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Spacecraft fulfill a myriad of critical functions on orbit, from defense and intelligence to 
science, navigation, and telecommunication. Spacecrft an also cost several hundred 
millions of dollars to design and launch, and given that physical access for maintenance 
remains difficult if not impossible to date, designing high reliability and survivability into 
these systems is an engineering and financial imperativ .  
While reliability is recognized as an essential attribute for spacecraft, little analysis has 
been done pertaining to actual field reliability of spacecraft and their subsystems. This 
thesis fills the gap in the current understanding of spacecraft failure behavior on orbit 
through extensive statistical analysis and modeling of anomaly and failure data, and then 
leverages these results to develop a theoretical basis and algorithmic tools for the analysis 
of survivability of spacecraft and space-based networks.   
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part provides extensive statistical results of 
recent on-orbit anomaly and failure data of Earth-orbiting spacecraft. Nonparametric 
reliability results are derived, and parametric models, including Weibull and mixture 
distributions, of spacecraft and spacecraft subsystem  are developed. These analyses are 
then extended to multi-state failures, accounting for and modeling spacecraft subsystems’ 
degraded states and partial failures. Culprit subsystems driving spacecraft unreliability 
are identified, including major contributors to infa t mortality and anomaly, and it is 
suggested that these would benefit most from a revision of their current testing protocol 
xxxii 
 
and burn-in procedures. The second part builds on these results to develop a novel 
theoretical basis and algorithmic tools for the analysis of survivability of spacecraft and 
space-based networks. Space-based networks (SBNs) allow the sharing of on-orbit 
resources, such as data storage, processing, and downlink. Spacecraft in SBNs can have 
different subsystem composition and functionality, thus resulting in node heterogeneity 
(each spacecraft being a node in the network). Current tools for network survivability 
analysis assume homogeneous nodes, and as such, they are not suited for the analysis of 
space-based networks. This thesis proposes that heterog neous networks can be modeled 
with a new approach termed interdependent multi-layer networks, which is then adapted 
for their survivability analysis. The multi-layer aspect enables the breakdown of 
spacecraft according to common functionalities and allows the emergence of 
homogeneous sub-networks, while the interdependency aspect constrains the network to 
capture the physical characteristics of spacecraft. Formal characterization of 
interdependent multi-layer networks, as well as algorithmic tools for the analysis of 
failure propagation across the network are developed and illustrated with space 
applications and proof of concepts. The SBN applications considered consist of several 
networked spacecraft that can tap into other’s Command and Data Handling subsystem 
(C&DH), in case of degradation or failure of its own, including Telemetry, Tracking and 
Command, Control Processor or Data Handling sub-subsystems. Results indicate and 
quantify the incremental survivability improvement of the SBN over the traditional 
monolith architecture. A trade-space analysis is then conducted using non-descriptive 
networkable subsystems/technologies to explore survivability characteristics of space-
based networks and help guide design choices. The trade studies provide important 
xxxiii 
 
insights into design and architectural choices for enhancing survivability of 
heterogeneous networks in general, and space-based networks in particular. For example, 
it is shown that such networks shield in priority the system from the most severe failures, 
and their incremental survivability decreases with decreasing severity of subsystems 
anomalies at comparable occurrence. Also, network su vivability benefits most from 
increasing number of nodes for networkable subsystems with increasingly problematic 
failure behavior. The analysis also demonstrates the criticality of the wireless link 
reliability, and highlights the importance of rooting out infant mortality of this link to 
enable any survivability improvements for space-based networks. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Tempus edax rerum” 
“Time, devourer of all things” 
 
Ovid, AD 8 
Metamorphoses, XV, 234 
 
 
1.1. A Brief Historical Perspective and Motivation 
On October 4, 1957, a small beeping spacecraft, Sputnik, heralded the beginning of the 
Space Age. From this humble start, the space industry grew into an impressive $100+ 
billion industry. Around 6500 spacecraft were launched in the five decades after Sputnik. 
And although the launch rate has been highly variable (Hiriart and Saleh, 2010), a rough 
estimate would set it at present around 80 to 100 spacecraft launched per year. Spacecraft 
today fulfill a myriad of functions, from Defense and Intelligence missions (early 
warning, reconnaissance, etc.), to Science missions (Earth observation, interplanetary 
probes), Communication functions (Direct-To-Home, Fixed Satellite Services, and 
Mobile Satellite Services) and Navigation services (GPS). 
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Spacecraft can cost several hundred millions of dollars to design and launch1, and as such 
reliability is essential for these systems. More generally, reliability is a critical design 
attribute for high-value systems operating in remote or inhospitable environments such as 
spacecraft or sub-sea installations. Since physical a cess to these assets is difficult or 
impossible, maintenance cannot be relied upon to compensate for substandard reliability 
(Rausand and Høyland, 2004). As a result, designing high reliability into these systems is 
an essential engineering and financial imperative. 
By an unexpected accident of history, the official birth of reliability engineering and the 
onset of the Space Age took place the same year (1957), and the first part of this 
dissertation is at the intersection of these two dev lopments by bringing reliability 
engineering to bear on space systems. Reliability engineering is founded on several 
essential ingredients such as probability and statistics, theoretically formalized in the 
seventeen century by Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat, or the concept of mass 
production, popularized by Henri Ford but already existing for several years with the use 
of standardized, interchangeable parts. The idea of the stochastic nature of the time to 
failure was not immediately accepted by production engineers, but the stark unreliability 
of the vacuum tube during World War II acted as the catalyst that accelerated the coming 
of reliability engineering, through studies launched by the US Department of Defense. A 
more detailed review of the history of reliability engineering can be found in Saleh and 
Marais (2006) and Saleh and Castet (2011). 
                                                 
1 Except for micro-satellites, which are typically in the $10 – $50 million range, and on-going efforts a e 
seeking to significantly reduce this price tag. Whether useful functions can be performed on orbit below 
this range remains to be seen. 
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In the case of space systems, statistical analysis of actual flight data would provide useful 
feedback to the space industry, in relation to partselection, redundancy allocation, testing 
programs, etc. In addition, a better understanding of spacecraft failures, and the 
determination of the existence of infant mortality among spacecraft subsystems is an 
important endeavor for the space industry. Indeed, infant mortality can be traced back to 
design flaws and manufacturing defects, and as suchit an be reduced or eliminated 
through proper equipment testing or burn-in. Robertson and Stoneking (2003) however 
warn against over-testing parts that could lead to a decrease in the overall subsystem 
reliability. This raises interesting questions of hw to do pre-flight testing, and at what 
level of integration, of subsystems whose components xhibit different failure behaviors 
(e.g., infant mortality for some and wear-out failure for others).  
In its traditional understanding, reliability analysis considers only two states: operational 
and failed. Consequently, the system under consideration is only perceived as being in 
one of these two states. In reality, engineering artifacts can experience partial 
degradations, and not necessary only catastrophic failures. To account for this 
progression from fully operational towards complete loss, multi-state failure analysis 
introduces “degraded states”, and thus provides more insights through finer resolution 
into the degradation behavior of an item. As such, following a reliability analysis of 
spacecraft subsystems, this dissertation provides a theoretical formalization of multi-state 
failure analysis and applies it on spacecraft subsystems. 
Finally, endogenous failures are a subset of the failures a spacecraft can experience: 
exogenous failures such as collisions with orbital debris or attacks from anti-satellite 
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(ASAT) weapons can trigger degradation in functionality, potentially leading to a total 
loss. This broader picture of failure analysis falls in the realm of survivability analysis 
and is applied to spacecraft and space-based networks (SBNs). SBNs are related to a 
novel concept recently introduced in the space industry termed fractionation: by 
physically distributing functions in multiple orbiting modules wirelessly connected to 
each other, this new architecture allows the sharing of resources on-orbit, such as data 
processing, data storage, and downlinks. 
To summarize, spacecraft and space-based networks, as engineering artifacts, degrade 
and fail in time; just how they do so, a particular aspect of their relationship with time, is 
explored in this thesis, and the remainder of this dis ertation is organized as follows. 
1.2. Outline and Anticipated Contributions 
This dissertation is articulated in two parts. The first part is a descriptive analysis of 
reliability and multi-state failures of spacecraft nd spacecraft subsystems based on 
statistical data analyses (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). The second part introduces a 
prescriptive or normative analysis of survivability bearing on spacecraft and space-based 
networks (Chapter 4 and following). It also brings a theoretical contribution to this thesis 
by proposing a novel method to represent and analyze networks with node heterogeneity. 
Chapter 2 presents a statistical analysis of spacecr ft failure data. As mentioned earlier, 
spacecraft reliability analysis are recognized as important for the space industry, but 
unfortunately, limited empirical data and statistical analyses of spacecraft reliability exist 
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in the literature. A brief literature review of early studies of spacecraft failures is 
conducted and highlights their limitations. This chapter fills the gap by providing a 
formal reliability analysi s based on a large sample and nonparametric spacecraft 
reliability results  are presented. In addition, parametric analyses are conducted and 
single Weibull as well as mixture distribution models are derived. Finally, the statistical 
failure analysis is extended to spacecraft subsystems, and the relative contribution of 
spacecraft subsystems to the global spacecraft unreliability is examined, highlighting 
problematic subsystems that would benefit most from reliability improvements. 
Chapter 3 extends the previous analyses of reliability, n its traditionally binary-state 
understanding, to account for spacecraft anomalies and failures of various severity. 
Partial failures constitute a significant portion of anomalous events a spacecraft can 
experience on-orbit, and as such their analysis is critical to obtain a complete picture of 
the spacecraft and spacecraft subsystems’ failure behavior. This chapter introduces a 
formal multi-state failure analysis of spacecraft subsystems, and provides practical 
implications for the space industry. 
Chapter 4 is a turning point in this dissertation as considerations of survivability 
analysis are brought on spacecraft and the newly introduced concept of space-based 
networks. Chapter 4 provides a literature review on survivability analysis, as well as on 
network analysis. A formal survivability framework  is introduced and limitations of the 
current network analysis to represent and analyze space-based networks are demonstrated. 
To overcome these limitations, a new framework is presented and termed 
interdependent multi-layer network approach. 
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Chapter 5 is devoted to the derivation of the anomaly and failure propagation for the 
interdependent multi-layer network approach introduced in this thesis. Several 
algorithms are introduced and illustrated with a case study space-based network. 
Chapter 6 presents the analyses conducted to validate the failure propagation for 
interdependent multi-layer networks introduced in the previous chapter. This validation 
procedure is important so that the survivability results can be trusted and properly 
analyzed. Chapter 6 also evaluate the pr cision of the model results, by comparing them 
with results obtained with an alternative modeling technique, namely stochastic Petri nets, 
as well as limited analytical solutions. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the potential 
scalability of the interdependent multi-layer network modeling. 
Chapter 7 puts to use the validated interdependent multi-layer network approach 
proposed in this dissertation to derive survivability analysis of selected space-based 
network architectures. This chapter then leverages these results to obtain insights on 
design and architectural choices for future space sy tems. 










STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SPACECRAFT RELIABILITY  




CHAPTER 2  
RELIABILITY OF SPACECRAFT AND SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEMS  
 
For space systems, statistical analysis of flight data, in particular of actual on-orbit (field) 
anomaly and failure data, would provide particularly useful feedback to spacecraft 
designers. For example, such analyses can help guide parts selection and provide an 
empirical basis for subsystem redundancy and reliability growth plans. Analyzing 
spacecraft failure behavior on orbit, and identifying their subsystems’ actual reliability 
profiles, not their reliability requirements—how they actually degrade and fail on-orbit, 
not how they should or are expected to—can help spacecr ft manufacturers prioritize and 
hone in on problematic subsystems that would benefit most from reliability 
improvements. Reliability improvements can be achieved through redundancy, increased 
testing prior to launch, or better design and parts selection, and these efforts would result 
in a decreased likelihood of spacecraft experiencing failure events. In addition, 
identifying whether specific spacecraft subsystems experience infant mortality for 
example would provide a clear opportunity for spacecraft manufacturers and equipment 
providers to develop burn-in procedures for weeding out early failures in said subsystems.  
Statistical analysis of on-orbit failure and spacecraft reliability can also provide important 
and actionable information to stakeholders other than spacecraft manufacturers. For 
example spacecraft operators may be particularly interested in the reliability profiles of 
their on-orbit assets, for planning and risk mitigation purposes, and insurers evidently 
rely on such analysis and information to set up their policy and insurance premiums. 
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The importance of statistical analysis of on orbit fa lure data was recognized early in the 
advent of the space age. The following subsections provide a brief overview of past 
spacecraft reliability studies. 
2.1. On Spacecraft and Reliability: Early Studies 
A few years after the launch of the first spacecraft, statistical analyses of spacecraft 
reliability and on-orbit failures began to appear. As discussed by Bean and Bloomquist 
(1968), statistical analyses based on empirical data from spacecraft on-orbit were an 
essential undertaking for the aerospace industry, for two reasons: gathering data from 
spacecraft and determining the failure behavior of satellites or satellite subsystems 1) 
provides feedback to the industry on the performance (“strengths” or “weaknesses”) of 
designed and manufactured parts and components, and allows efficient reliability 
improvement programs, and 2) allows improving the estimation of “parameters 
commonly used in reliability predictive techniques” by comparing estimated and 
observed reliability/failure rates. One of the earliest reliability studies, according to 
Leventhal et al. (1969), was published in 1962, and it analyzed th failure behavior of 16 
spacecraft launched before November 1961 (ARINC, 1962). Over the years, similar 
analyses would be conducted with larger sample sizes or spacecraft population. For 
example, Bean and Bloomquist (1968) analyzed the failure behavior of 225 spacecraft; 
Timmins and Heuser (1971), and Timmins (1974; 1975) analyzed the failure behavior of 
57 spacecraft; and Hecht and Hecht (1985) and Hecht and Fiorentino (1987; 1988) 
analyzed the failure behavior of some 300 spacecraft. 
More recent studies revolved around specific spacecr ft subsystems. For example Cho 
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(2005) and Landis et al. (2006) focused on failures in spacecraft power subsystem, 
Brandhorst and Rodiek (2008) on solar arrays failures, and Roberston and Stoneking 
(2003) on the attitude control subsystem failures. Sperber (2002) and Tafazoli (2009) 
analyzed not a single subsystem’s failures but the comparative contribution of various 
subsystems to spacecraft on orbit failures. And instead of spacecraft subsystems, 
Bedingfield et al. (1996) focused on spacecraft failures only due to the natural space 
environment. 
Early spacecraft reliability studies assumed an exponential distribution and constant 
failure rate (Leventhal et al., 1969; Bean and Bloomquist, 1968; Binckes, 1983). In some 
of these studies however, discrepancies between the valu s of the observed reliability and 
the predicted reliability of the spacecraft already started to appear: Bean and Bloomquist 
(1968), for example, concluded that observed failures rates were lower than expected 
from prediction. The exponential assumption was challenged by Timmins and Heuser 
(1971) who showed that, for their small sample of 57 NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center spacecraft, the failure rate was in fact not constant but higher in the early days on 
orbit: 
“The number of failures per spacecraft were abnormally high for the first 
30 days in space. The number of first-day failures d parted even more 
from the longer trend.”  
This finding of spacecraft infant mortality and decreasing failure rate was repeated in 
subsequent studies (Timmins, 1974; 1975), and led Baker and Baker (1980) to comment 
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that “those spacecraft that last, last on and on,” which in effect reflects for these authors 
the absence of wear-out failures in spacecraft. 
Hecht and Hecht (1985) analyzed a different population of spacecraft than the one used in 
the previous four studies (the 57 NASA spacecraft). Their sample consisted of some 300 
spacecraft launched between 1960 and 1984, and covered 96 different space programs. 
Their analysis also found decreasing failure rate in their spacecraft sample, and they took 
issue with the constant failure rate models proposed in the military reliability handbook, 
MIL-HDBK-217 as unrealistic for system reliability predictions. MIL-HDBK-217 was 
first developed in 1961 and revised several times afterwards. Similar conclusions were 
advanced by Krasich (1995) and Sperber (1990; 1994) who noted a qualitative agreement 
in prior studies “that as the mission goes on, riskper unit time to surviving spacecraft 
decreases.” 
To better represent this non constant failure rate, several models have been explored, and 
several studies chose the Weibull distribution as suitable for spacecraft or spacecraft 
subsystem reliability (Norris and Timmins, 1976; Baker and Baker, 1980; Hecht and 
Hecht, 1985; Hecht and Fiorentino, 1987; Krasich, 1995). However, given the significant 
technological changes in spacecraft design in the last decades, these models suffer from 
obsolescence and are of limited relevance for today’s spacecraft. As for the more recent 
studies mentioned earlier, they reported failure numbers but they did not provide 
reliability models. Consequently there is a gap in the literature for recent reliability 
models for spacecraft and a need for a thorough statistic l analysis of recent flight data to 




2.2. Nonparametric Reliability Analysis of Spacecraft Failure Data 
2.2.1. Database and Data Description 
The SpaceTrak database (see References) was adopted f r the purpose of this thesis. This 
database is used by many of the world’s launch providers, spacecraft insurers, operators, 
and spacecraft manufacturers. The database provides a hi tory of on-orbit spacecraft 
failures and anomalies, as well as launch histories s nce 1957. It should be pointed out 
that this database is not necessarily “complete” in a statistical sense since some military 
or intelligence spacecraft may not have their failures reported. Similarly, the database 
cannot be considered “complete” with respect to anomalies or partial failures since 
spacecraft operators may not report all partial failures, especially, the ones that can be 
recovered from in a timely manner. This being said, the database is considered as one of 
the authoritative databases in the space industry wi h failure and anomaly data for over 
6400 spacecraft. The statistical analysis in this work is enabled by, and confined to, the 
failure and anomaly information provided in this database. 
The sample analyzed in this section consists of 1584 spacecraft. The sample was 
restricted to Earth-orbiting spacecraft successfully launched between January 1990 and 
October 2008. The observation window has been chosen t  obtain a spacecraft sample as 
large as possible, while limiting the effect of technology heterogeneity and obsolescence. 
A failure leading to the spacecraft retirement is identified in the database as a Class I 
failure, that is, a complete failure leading to theloss of the spacecraft. In addition, as will 
be detailed later, eleven spacecraft subsystems are identified in the database. If the cause 
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of a Class I failure is identified and traced back to a particular subsystem, that “culprit” 
subsystem is noted in the database. When the culprit subsystem, whose failure led to the 
spacecraft failure, could not be identified, the failure of the spacecraft is ascribed to an 
“unknown” category in the database. This categorization was used for analyzing the 
relative contribution of each subsystem to the overall spacecraft failures. 
For each spacecraft in the sample, the following information was collected: 1) its launch 
date; 2) its failure date, if failure occurred; 3) the subsystem identified as having caused 
the spacecraft failure, hereafter referred to as the culprit subsystem; and 4) the censored 
time, if no failure occurred. This last point is further explained in the following 
subsection, where data censoring and the Kaplan–Meier estimator are discussed. The data 
collection template and sample data for the analysis are shown in Table 2.1. 











(if no failure occurred) 
Spacecraft #1 11/06/1998 11/15/1998 TTC – 
Spacecraft #2 03/01/2002 – – 10/02/2008 
… … … … … 
Spacecraft #1584 04/26/2004 03/28/2006 Mechanisms – 
* Note that spacecraft are not necessarily arranged/shown in chronological order 
2.2.2. Nonparametric Analysis of Spacecraft Failure Data 
Censoring occurs when life data for statistical analysis of a set of items is “incomplete”. 
This situation occurs frequently in multiple settings (e.g., medical and engineering 
contexts) and can happen because some items in the sample under study are removed 
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prior to failure or because the test or observation window ends prior to all items failing. 
By contrast, a life data set is said to be “complete” if one observes the actual time to 
failure of all the items in the sample under study, that is, if no censoring occurs within the 
data. Censoring introduces particular difficulties in statistical analysis which, if not 
addressed and accounted for, can significantly bias the results. There are multiple 
classifications and types of censoring and different statistical techniques for dealing with 
them. The reader interested in extensive detail is referred to three excellent books on the 
subject: Lawless (2003), Ansell and Phillips (1994) and Meeker and Escobar (1998). In 
the particular case of this study, the sample analyzed is right-censored (random censoring) 
with staggered entry. This means the following: 1) the units in the sample are activated at 
different points in time (i.e. the spacecraft are launched at different calendar dates), but 
all activation times in the sample are known; 2) failures dates and censoring are 
stochastic; and 3) censoring occurs either because  unit (spacecraft) is retired from the 
sample before a failure occurs or because the spacecraft is still operational at the end of 




Figure 2.1. Censored data with staggered entry 
 
Staggered entries are easily handled by shifting all the activation times to t = 0, which 
changes the approach, and the x-axis in Figure 2.1, from a calendar-time to a clock-time 
analysis of spacecraft reliability. Therefore spacecraft reliability is investigated as a 
function of time following successful orbit insertion. 
Censoring of data requires particular attention. Deriving a reliability function from 
censored life data is not trivial, and it is important that is it done properly if the results are 
to be meaningful and unbiased. In this work, the powerful Kaplan–Meier estimator 
(Kaplan and Meier, 1958) is adopted, as it is best sui ed for handling the type of 
censoring in the sample.  
Starting with n operational units, and because of censoring, only m time to failure (m < n) 






















 t(1) < t(2) < … <  t(m) (2.1) 
be the failure times organized in ascending order. The goal is to estimate the reliability 
function, defined with respect to the random variable TF (time to failure) as: 
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where: 
 ni = number of operational units right before t(i) 
    = n – [number of censored units right before t(i)] 
          – [number of failed units right before t(i)]
(2.4) 
 
The complete derivation of the Kaplan-Meier estimator and the treatment of ties in the 
data are provided in Castet and Saleh (2009a) and Sleh and Castet (2011). Also in these 
references are provided details about the construction of confidence intervals for the 
Kaplan-Meier estimate (here using the Greenwood’s formula, with alternative methods in 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) and Lawless (2003)). 
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The on-orbit spacecraft reliability from the censored data set can now be analyzed. For 
the 1584 spacecraft in the sample, there are 98 failures times and 1486 censored times. 
The (ordered) failure times are provided in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2. Failure times (in days) of spacecraft launched between January 1990 and October 2008 
1 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 
7 9 12 15 15 16 16 23 36 51 53 
64 68 73 79 89 102 107 123 128 131 167 
190 197 221 229 237 252 271 309 314 317 334 
364 465 515 696 701 713 722 724 787 1053 1073 
1122 1146 1167 1184 1233 1256 1347 1458 1551 1637 1778 
1797 1836 1967 2009 2091 2097 2098 2181 2191 2237 2429 
2434 2472 2577 2580 2624 2702 2917 2947 2963 3038 3077 
3159 3268 3455 3684 3759 4192 4324 4909 5043 5207  
 
The data is then treated with the Kaplan-Meier estimator (Eq. (2.3)), and the 
Kaplan-Meier plot of spacecraft reliability shown i Figure 2.2 is obtained, with 95% 
confidence intervals (that is, a 95% likelihood that the actual reliability will fall between 
these two bounds, with the Kaplan-Meier analysis providing the most likely estimate).  
Figure 2.2 reads as follows: For example, after twoyears on-orbit, spacecraft reliability 
will be between 95.4% and 97.8% with a 95% likelihood—these values constitute the 
lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval at t = 2 years. In addition, the 
most likely estimate of spacecraft reliability at this point in time is R̂ = 96.4%. More 
precisely: 
  years 2.155years 1.982  for             964.0)( <≤= ttR
)
 
Spacecraft reliability then drops to approximately 94% after 6 years on-orbit. Past 12 
years, spacecraft reliability lies roughly between 90% and 91%. Complete tabular data 
18 
 
are given in Castet and Saleh (2009a) and Saleh and C stet (2011). Comments about the 
confidence interval spread are made in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 2.2. Kaplan-Meier plot of spacecraft reliability with 95% confidence intervals 
 
These are actual (field) spacecraft reliability results, not reliability specifications, and 
they provide a first answer to “how reliable spacecraft have been?” (between 1990 and 
2008). Several trends can be seen in Figure 2.2, the most noticeable one being the steep 
drop in reliability during the first year of spacecraft operation, which is indicative of 
infant mortality. These trends are better captured further with parametric models. 
2.2.3. Parametric Analysis and Weibull Modeling of Spacecraft Reliability 
Nonparametric analysis provides powerful results since the reliability calculation is 
unconstrained to fit any particular pre-defined lifetime distribution. However, this 
flexibility makes nonparametric results neither easy nor convenient to use for various 































95% confidence interval bounds
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purposes often encountered in engineering design (e.g., reliability-based design 
optimization). In addition, some failure trends and patterns are more clearly identified 
and recognizable with parametric analysis. Several methods are available to fit parametric 
distributions to the nonparametric reliability result  (as provided for example by the 
Kaplan-Meier estimator), or to derive parametric reliability distributions directly from the 
failure and censored times. Probability plotting is u ed to illustrate that spacecraft 
reliability can be reasonably approximated by a Weibull distribution, and the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method is used to calculate the parameters of the Weibull 
distribution. However, as discussed below, several trends are present in the 
nonparametric result of spacecraft reliability that c n be better captured by more complex 
models, such as mixtures of Weibull distributions. 
Weibull distributions and mixtures. The Weibull distribution is one of the most 
commonly used distribution in reliability analysis. The reason for its wide adoption is that 
it is quite flexible, and with an appropriate choice of one of its two parameters (the shape 
parameter), it can model different kinds of failure behaviors. The Weibull distribution has 
two parameters: the shape parameter β and the scale parameter θ. Its failure rate can be 












βλ tt  with θ > 0, β > 0, t ≥ 0 (2.5) 
The shape parameter β is dimensionless, and the scale parameter θ is expressed in units of 
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Weibull models for spacecraft reliability. Probability plots constitute a simple and 
visually appealing graphical estimation procedure for fitting a parametric distribution to 
nonparametric data. This procedure is based on the fact that some parametric models such 
as the Exponential or Weibull distribution can have th ir reliability function linearized 
using a particular mathematical transformation. This transformation for the Weibull 
distribution is presented in Castet and Saleh (2009a) and Saleh and Castet (2011). In the 
case of the estimated spacecraft reliability obtained above, its resulting Weibull plot is 




Figure 2.3. Weibull plot of spacecraft reliability 
 
The data points are well aligned (R2 = 0.9835) and this provides a first indication that the 
Weibull fit is indeed a good one, and that spacecraft reliability can be justifiably 
approximated by a Weibull distribution. The Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) 
method provides more precise parametric fits than graphical estimation, as long as the 
sample size is not exceedingly small (e.g., in the single digits). The MLE method is 
analytically more involved than the graphical estimation techniques, and requires 1) 
determining the right formulation of the Likelihood function for a chosen distribution and 
type of censoring, as will be shown shortly, and, 2) searching for an optimum of this 
function, which can be accomplished through various computational or analytical 
techniques. The values of unknown parameters of the distribution parameters that 
maximize the Likelihood Function are termed the Maximum Likelihood Estimates and 
the method is known as the MLE. The complete analytic l derivation of the MLE in the 
case of a Weibull distribution is provided in Saleh and Castet (2011). The resulting 
Weibull reliability function for spacecraft is given as follows: 














































tR , t in years (2.9) 
The shape parameter of the Weibull distribution (β = 0.4521) is smaller than 1, which 
indicates that spacecraft infant mortality  is a robust finding. 
In addition to the Weibull distribution to parametrically model spacecraft reliability, other 
distributions were investigated, and in particular an MLE lognormal fit was also 


















with 7646.9=µ  and 2209.5=σ  for t in years 
(2.10) 
The residuals of the lognormal distribution indicate that although it is a relatively 
accurate representation of the nonparametric (benchmark) satellite reliability results, the 
lognormal distribution is less precise and a more biased fit of satellite reliability than the 
Weibull distribution. As a conclusion, the Weibull distribution is retained for the 
remainder of this dissertation. 
In the case of a 2-Weibull mixture distribution, the MLE method yields the following 
(method and step-by-step derivation of the MLE for Weibull mixtures provided in Saleh 
and Castet (2011). Also in that reference are provided alternative methods based on 
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Dempster, et al. (1977), or McLachlan and Krishnan (2008), Titterington, et al. (1985) 




































tR , t in years (2.11) 
Note that the first Weibull shape parameter β1 < 1 captures spacecraft infant mortality, 
whereas the second Weibull shape parameter β2 > 1 captures spacecraft wear-out failures. 
These two parametric models of the spacecraft reliability are shown in Figure 2.4 and 
Figure 2.5, superimposed on the nonparametric reliability results. 
It can be observed that both parametric models provide relatively precise approximation 
of the nonparametric reliability as can been seen from Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5. 
However, upon closer inspection, it is clear that the 2-Weibull mixture distribution 
follows with a higher accuracy the trends present in the nonparametric spacecraft 
reliability. To quantify this difference in accuracy, a detailed analysis of the residuals of 
both parametric models is conducted with respect to the nonparametric reliability, as 
shown in Figure 2.6. Figure 2.6 presents two box-plots for the residuals of the single 
Weibull and the 2-Weibull mixture distributions. Recall that the box-plot reads as follows: 
the lower boundary of the “box” is determined by the first quartile (25th percentile) of the 
residuals, and the upper boundary by the third quartile (75th percentile). The line within 
the box corresponds to the median value, and the “whiskers” outside the box represent 









Figure 2.5. Nonparametric and 2-Weibull mixture reliability 
 
 





























Single Weibull distribution (MLE)

































Figure 2.6. Box plots of the residuals between the Weibull fits and the nonparametric reliability over 
15 years 
 
Figure 2.6 confirms the higher precision of the mixture of distributions over 15 years. 
The residuals of the mixture distribution have a smaller spread than those of the single-
function parametric fit:  
• The 25th and 75th percentile are less dispersed for the mixture distribution (i.e., 
smaller box); 
• The extreme values are less spread (i.e., shorter whiskers); 
• The residuals of the 2-Weibull mixture distribution are clearly more 
symmetrically dispersed that those of the single Weibull. In addition, the residuals 
between the 2-Weibull and the nonparametric reliability results are quasi-
normally distributed which is a good indication that no bias remains in the 
parametric mixture model and all failure trends have been captured by the 2-
Weibull mixture distribution. This last comment also indicates that it is 
superfluous to fit higher order mixture distributions (k > 2). 


























As a conclusion, the following suggestions are made for researchers and industry 
professionals should they wish to use these spacecrft reliability results. First, the use the 
nonparametric results is recommended as the most accurate reflection of actual spacecraft 
reliability. However, if the context of the study is not amenable to manipulating or using 
nonparametric results, then the use of the 2-Weibull mixture fit is recommended. The 
single Weibull MLE fit can be used if simplicity issought and the study does not require 
a high level of precision. 
2.2.4. Discussion and Limitations 
A discussion is in order regarding the challenges and limitations of statistical analysis of 
spacecraft reliability in general, and the analysis and results in the previous section in 
particular. First note that the results here provided represent the “collective” failure 
behavior of Earth-orbiting spacecraft launched betwe n 1990 and 2008. It can be argued 
however that no two spacecraft are truly alike, andthat every spacecraft operates in a 
distinct environment, in different orbits or even within the same orbit, where spacecraft, 
unless they are co-located, are exposed to different space environment conditions. The 
situation of the space industry is different from that for example of the semi-conductor 
industry where data on, say, thousands of identical ransistors operating under identical 
environmental conditions are available for statistical analysis, or other industries with 
items for which failure data can be easily obtained from accelerated testing or field 
operation. The consequence is that in the absence of “spacecraft mass production,” 
statistical analysis of spacecraft failure and reliabi ty data faces the dilemma of choosing 
between calculating precise “average” spacecraft reliability or deriving a possibly 
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uncertain “specific” spacecraft platform reliability. This dilemma is explained in the 
following two possible approaches.  
The first approach is to lump together different spacecraft and analyze their “collective” 
on-orbit failure behavior, assuming that the failure times of the spacecraft are 
independent and identically distributed (iid). The advantage of doing so is that one can 
work with a relatively large sample (a few hundred or thousand of units), as done in this 
section, and thus obtain some precision and a narrow c nfidence interval for the 
“collective” reliability analyzed (a single-digit percentage point dispersion). The 
disadvantage is that the iid assumption can be challenged, and the “collective” reliability 
calculated (with precision) may not reflect the specific reliability of a particular type of 
spacecraft in a particular orbit.  
The second approach is to specialize the data, for example for specific spacecraft 
platform or mission type, or for spacecraft in particular orbits. The advantage of doing so 
is that the reliability analyzed is specific to the type of spacecraft considered (it is no 
longer a “collective” on-orbit reliability). The disadvantage is that the sample size is 
reduced, and as a consequence, the confidence interval xpands. Given the available 
number of spacecraft (a few thousands), inappropriate d ta specialization, which could 
reduce the sample size to say fewer than a hundred data points, will result in significantly 
large confidence intervals, and thus highly dispersed and uncertain “specific” spacecraft 
reliability results.  
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This section provided results based on the first approach, the “collective” failure behavior 
of spacecraft recently launched. The second approach is adopted in Castet and Saleh 
(2009b), Hiriart, et al. (2009), and Dubos, Castet and Saleh (2010), where reliability 
results based on careful data specialization by spacecr ft mission type, orbit type, and 
mass category are derived. 
2.2.5. Spacecraft Subsystem Reliability and Comparative Contribution to 
Spacecraft Unreliability 
In this subsection, , the previous statistical analysis of spacecraft reliability is extended to 
include spacecraft subsystems, that is, the analysis is narrowed down from the 
system-level to the subsystem-level failures, and reliability results, nonparametric and 
parametric, are derived for spacecraft subsystems. The two broad questions addressed 
here are, 1) what are the reliability profiles of various spacecraft subsystems? And 2) 
to what extent does each subsystem contribute to the overall failures of spacecraft? 
The answer to the second question constitutes a comparative analysis of subsystems 
failure, from an actuarial perspective, and allows for example the identification of culprit 
subsystems driving spacecraft unreliability. The results here provided should prove 
helpful to spacecraft manufacturers by allowing them to hone in on problematic 




Spacecraft subsystem identification. The statistical failure data analysis at the subsystem 
level is enabled by, and confined to, the subsystem identified in the database:  
1. Gyro / Sensor / Reaction Wheel (hereafter referred to as Gyro) 
2. Thruster / Fuel (Thruster) 
3. Beam / Antenna Operation / Deployment (Beam) 
4. Control Processor (CP) 
5. Mechanisms / Structures / Thermal (Mechanisms) 
6. Payload Instrument / Amplifier / On-board Data / Computer / Transponder 
(Payload) 
7. Battery / Cell (Battery) 
8. Electrical Distribution (ED) 
9. Solar Array Deployment (SAD) 
10. Solar Array Operating (SAO) 
11. Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TTC) 
Descriptions of these subsystems can be found in textbooks on spacecraft systems 
engineering such as in Fortescue et al. (2003) or Wertz and Larson (1999). When the 
culprit subsystem that led to the failure of the spacecraft could not be identified, the 
failure of the spacecraft is ascribed to an “Unknow” category in the database. Only the 
Beam/Antenna operation/deployment subsystem exhibits no Class I failure in the dataset. 




Nonparametric reliability of spacecraft subsystems. The subsystem failure data is treated 
with the Kaplan-Meier estimator (Eq. (2.3)), and the Kaplan-Meier plots of the reliability 
of all the spacecraft subsystems along with 95% confide ce intervals are shown in Figure 
2.7 and Figure 2.8.  
Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 read as follows. Consider th  “Gyro” subsystem, its reliability 
is shown in the upper-left corner of Figure 2.7. After a successful launch, the reliability of 
this subsystem drops to approximately 99.5% after fou years on-orbit. More precisely : 
          
years 385.5years 3.137    ist        tha                  







In addition, the reliability of this subsystem will fall between 99.1% and 99.9%, its 95% 
confidence interval, over this period of time.  
This same “reading grid” regarding the estimated reliability   
) 
R (t)and confidence interval 
applies to all the other subsystems of Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8. Notice the particular 
nonparametric reliability of the Solar Array Deployment, a constant, which is due to the 





Figure 2.7. Spacecraft subsystems reliability with 95% confidence intervals (1/2) 
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Figure 2.8. Spacecraft subsystems reliability with 95% confidence intervals (2/2) 
 
A general observation can be made regarding these nonparametric reliability results, 
namely that spacecraft subsystems all maintain reliability above than 98% after 15 years 
on orbit (and above 97% for the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval). However, 
the collective failure contributions of these subsystems lead to spacecraft reliability in the 
80% to 90% range as seen in the previous subsection, a costly situation, considering that 
these high-value assets often cost several hundred millions of dollars to design and 
launch, and they do not benefit from physical access and maintenance to remedy on orbit 
failures. Consequently, improvements to spacecraft subsystem reliability are warranted, 
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and the nonparametric results in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8. provide a first indication of 
possible subsystem failure patterns to target and remedy. Notice for example the distinct 
and marked infant mortality failures of the Thruster / Fuel and the TTC subsystems, 
which could be eliminated through improved testing or burn-in procedures.  
Weibull modeling of spacecraft subsystem reliability. Weibull distributions have been 
shown previously to be adequate for modeling spacecr ft reliability. The same 
observation can be extended to spacecraft subsystems as demonstrated in Castet and 
Saleh (2009c) and Saleh and Castet (2011). The resulting models from the MLE methods 
are given in Table 2.3. It is shown in these two references that the resulting Weibull 
distributions are a good fit for the nonparametric results. Improved accuracy, if needed, 
can be obtained as done previously through the use of mixture distributions. 
Table 2.3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Weibull parameters for subsystem reliability 
Subsystem β θ 
years 
Gyro / Sensor / Reaction Wheel 0.7182 3831 
Thruster / Fuel 0.3375 6,206,945 
Control Processor 1.4560 408 
Mechanisms / Structures / Thermal 0.3560 2,308,746 
Payload Instrument / Amplifier / On-board Data / Computer / Transponder 0.8874 7983 
Battery / Cell 0.7460 7733 
Electrical distribution 0.5021 169,272 
Solar Array Deployment – – 
Solar Array Operating 0.4035 1,965,868 
Telemetry Tracking and Command 0.3939 400,982 
 
Note that no values of the Weibull parameters are provided for the Solar Array 
Deployment subsystem. As discussed previously, the “Solar Array Deployment” is a one-
shot “subsystem” and a Weibull fit is not meaningful in this case. A Weibull fit can also 
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be conducted on the data assigned to the “Unknown” category. The resulting Weibull 
parameters are β = 0.4011 and θ = 5836474 years. 
The important result in Table 2.3 is that all spacecraft subsystems, with the exception 
of the Control Processor, suffer from infant mortality  (shape parameter β < 1). This 
finding has important implications for the space industry and should prompt serious 
considerations for improved subsystem testing and burn-in procedures. 
Comparative analysis of subsystem failures. A comparative analysis of subsystem 
failure is provided in this section and the culprit subsystems driving spacecraft 
unreliability are identified. More specifically, the relative contribution of each subsystem 
to the failure of the spacecraft in the sample is quantified. In addition, a time dimension is 
added to this analysis by investigating the evolutin over time of the relative contribution 
of each subsystem to the loss of spacecraft. The derivation of the percentage contribution 
of subsystem j to the failure of a spacecraft, named r j, is not trivial and the complete 
original derivation is available in Saleh and Castet (2011) and an illustrative example is 
shown in Kim, Castet and Saleh (2012).  
Deriving r j for all subsystem addresses the second question of this subsection, namely to 
what extent each subsystem contributes to the overall failures of spacecraft. The results of 
the analysis can be displayed in one figure, showing all the r j for j = 1 to 11 as a function 
of time. Doing so however would result in an exceedingly cluttered figure. For 




Figure 2.9. Relative contribution of various subsystems to spacecraft failure 
 
Figure 2.9 shows the evolution over time of the contribution of each subsystem to the loss 
of spacecraft. For example, it can be seen in the low r-left quadrant of Figure 2.9, that the 
Control Processor (CP) contributes approximately 6% to the total failures of spacecraft 
over 15 years. Similarly in the upper-left quadrant of Figure 2.9, it is observed that the 









































































































































































































































































































































Gyro and TTC are the major contributors to spacecraft failures with respectively 20% and 
15% of spacecraft failures due to these subsystems over a period of 15 years. 
These results clearly mark the TTC, Gyro, and Thruster/Fuel subsystems as the major 
culprits driving spacecraft unreliability  and the ones that would benefit most from 
reliability improvements. The Gyro and the Thruster/Fuel are the two subsystems of the 
macro spacecraft subsystem Attitude and Orbit Control Subsystem (AOCS). As a side 
node, if the Battery/Cell, ED, SAD and SAO are considered together within the larger 
Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS), their combined contributions to spacecraft 
unreliability class them as major protagonists for spacecraft complete loss, as shown in 
Kim, Castet and Saleh (2012). A complete discussion of the results presented in Figure 
2.9 is available in Saleh and Castet (2011). As a conclusion, Figure 2.9 provides some 
guidance to engineers working on spacecraft design and corresponding reliability 
testing programs. 
Figure 2.10 provides a more readable version of Figure 2.9. Instead of the evolution over 
time of r j, Figure 2.10 provides a snapshot or static picture of the subsystems’ 
contributions to spacecraft failures at four discrete points in time, after 30 days, after 1 
year, after 5 years, and after 10 years on-orbit. Figure 2.10 in effect represents vertical 
cuts across Figure 2.9, and while the dynamical information portrayed in this figure is 





Figure 2.10. Subsystem contributions to spacecraft failures after 30 days, 1 year, 5 years, and 10 
years on-orbit 
 
Similar observation can be made on Figure 2.10. In addition, note in the upper-left 
quadrant of Figure 2.10 that the Solar Array (Deployment and Operating) and TTC 
account respectively for 20% and 28% of the failures of the first 30 days on-orbit. Thus 
spacecraft infant mortality is driven to a large extent by these two subsystems, followed 




































































































The technical literature has long recognized the importance of spacecraft reliability, but 
little analysis based on actual extensive flight daa has been conducted. The present 
chapter helps to fill this gap by 1) conducting a thorough statistical analysis of recent on-
orbit spacecraft reliability data and on a significantly large sample, 2) fitting parametric 
models to the actual/observed reliability and 3) deriving reliability profiles of spacecraft 
subsystems and quantifying their relative contribution to satellite failures, enabling the 
identification of the subsystems that drive spacecraft unreliability. 
Fundamental results or this chapter includes the following: the spacecraft failures 
examined in this thesis exhibit a clear infant mortality trends, as well most subsystem 
failures (with the exception of the control processor). It was shown that the Weibull 
distribution is an appropriate model (single or mixture) for spacecraft reliability. Finally, 
particular subsystems such as the TTC or the Gyro were outlined as major contributors to 
spacecraft failures, and the time-dependence contribution of each subsystem was clearly 
identified. As such, the TTC and the solar array drive a significant part of the infant 
mortality. These analyses provides helpful feedback to the space industry in providing 
results, but also reproducible reliability methods for redesigning spacecraft and spacecraft 
subsystems, their test and screening programs, and providing an empirical basis for 
subsystem redundancy allocation and reliability growth plans. In the subsequent chapter, 
a more detailed approach to the degradation behavior of spacecraft subsystems is 
developed by accounting for and analyzing their anomalies and partial failures, i.e., 
failures of different severities, not just Class I (total) failures.  
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CHAPTER 3  
MULTI-STATE FAILURE ANALYSIS OF SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTE MS 
 
3.1. Introduction  
The previous section dealt with reliability of spacecraft and spacecraft subsystems, a 
critical design attribute for high value assets. The events considered were catastrophic 
failures (Class I) that lead to the complete loss of the spacecraft. As a result, only two 
states were considered, operational and failed, and the (sub)systems were analyzed and 
modeled as being in one of these two states. In reality, many engineering artifacts, 
spacecraft included, can experience failure events of varying severities, and thus 
transition from fully operational to various states of partial degradations, not necessarily 
complete failures. Indeed, the database used for the statistical analysis in the present work 
identifies four classes of anomaly and failure for each spacecraft subsystem: three 
degraded states, and one failed state (complete failure):  
• Class IV: minor/temporary/repairable failure that does not have a significant 
permanent impact on the operation of the spacecraft o  its subsystems; 
• Class III: major non-repairable failure that causes the loss of redundancy to the 
operation of a spacecraft or its subsystems on a permanent basis; 
• Class II: major non-repairable failure that affects the operation of a spacecraft or 
its subsystems on a permanent basis; 
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• Class I: subsystem failure causing spacecraft retirements. This effectively means 
the total failure of the spacecraft due to a (dramatic) subsystem failure. 
All the anomalies and failure events experienced by the spacecraft in the sample were 
collected, and their distribution across the different classes is shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. Distribution of anomaly and failure events by severity for spacecraft successfully 
launched between January 1990 and October 2008 
 
Partial failures of different severities constitute a significant portion of anomalous events 
spacecraft experience on orbit, and as such their analysis provides additional and 
important pieces of information toward the understanding of spacecraft and subsystems’ 
failure behavior and propensity. The numbers present d in Figure 3.1 should not be 
overly interpreted beyond the important message that they convey, namely that focusing 
solely on the reliability of spacecraft, defined as the probability of being in an operational 
(not total failure) state, misses an important part of spacecraft on orbit degradation and 
failure behavior. This leads to the following questions: How can the functionality 
degradation of an item be analyzed? and How does specific spacecraft subsystems 







3.2. Setting the Stage for Multi-State Failure Analysis 
To answer these questions, the investigation of failures of spacecraft subsystems is 
extended in a new direction beyond the binary concept of reliability to the analysis of 
anomalies and multi-state failures, or failure events of different severities, as shown in 
Figure 3.2. Multi-state failure analysis introduces “degraded states” or partial failures, 
and thus provides more insights through finer resolution into the degradation behavior of 
an item, and its progression towards complete failure. 
 
Figure 3.2. Progression in the statistical analysis of spacecraft and spacecraft subsystem failures 
 
The failure state diagram for each subsystem is shown in Figure 3.3. State 1 (Class I 
failure) is referred to in stochastic modeling as an absorbing state: it cannot be recovered 
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Figure 3.3 from a partially failed state towards a higher functional state (i.e., no directed 
arc from Si to S(i+1) for i ≠ 1). In reality, few transitions (3.6%) in the database occur in 
this “healing” direction. Incidentally, the argument i  support of on-orbit servicing can be 
made in relation to these “healing” state transitions. This subject however is beyond the 
scope of the present work (see Saleh, et al. (2003) for details about on-orbit servicing). 
 
Figure 3.3. Multi-state and transition diagram for spacecraft subsystem failure behavior 
 
Consider the following notations: 
 Tij: transition between the state i and state j 
 Pij: conditional probability of transitioning from state i to state j
For example the transition for a subsystem from a fully operational state (S4) to a major 
anomaly (S2) is labeled T42, and the probability of transitioning between these two states 
is P42. How to calculate these probabilities of transitioning is the focus of the next 
section. 
Fully operational 
Class IV – Class III 
Minor anomaly/degradation 
Class II 








3.3. Multi-State Failure Analysis: Theoretical Development and Application to 
Spacecraft Subsystems 
3.3.1. Nonparametric Analyses of Subsystems’ Multi-State Filures 
In this section, the failure and anomaly data from all the states previously defined are 
used to compute the probability of transitioning from one state to another for all the 
spacecraft subsystems. The following data is collected for each subsystem and each state 
transition (i,j): 1) its date of arrival in state i; 2) its date of leaving state i to state j, if this 
transition occurred; and 3) the “censored time” if the state transition (i,j) did not occurred.  
Particular attention is required in handling censoring. In addition, beyond the procedure 
for handling right-censored data in the binary case of reliability analysis described in the 
previous chapter, multi-state failures introduce an additional subtlety in the definition of 
censored data and its handling. The dataset is still random-censored with staggered entry, 
meaning the following: 
• The subsystems in the sample are activated (arriving date in state i or launch date 
for i = 4) at different points in time, but all these activation times are known. 
• Departure dates from state i to state j are stochastic (and so is censoring). 
• Censoring occurs because a spacecraft is retired from the sample before Tij occurs 
or because the end of the observation window is reached (October 2008) without 
the subsystem experiencing to the transition Tij. In addition, in multi-state failure 
analysis, when studying Tij for a given subsystem, censoring also occurs when t  
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subsystem transitions to a state k different from state j. In this case, Tik with k ≠ j 
is considered censoring for the calculation of Tij. For example, when studying T43, 
that is, the transition of a subsystem from the fully operational state to the minor 
anomaly/degradation state, T43 is censored by T42 and T41, the transitions to state 2 
and state 1 (major anomaly/degradation and total failure). 
Accordingly, the Kaplan-Meier estimator needs to be adapted to estimate the conditional 
probability Pij of transitioning from state i to state j in the context of multi-state failures 
with their distinct censoring. To illustrate this point, consider the transition diagram 
shown in Figure 3.4. The following focuses on estimating the probability of transitioning 
from state i to state j, Pij. This in effect is a conditional probability, whic means if the 
item is in state i, it is Pij likely to have transitioned to state j by the time t. Recall that 
censoring in the binary reliability analysis implies that an item has been removed from 
observation (for various reasons) prior to the occurrence of failure. In multi-state failure 
analysis, any transition to another state than the one of interest, in the example from state 
i to state j, is also considered censoring. For example, in Figure 3.4, the transitions from 
the state i to the state r or s (r ≠ j and s ≠ j) are considered censoring for the calculation of 
Pij . 
 
Figure 3.4. Censoring of Pij 
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ptP  (3.1) 
where: 
 tij (k): time to k
th departure from state i to state j (arranged in ascending 
order) 
nij, k = number of units in state i right before tij (k) 
           = n – [number of censored units right before tij (k)] 
 – [number of units having transitioned to state j right before tij (k)] 
(3.2) 
The treatment of ties in the data in the context of multi-state failures is provided in Castet 
and Saleh (2010) and Saleh and Castet (2011). Also in these references are provided 
details about the construction of confidence intervals for multi-state failure analysis. 
With the background information, the multi-state failure analysis of spacecraft 
subsystems can now be applied to the on-orbit anomaly and failure data of the 1584 
spacecraft in the sample to obtain the nonparametric st mations ijP̂  of Pij. 
How many nonparametric calculations and ijP̂ are there? The combinatorics of the multi-
state problem involves the following: 
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• The multi-state analysis covers 11 spacecraft subsystems and 4 states for each 
subsystem (plus one unknown category). 
• Therefore theoretically, for each subsystem, we should calculate 42 = 16 transition 
probabilities. This number however is reduced because of the following two 
reasons: 
o The probability Pii is a dependent variable on all Pij (i ≠ j) and does not 
require a dedicated nonparametric calculation. The consequence is that we 
are left with 42 – 4 = 12 transition probabilities ijP̂ to estimate (i.e., no 
estimation of ̂  P ii ) 
o With the additional assumption of no transition in the healing direction, 
the transitions from a partially failed state towards a higher functional 
state are eliminated, and 12 – (3 + 2 + 1) = 6 transition probabilities ijP̂ are 
left to estimate for each subsystem, as shown in Figure 3.3. 
With 11 subsystems and 6 possible state transitions for each subsystem to calculate, there 
are 66 nonparametric probabilities to estimate (excluding the unknown category). In 
addition, two (nonparametric) calculations for each transition probability are required to 
estimate the 95% confidence interval. As a result, 198 nonparametric calculations are 
needed to fully characterize the multi-state failure behavior of the satellites in the sample, 
given the number of subsystems and the classes of failures identified. This proliferation 
of transition probabilities is in effect one of the main difficulties in statistically handling 
multi-state failures compared to the simple (binary) reliability analysis, and is rightfully 
described as the “dimension damnation” by Lisnianski and Levitin (2003). However, the 
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insights that emerge from multi-state failure analysis are significantly worth this added 
complexity, as will be shown shortly. 
Figure 3.5 provides an example of the nonparametric cal ulations. Shown are the six 
transition probabilities of the Gyro / Sensor / Reaction wheel subsystem. Figure 3.5 reads 
as follows. For example, after four years on-orbit, the Gyro subsystem is roughly 4.8% 
likely to have transitioned from state 4 to state 3 (minor anomaly; additionally P43 will 
fall between 3.5% and 6.0% with 95% confidence), 1.3% likely to have transitioned from 
state 4 to state 2 (major anomaly), and 0.3% likely to have transitioned from state 4 to 
state 1 (total failure). The probabilities of transitioning P41, P31 and P21 provide a finer 
resolution in the mechanisms leading to the total loss of the spacecraft, as opposed to 
traditional reliability analyses that lump together these transitions.  
Several transitions between states for various subsy tems are not present in the dataset 
here analyzed. For example, for the Thruster / Fuel s bsystem has no transition that 
occurred on orbit between a minor anomaly (State 3) and a complete failure (State 1) in 
the dataset. As a result, this transition is not subject to statistical analysis. Other 
transitions also do not occur in the dataset, thus reducing the total number of transitions 
to 48 and a total of 144 nonparametric calculations (excluding the unknown category). 
The absent transitions can be seen in Table 3.1 and T ble 3.2 noted as “NA”. All the 144 
calculations are not shown here for convenience, but more are provided in Castet and 
Saleh (2010) and Saleh and Castet (2011). The parametric fits for all these transition 
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3.3.2. Weibull Parametric Models 
Since the interest herein is in the cumulative failure likelihood (the transition to a 
degraded state), the shape and scale parameter of the following are calculated with the 



















tPij exp1)(  (3.3) 
Table 3.1. Weibull parameters for the spacecraft subsystems Pij (β is dimensionless, θ is given in years) 
Gyro / Sensor / Reaction wheel Thruster / Fuel 
Beam / Antenna operation / 
deployment 
Pij β θ Pij β θ Pij β θ 
P43 0.4731 2758 P43 0.3827 171879 P43 0.0019 * 
P42 0.3685 336231 P42 0.4763 8591 P42 0.2468 436409190 
P41 0.5635 65547 P41 0.3114 29975357 P41 NA 
P32 1.1950 33 P32 0.6052 46 P32 NA 
P31 0.7551 546 P31 NA P31 NA 
P21 0.4653 134 P21 0.2632 589300 P21 NA 
Control Processor 
Mechanisms / Structures / 
Thermal 
Payload Instrument / Amplifier 
/ On-board data / Computer / 
Transponder 
Pij β θ Pij β θ Pij β θ 
P43 0.6585 3562 P43 0.3840 4952368 P43 0.4474 4065 
P42 NA P42 0.0060 * P42 0.4691 3170 
P41 NA P41 0.3572 19794952 P41 0.6701 119171 
P32 0.5487 1056 P32 NA P32 0.6647 38 
P31 0.7231 45 P31 NA P31 NA 
P21 1 * P21 NA P21 0.2513 169439610 
 
* Due to the constant form of the nonparametric curve, a Weibull fit is not meaningful in these cases. The 
values are the probabilities of transitioning over 15 years. 
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Table 3.2. Weibull parameters for the spacecraft subsystems Pij (β is dimensionless, θ is given in years) 
Battery / Cell Electrical distribution Solar array deployment 
Pij β θ Pij β θ Pij β θ 
P43 0.3855 9946825 P43 0.3663 13753674 P43 0.0015 * 
P42 0.4134 357357 P42 0.3526 11893973 P42 0.0040 * 
P41 0.9239 4431 P41 0.5215 144569 P41 0.0013 * 
P32 NA P32 1.1329 38 P32 NA 
P31 NA P31 NA P31 NA 
P21 0.2353 1936 P21 0.4618 376 P21 NA 
Solar array operating 
Telemetry, Tracking and 
Command2 
Unknown 
Pij β θ Pij β θ Pij β θ 
P43 0.3216 3237079 P43 0.3668 205920 P43 NA 
P42 0.4724 4313 P42 0.5249 19577 P42 0.3766 1471383 
P41 0.2527 3.45E10 P41 0.3098 29482835 P41 0.4020 5578316 
P32 0.7268 16 P32 0.2273 390440 P32 NA 
P31 0.5935 646 P31 NA P31 NA 
P21 0.4307 4501 P21 0.3374 87 P21 NA 
 
* The Solar Array Deployment is a one-shot “subsystem” and a Weibull fit is not meaningful in this case. 
Thus these are the probabilities of transitioning over 15 years. 
Figure 3.6 shows the nonparametric curves (with the 95% confidence interval) for the 43P̂
of the Gyro subsystem, and the 42P̂  of the Thruster / Fuel subsystem, superimposed on 
their respective MLE Weibull fits. Figure 3.6 provides a visual confirmation that the 
Weibull distributions with the MLE parameters provided in Table 3.1 are good fits for the 
43P̂ of the Gyro subsystem and the 42P̂  of the Thruster / Fuel subsystem. Similar results are 
obtained for the other probabilities of transitioning of the spacecraft subsystems using the 
Weibull parameters given in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. 
                                                 





Figure 3.6. Examples of nonparametric probabilities of transitioning and Weibull fits 
 
Given the relative complexity of subsystem models, several tests were devised to verify 
that the parametric models were properly derived, an  that they reflected actual on-orbit 
data. This validation procedure is presented in Castet and Saleh (2010) and Saleh and 
Castet (2011). The conclusion of the validation is that the parametric models are 
appropriate and exhaustive. 
3.3.3. Discussion about Uncertainty and Confidence Interval Spread 
For reliability or multi-state analyses, the uncertain y that arises from the censoring in the 
data (or the lack of a complete data set) is captured by the confidence intervals. Indeed, 
the Kaplan-Meier estimator (for reliability or the adapted one for the probabilities of 
transitioning) provides a maximum likelihood estimate, but does not inform about the 
dispersion around that estimate. As a consequence, it is necessary to build confidence 
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intervals to display the uncertainty associated with the best estimate, and their analysis 
yields interesting observations. Note that the confidence interval spread increases with 
time, as seen for example in Figure 2.2 (spacecraft reliability), Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 
(spacecraft subsystems reliability) and Figure 3.5 (probabilities of transitioning between 
states for the Gyro subsystem). For example, in Figure 2.2, after two years on-orbit, the 
spacecraft reliability is dispersed over a 2 percentage point interval (with 95% 
confidence), whereas after 12 years on-orbit, the sat llite reliability is dispersed over a 
3.7 percentage point interval. In the case of the multi-state analysis, the probability of 
transitioning between the fully operational state and the minor anomaly state, P43, for the 
Gyro subsystem is dispersed over a 1.6 percentage point interval after 1 year on orbit, 
while it is dispersed over 3.9 percentage point interval after 15 years on orbit. This is a 
direct result of the decreasing sample size with time and how it is handled in Eq. (2.3) for 
reliability analysis as more spacecraft fail or areretired from the sample due to censoring 
effects or in Eq. (3.1) for multi-state analysis as more spacecraft transition to the state of 
interest or are retired from the sample due to censori g effects. The spread of the 
confidence intervals remains small and shows that these reliability and multi-state failure 
results are precise. 
Another observation about uncertainty in multi-state nalysis can be seen in Figure 3.5: in 
the case of the Gyro subsystem, the confidence interval spread is larger for P32, P31 and 
P21 than for any probabilities of transitioning out of the fully operational state S4 (P43, P42 
and P41). For example, the maximum confidence interval spread is about 11 percentage 
points for P31, while the maximum spread for P42 is about 2.5 percentage points. This is a 
direct consequence of the difference in sample size for deriving probabilities of 
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transitioning: for the transitions out of S4, the sample consists of all the 1584 spacecraft 
in the sample used in Chapter 2, while the samples for the transitions out of S3 and S2 are 
reduced to the spacecraft among the 1584 spacecraft that effectively transitioned to these 
states in the original sample. In the case of the Gyro, 62 spacecraft transitioned to a minor 
degradation state (S3) and 30 to a major degradation s ate (S2). A similar trend can be 
observed for all the spacecraft subsystems under consideration in this thesis. The impact 
of this uncertainty on the probabilities of residency in degraded states is lessened due to 
the small number of spacecraft that are subjected to these transitions. Decreasing the 
uncertainty (decreasing confidence interval spread) could be obtained by collecting more 
precise and complete data about the degradation and failure behavior of spacecraft 
subsystems for these states, with improved spacecraft state of health (SOH) monitoring, 
or running accelerated life testing (ALT). 
The multi-state results and further simulations in this thesis are confined to the best 
estimates of these probabilities. Propagating their uncertainties to the final results could 
bring an additional piece of information to the degradation and failure behavior of the 





3.4. Comparative Reliability and Multi-State Failure Analyses of Spacecraft 
Subsystem: the Thruster/Fuel Subsystem Example 
In this section, complete multi-state failure result  are provided, resulting from 
simulations, for a specific spacecraft subsystem: the Thruster / Fuel subsystem. This 
subsystem was chosen in part because it was identified in the previous chapter as a major 
culprit driving spacecraft unreliability. In addition, this subsystem was chosen because its 
multi-state failure analysis clearly identifies key insights that cannot be captured by the 
traditional (binary) reliability analysis. However, multi-state analyses have been 
conducted for all subsystems, and plots are presentd i  the appendix of this chapter. 
Analyses of more subsystems (e.g., the Gyro or the TTC) are presented in Castet and 
Saleh (2010) and Saleh and Castet (2011). 
The Thruster/Fuel subsystem is a major contributor to spacecraft failures, especially over 
the early years of the spacecraft service life. For example, over the first 10 years on orbit, 
13% of all spacecraft failures are due to the Thruster/Fuel subsystem, and for the first 
year on orbit, 20% of all spacecraft failures are du  to this subsystem. Figure 3.7 shows 
on the left the reliability curve and the probability of being in state 4, that is, the 
probability of being fully operational for the Thruster/Fuel subsystem. The reliability 
curve, or survivor function, represents the probability of the subsystem not being in the 
failed state 1. On the right of Figure 3.7 are shown the different probabilities of being in 




Figure 3.7. (left) Reliability and probability of being fully operational and (right) degraded states 
probabilities for the Thruster / Fuel subsystem 
 
Figure 3.7 highlights an important distinction that is made in multi-state failure analysis 
but that cannot be captured by the traditional (binary) reliability analysis, namely the 
distinction between being in a fully operation state nd being in the non-total failure state. 
To clarify this point, consider the following. The two left curves in Figure 3.7 are 
separated by a distinct and growing gap, with roughly 7 percentage point difference at      
t = 15 years. The upper reliability curve indicates hat the subsystem is 98.5% reliable 
after 15 years, that is, the subsystem is 98.5% likely to be operational (not broken), 
whereas the multi-state failure analysis (lower curve) indicates that the subsystem is only 
91.5% likely to be fully operational after 15 years. 
The difference is not negligible and can have important consequences, the most important 
probably being that a 98.5% reliable subsystem after 15 years may not trigger any 
engineering action whereas a 91.5% fully operational subsystem may prompt a careful 
analysis of the subsystem (partial) failure modes and support improvement efforts. 
  
 

























































The distinction between these two probabilities of a subsystem occupying different states 
(fully operational versus non-total failure states) lies of course in the partial failures that 
are introduced and probed by the multi-state failure analysis. The probabilities of 
occupying any one of the failure states over 15 years are shown on the right of Figure 3.7, 
and read as follows. For example, at t = 10 years, there is a 1.7% probability that the 
subsystem is in a minor anomaly state (S3), 4.4% that e subsystem is in a major 
anomaly state (S2)—these states and probabilities ar  not visible to the traditional 
reliability analysis—and a 1.1% that the subsystem is totally failed (S1). This last 
probability is in effect the complement of the reliability of the subsystem (the failed curve 
on the right of Figure 3.7 is the complement of the reliability curve on the left of Figure 
3.7). 
The most interesting feature of the multi-state failure analysis of this subsystem is the 
dynamics of the degraded states, and especially the probability of being in the major 
anomaly state (S2). The probability of being in a minor anomaly is low (less than 2%), 
whereas the probability of being in a major anomaly state is significantly higher, 
continuously increasing over the years to eventually reach approximately 5% after 15 
years. The fast increase in the probability of transitioning to state 3 (major anomaly) in 
the early years can be termed “infant severe degradation” of the Thruster/ Fuel subsystem, 
as the multi-state analog of the infant mortality con ept in traditional reliability analysis. 
In summary, when the Thruster/ Fuel subsystem (partially) fails, it is likely to “fail hard”, 
i.e., with a transition to a major anomaly/degradation state (S2). The Thruster/ Fuel 
subsystem has previously been identified as one of the major culprits driving spacecraft 
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failures. The present multi-state failure analysis al o shows that this subsystem 
experiences significant degradations in its functionality on-orbit. This provides an 
additional indication for spacecraft manufacturers and equipment providers to focus their 
attention on improving the Thruster / Fuel subsystem, and more generally on subsystems 
that either drive spacecraft failures or that have  high propensity for major degradations. 
3.5. Summary 
This chapter provided multi-state failure analyses of spacecraft subsystems as an 
extension of the previous chapter results on spacecr ft and spacecraft subsystems 
reliability. Multi-state failure analysis introduces “degraded states” or partial failures and 
provides additional insights on the failure and degradation behavior of an item. In this 
chapter, a formal theoretical framework was established to conduct multi-state failure 
analyses, and applied to gather information about the degradation of spacecraft 
subsystems. The models obtained were shown to appropriately capture the multi-state 
failure characteristics of the subsystems. The results provided by the multi-state failure 
analysis can thus be used to prompt further detailed investigation into the “physics of 
anomaly and failure” of particular spacecraft subsystems and guide technical efforts 





3.A. Appendix: Multi-State Failure Analysis of Remaining Subsystems 
Gyro / Sensor / Reaction wheel 
 
Figure 3.A. (left) Reliability and probability of being fully operational and (right) degraded states 
probabilities for the Gyro / Sensor / Reaction wheel subsystem 
 
Beam / Antenna operation / deployment  
 
Figure 3.B. (left) Reliability and probability of being fully operational and (right) degraded states 
probabilities for the Beam / Antenna operation / deployment subsystem 
 















































































































Figure 3.C. (left) Reliability and probability of being fully operational and (right) degraded states 
probabilities for the Control processor subsystem 
 
 
Mechanisms / Structures / Thermal 
 
Figure 3.D. (left) Reliability and probability of being fully operational and (right) degraded states 
probabilities for the Mechanisms / Structures / Thermal subsystem 
 
 











































































































Payload instrument / Amplifier / On-board data / Computer / Transponder  
 
Figure 3.E. (left) Reliability and probability of being fully operational and (right) degraded states 




Battery / Cell 
 
Figure 3.F. (left) Reliability and probability of being fully operational and (right) degraded states 
probabilities for the Battery / Cell subsystem 
 
 














































































































Figure 3.G. (left) Reliability and probability of being fully operational and (right) degraded states 
probabilities for the Electrical distribution subsystem 
 
 
Solar array deployment 
 
Figure 3.H. (left) Reliability and probability of being fully operational and (right) degraded states 
probabilities for the Solar array deployment subsystem 
 
 












































































































Solar array operating 
 
Figure 3.I. (left) Reliability and probability of b eing fully operational and (right) degraded states 
probabilities for the Solar array operating subsystem 
 
Telemetry, Tracking and Command 
 
Figure 3.J. (left) Reliability and probability of being fully operational and (right) degraded states 
probabilities for the Telemetry, Tracking and Command subsystem 
 
























































































































CHAPTER 4  
SURVIVABILITY AND INTERDEPENDENT MULTI-LAYER NETWOR KS: 
SETTING A NOVEL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS  
 
Modeling, analyzing, and predicting failures is a central focus to many engineering 
disciplines dealing with system design and operations, such as civil, aerospace, and 
electrical engineering. Given the design and development of increasingly complex and 
interconnected systems, it has become even more important to analyze the propensity to 
failures of said systems and whether they would experience catastrophic failures or 
graceful degradations following node or component failures for example. These failures 
may be triggered by endogenous or exogenous causes (e.g., attacks), and the analysis 
would assess, among other things, how localized failures or disruptions would propagate 
throughout the system. These concerns fall within te realm of survivability analysis.  
In this second part, the survivability assessment of spacecraft and what is termed in this 
work Space-Based Networks (SBNs) is sought. SBNs are related to a novel concept 
recently introduced in the space industry termed fractionation (Brown and Eremenko, 
2006a; 2006b). By physically distributing functions in multiple orbiting modules 
wirelessly connected to each other, this new archite ture allows the sharing of resources 
on-orbit, such as data processing, data storage, and downlinks. Preliminary analysis 
suggests that such an architecture, under certain conditions and despite some initial 
overhead, offers several advantages over the traditional monolith spacecraft design in 
terms of utility versus cost (details can be found in Dubos and Saleh, 2011).  
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As mentioned above, survivability analysis considers system component failures, and 
among them, endogenous failures. As a consequence, the knowledge from the failure 
models of spacecraft subsystems developed in Part 1 is leveraged in this second part to 
assess the survivability of spacecraft and space-bas d networks and answer the following 
questions: How can the survivability of spacecraft and SBNs be assessed? and What 
insights for design and architectural choices of spacecraft and SBNs can arise from 
survivability analyses? 
Before describing this thesis’ proposed model for survivability assessment of spacecraft 
and SBNs, an overview of the survivability concept is presented first. The survivability 
framework is then followed by literature highlights on network analysis for introducing a 
new modeling technique for space-based networks.  
4.1. Survivability: Literature Highlights 
In this section, a brief overview of the concept of survivability is provided. Survivability 
is extensively used in the technical literature as multi-disciplinary concept in a variety of 
contexts and often with different meanings.  
4.1.1. Military Context 
Survivability as a system attribute has always been important to the military, and its 
experimental and analytical assessment was probably heightened since the 1960’s (Ball 
and Atkinson, 1995). Survivability in a military context is applied to platforms (e.g., 
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aircraft), people, systems (e.g., military network), and nowadays more generally to 
missions. Several articles show this evolution, from ne of the first attempts to assess 
survivability of an aircraft in 1967 (Atkinson, et al., 1969; Ball and Atkinson, 1995) to 
some more general definitions (MIL-STD-2069, 1961; MIL-HNBK-336-1, 1982; MIL-
HDBK-2069, 1997; DoD Regulation 5000.2-R, 1999) as the one provided by the DoD 
Regulation 5000.2-R (1999): “[survivability is] the capability of a system and crew to 
avoid or withstand a man-made hostile environment without sustaining an impairment of 
its ability to accomplish its designated mission. Survivability consists of susceptibility, 
vulnerability, and recoverability.” Susceptibility is “the degree to which a weapon system 
is open to effective attack because of one or more inh rent weakness”; vulnerability is 
“the characteristic of a system that causes it to suffer a definite degradation (loss or 
reduction of capability to perform its designated mission) as a result of having being 
subjected to a certain (defined) level of effects in an unnatural (man-made) hostile 
environment”; recoverability is “the ability, following combat damage, to take emergency 
action to prevent the loss of the system, to reduce personnel casualties, or to regain 
weapon system combat mission capabilities.” In addition, several publications addressed 
the issue of survivability of military communication networks, a growing area of interest 
and research since the 1990’s, and for which survivability of the network is defined as the 
“ability to maintain communication among the nodes when it is subject to deliberate 
destruction” (Haizhuang Kang, et al., 1998). 
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4.1.2. Engineering Context 
Following its initial analysis within a military context, the concept of survivability spread 
to other areas than the military, especially to electrical engineering with an emphasis on 
software, telecommunications, and information system . In particular, survivability has 
become of major interest for network systems designers since society has become 
significantly dependent on a variety of networks, leading to severe consequences in the 
case of network system disruptions or failures. While the use of “survivability” is 
widespread within the technical community, no definitio  is unanimously adopted. 
Westmark (2004) compiled 53 definitions of survivability from different publications and 
synthesized the following definition: survivability, according to Westmark, is “the ability 
of a given system with a given intended usage to provide a pre-specified minimum level 
of service in the event of one or more pre-specified threats.” One of the more cited 
definitions of survivability is provided by Ellison et al. (1999): survivability, according to 
Ellison et al., is the “capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in 
the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents”. Knight et al. (2003), while focusing on 
survivability in a telecommunications and network context, found previous definitions 
not precise enough, and proposed a formal definition of survivability based on six 
quantitative parameters (or sextuple). He characterized a system as “survivable if it 
complies with its survivability specification,” and the survivability specification is 
mathematically defined, gathering all acceptable levels of service from the system, the 
associated services values and relative values (perceiv d by the user), its probabilistic 
requirements and its possible transitions in a specified operating environment. 
Accordingly, survivability definitions teeter between the informal and the formal, and 
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occasionally, they include probabilistic terms. But, as the previous definitions indicate, 
survivability is context-specific, related to the system studied and its environment, the 
services it provides to users, and the requirements that have been set for it. This 
specificity explains why often survivability seems to be a more generic word defined or 
measured in terms of other notions, like availability, performance, traffic capacity, 
connectivity, etc.  
4.1.3. Survivability Concept Summary 
Since the definition of survivability is context-specific, the environment, the threat(s), 
and the performance index have to be specified each time an analysis is conducted. 
Figure 4.1 provides a notional representation of a system response facing a shock or 
disruption. The survivability of the system is relat d to the performance degradation3 ∆P. 
The extent of the performance drop depends on the survivability features of the system: 
the more survivable (with respect to the defined threat), the smaller the drop (in the 
performance metric of interest). The response of the system after the shock characterizes 
the recoverability of the system, which in simple terms can be thought of as the time 
needed for the system to return within a certain percentage of its initial level of 
performance. However, the study of the system recovrability is out of the scope of the 
thesis and will not be addressed in the following. 
                                                 
3 As a side note, graceful degradation, which is particularly desirable for systems with high-availability 
requirements, allows a system to keep operating and providing some level of service by staging the 




Figure 4.1. Notional system response following a shock 
 
4.2. Survivability Framework 
This dissertation introduces a notional fr mework for survivability analysis  is shown in 
Figure 4.2 and this framework captures the different steps through which survivability 
analysis proceeds. 
 
Figure 4.2. Survivability framework 
 
Figure 4.2 starts to the left with the definition or delineation of the classes of threats or 
types of disruptions the analyst is interested in assessing the system’s survivability with 
respect to. Survivability, like the concept to optimization, remains ill-defined unless an 
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latter, and what the system is survivable with respect to for the former. The 
characterization of the classes of threats or types of disruptions of interest constitutes the 
first step in a survivability analysis. The second step in Figure 4.2 is design-centric and 
seeks to characterize the architecture of the system under consideration, its (functional) 
structure and design choices (e.g., modularity, coupling, redundancy, etc.), in particular 
the features that pertain to its performance. The third step in Figure 4.2 transforms the 
previous step into an analytical or computational model of the system to assess its 
survivability with respect to the classes of threats or types of disruptions of interest. 
Finally the last step in Figure 4.2 consists in asses ing the system’s performance 
degradation—its survivability assessment—following disruptions, using the system 
model previously developed and the characterization of the classes of threats or types of 
disruptions of interest (step 1). 
Step 3 requires the modeling of the architecture fo which a survivability assessment is 
desired. This thesis is particularly interested in investigating the survivability features of 
spacecraft and space-based networks. Modeling space-based networks falls in the realm 
of network analysis, and a brief literature review of network analysis is provided next. 
This literature highlights the limitations of the application of current models and tools for 
space-based networks in particular, and stresses the need of introducing a new approach 
to remedy the underlined shortcomings.  
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4.3. Networks: Literature Highlights and Limitations for  Space-Based Networks 
Networks have been widely studied (Newman, 2010; Albert and Barabási, 2002), as they 
can describe a large number of technical, biological or social systems: the World Wide 
Web and the Internet, power grids, telecommunications systems, social relationships, 
food webs, to cite a few. Graph theory and analyses of real networks allowed a better 
understanding of network properties (random graphs, scale-free networks, etc.) and the 
definition of metrics to describe network characteristics (Newman, 2010; Albert and 
Barabási, 2002).  
Networks have also been studied with respect to failure propagation and cascading 
failures (Motter and Lai, 2002; Crucitti, et al., 2004; Ash and Newth, 2007; Kurant and 
Thiran, 2007; Buldyrev, et al., 2010; Zio and Sansavini, 2011; to cite a few). A simple 
model for cascading failures in communication/transportation network was to 
dynamically redistribute the flow on the network after the failure of a node, this 
redistribution leading to the overload of other nodes in a cascading fashion (Crucitti, et 
al., 2004). More recent analyses pointed that the failure behavior of a significant number 
of modern networks could not be independently studied as these networks are coupled 
together: for example, the electrical power network and the Internet network rely on each 
other for communication and control on one hand, and electricity supply on the other 
hand (Buldyrev, et al., 2010). Such analyses showed that while an independent single 
network will break down after the removal of a significant number of nodes, 
interdependent networks can fail catastrophically after the removal of a small fraction. 
This approach led to the introduction of interdependent network analyses to characterize 
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properties of networks (e.g., Rinaldi, 2004; Newman, et al., 2005; Kurant and Thiran, 
2006; Knippel and Lardeux, 2006; Wong-Jiru, et al., 2007; Buldyrev, et al., 2010; 
Donges, et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2011). More particularly, Kurant and Thiran (2006) 
introduced the concept of a two-layered network to study the dynamics of a 
transportation system: they noted that the representatio  of such systems as a single 
network was inappropriate as it did not allow both the modeling of the physical topology 
of the network and the traffic flow on it. Also, Xu et al. (2011) introduced the concept of 
interconnecting bilayer networks, where networks on both layer could share some 
common nodes (e.g., the networks of scientists and musicians can share similar persons, 
as a person can both be a scientist and a musician).   
However, these analyses and tools cannot be directly applied to the study of space-based 
networks for a fundamental reason pertaining to the nature of SBNs. These analyses 
usually assume homogeneous (or identical) nodes in the etworks, while spacecraft in an 
SBN can have different components due to the fractiona on of the functionality, resulting 
in node heterogeneity.  
To illustrate this, let us take the example that is going to be a case study later in this 
dissertation: the space-based network (SBN) here considered is simple and consists of 
two networked spacecraft that can tap into the other spacecraft’s TTC in case of damage 
or failure of its own TTC. This architecture is shown in Figure 4.3. In essence, the 
wirelessly connectivity in the SBN enables a new type of redundancy – functional 
redundancy – of the TTC between the two spacecraft in the network. Each spacecraft is 
composed of the following subsystems: 
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• The first spacecraft, S/C#1 contains all subsystems described in Part 1. For an 
easier representation, S/C#1 is composed of three “components”: a payload 
component (generating utility), a TTC component, and  “supporting subsystems 
component” composed of the remaining subsystems (AOCS, EPS, Beam, CP, 
Mechanisms plus Unknown) necessary for the operation of the spacecraft. 
• The second spacecraft, S/C#2, is composed of a TTC component and a supporting 
subsystems component (equivalent of the one of S/C#1). Note that S/C#2 has no 
payload component, as it is envisioned as a backup for S/C#1’s TTC. 
 
Figure 4.3. Example of a space-based network 
 
It is immediately clear that if we were to represent this particular SBN as shown in Figure 
4.4, the nodes could not be considered as identical, as S/C#1 possesses a payload 
component, while S/C#2 does not. The representation shown in Figure 4.4 could be 
adequate at a high-level representation, indicating that S/C#1 and S/C#2 are networked, 
but would be meaningless and misleading for any other purposes: for example, what 




Figure 4.4. Inadequate representation of the case study SBN 
 
Some attempts at considering heterogeneous nodes hav  been conducted in the literature, 
but are too limited to properly model SBNs. For example, some studies considered nodes 
with different capacities (Motter and Lai, 2002; Crucitti, et al., 2004), but the function of 
the nodes remains identical, when a SBN might have spacecraft with different 
functionalities. The Internet network has raised questions about heterogeneity as it is the 
union of different networks (wireless devices, computers, routers, etc.). However, the 
efforts in these studies were put on the transmission of data among the nodes rather than a 
modeling of heterogeneity in networks. As a consequence, a first question must be 
answered before analyzing the survivability of SBNs: how can networks with 
heterogeneous nodes be represented and analyzed? 
4.4. Introduction to Interdependent Multi-Layer Networks  
Building on the concepts of interdependency and layers in network presented in the 
literature review, we propose in this thesis to represent a network with heterogeneous 
nodes as an interdependent multi-layer network (IMLN), where each layer 
corresponds to a particular node characteristic or functionality and is represented as a 
network with homogeneous (or identical) nodes. The following paragraphs aim to 
introduce and present this new concept, as well as to provide a formal mathematical 




To illustrate the proposed concept, let us go back to the case study example: the three 
identified functionalities in that particular SBN are: the payload, the TTC and the 
supporting subsystems. Three layers are then created to represent each of these 
functionalities, and homogeneous networks can be created on each of the layers: a link is 
present between two nodes in the same layer if there is a relationship of sort between 
these nodes (e.g., flow of data, or in this dissertation, a node that provides resources to 
another one). A link can be directed (from the node that provides the resources to the 
receiver node) or undirected (which can be conceived as two opposite directed arcs). A 
multi-layer network representation of the SBN illustrating the previous step is shown in 
Figure 4.5. Note that in each layer, the nodes are now “identical”. However, this 
representation is incomplete because some nodes acro s the layers physically belong to 
the same spacecraft and are not independent as pictured in Figure 4.5. 
 
Figure 4.5. Incomplete representation of the case study SBN 
 










capture the breakdown of S/C#1 and S/C#2. Several types of interdependencies can be 
conceived between layers. In the present case, two types of interdependencies exit4: 
• The failure of the supporting subsystems results in the immediate failure of the 
whole spacecraft, leading to the unavailability of other nodes (TTC, payload) in 
different layers belonging to that spacecraft. In this thesis, this effect is called the 
“kill effect” and is represented with solid directed arcs from the “killer node” to 
the “victim node”.  
• The failure of the TTC does not necessarily result in the immediate failure of the 
spacecraft. Indeed, the functional redundancy on the TTC can allow the survival 
of the spacecraft if it can tap in the TTC of the other spacecraft. This is possible if, 
in the TTC layer, both the link to another TTC node and that TTC node are both 
functioning. In this thesis, this effect is called the “precursor effect” and is 
represented with dashed directed arcs from the “killer node” to the “victim node”. 
In the case of S/C#1, the “supporting systems” node failure renders unavailable the “TTC” 
node and the “payload” node through the “kill effect”; the “TTC” node renders 
unavailable the “supporting subsystems” node and the “payload” node through the 
“precursor effect”. The “payload” node failure has no impact on the other nodes as the 
loss of the payload does not doom the spacecraft, only its ability to generate utility. 
In the case of S/C#2, “supporting systems” node failure renders unavailable the “TTC” 
node through the “kill effect”; the “TTC” node renders unavailable the “supporting 
                                                 
4 Similar or other types of interdependencies between layers have been used in the literature: for example, 
Zio and Sansavini (2011) used interdependency links to transfer loads from a failed node, or Gu et al. 
(2011) used interdependent links to model cooperation between sub-networks. The interdependency 
scheme used by Buldyrev t al. (2010) is similar to the kill effect described in this thesis. 
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subsystems” node through the “precursor effect”.  
The complete representation of this SBN as an interdependent multi-layer network is 
shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6. Interdependent multi-layer network representation for the case study SBN 
 
One last component in the IMLN representation is what is called in this thesis a “virtual 
node”. Let illustrate this node with an example: consider the addition of another 
spacecraft, S/C#3 to the current space-based network. H wever, this new spacecraft has a 
payload component and a “supporting subsystems” component, but does not have a TTC 
component. S/C#3 can however be operational by tapping into the TTC of the other two 
spacecraft. A node must be added in the “TTC” layer to represent this, but the node does 
not correspond to a physical subsystem, hence called  “virtual node”. Also this node is 
peculiar as S/C#3 does not provide any TTC resources to the other spacecraft, as shown 
by the directed arcs towards that node in the “TTC” layer. This “virtual node” is 











Figure 4.7. Illustration of a “virtual node” 
 
In summary, the IMLN representation consists of nodes placed on several layers 
representing different types of functionality. Within a layer, nodes form a network by 
connecting to other nodes with directed or undirected links. Arcs also connect nodes 
across layers to capture the physical reality of spacecraft and model two types of 
interdependencies related to the kill and precursor effect. A formal definition of 
interdependent multi-layer networks is presented next. 
4.5. Formal Definition of Interdependent Multi-Layer Net works 
4.5.1. IMLN Representation Using Graphs 
Building on the notation of Gu et al. (2011), the interdependent multi-layer network N is 












 L is the number of layers, each numbered sequentially from 1 to L 
LGG ,,1 K  are the graphs on each layer 
            [ ] ( )lll EVGLl , ,,,1 =∈∀ K  with:  
                                              Vl is the set of nl vertices (or nodes) in Gl  
                                              El is the set of edges (or links) in Gl  
Ek is the set of interlayer edges representing the “kill effect” 
Ep is the set of interlayer edges representing the “pr cursor effect” 
(4.1) 







, and the vertices are numbered uniquely and 
sequentially from 1 to n. As indicated in Newman (2010), “it does not matter which 
vertex gets which label, only that each label is uniq e so that we can use the labels to 
refer to any vertex unambiguously.” However, it is shown later in this chapter that a 
particular scheme for numbering vertices leads to amore efficient way of representing 
IMLNs.  
Figure 4.8 presents the vertices numbered in the cas of the case study SBN presented in 
Figure 4.6. For that particular case, the interdependent multi-layer network is 
( )pk EEGGGN ,,,, 321  where: 
• ( )111 ,EVG =  with { }4,11 =V  and ( ) ( ){ }1,4,4,11 =E  is the graph for the “TTC” layer; 
• ( )222 ,EVG =  with { }5,22 =V  and Ø2 =E  is the graph for the “supporting 
subsystems” layer; 
• ( )333 ,EVG =  with { }33 =V  and Ø3 =E  is the graph for the “payload” layer; 
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• ( ) ( ) ( ){ }4,5,3,2,1,2=kE  
• ( ) ( ) ( ){ }5,4,3,1,2,1=pE  
The set of functionally redundant layers EL is defined as: 
 { }Ø* ≠∈= lLL ElE N  (4.2) 
 
Figure 4.8. Interdependent multi-layer network with numbered vertices for the case study SBN 
 
4.5.2. IMLN Representation Using Matrices 
A more practical representation of N is given by using 1) classic adjacency matrices 
LAA ,,1 K  for the respective graphs LGG ,,1 K , 2) what is introduced in this thesis as the 















As said before, the vertices are numbered from 1 to n: his numbering scheme is called in 
this thesis the “overall numbering”. An additional numbering of the vertices is introduced, 
called the “layer numbering”: for each layer l, the vertices are numbered sequentially 
from 1 to nl. The function f maps the labels kO of each node in the “overall numbering” 
scheme to a pair of integers ( )Lkl,  where l is the layer number, and kL is the label of the 
node in the “layer numbering”. Note that indices in the “overall numbering” scheme have 
a subscript “O”, while the indices in the “overall numbering” scheme have a subscript 
“L”. 
For example, in the case of the case study SBN: 
• In the “TTC” layer, numbered layer 1, the node 1 in the “overall numbering” is 
given the “layer number” 1, while the node 4 in the“overall numbering” is given 
the “layer number” 2; 
• In the “supporting subsystems” layer, numbered layer 2, the node 2 in the “overall 
numbering” is given the “layer number” 1, while the node 5 in the “overall 
numbering” is given the “layer number” 2; 
In the “payload” layer, numbered layer 3, the node 3 in the “overall numbering” is given 

























Because of the layers and the nodes in both numbering schemes are numbered uniquely, 
the function f is bijective. As a consequence, the inverse mapping fu ction 1−f  is also 
defined. 




jil aA ×=  such that: 
 1=l ji LLa  if there is an edge from vertex jL to iL 
0=l ji LLa  otherwise  
(4.4) 
In the case study SBN example: 











1A  (4.5) 
• The adjacency matrices A2 for the “supporting subsystems” layer (layer 2) and A3 
for the “payload” layer (layer 3) are trivial as there is no edge in these layers:  
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 222 0 ×=A and 113 0 ×=A  (4.6) 




=  is defined as follows:  
 1=
OO ji
c  if there is an edge from vertex jO to iO belonging to Ek  
                   (kill effect) 
2=
OO ji
c  if there is an edge from vertex jO to iO belonging to Ep  
                   (precursor effect) 
0=
OO ji
c  otherwise 
(4.7) 
























C  (4.8) 
As mentioned earlier, the overall numbering scheme can be chosen to facilitate the 
representation of the IMLN, and in particular the interlayer matrix C. Indeed, if the 
“overall numbering” is chosen such that vertices belonging to the same spacecraft were 
numbered sequentially (vertices 1, 2 and 3 belongs to S/C#1, and vertices 4 and 5 to 

































C  (4.9) 
As the number of spacecraft increases in the space-b s d network, the interlayer matrix 
growth can be alleviated using this numbering scheme, as only the blocks around the 
diagonal need to be populated. Also, from a computation l point of view, this can allow 
for the matrix to be saved as a scarce matrix and sve memory during the simulation. 
Examples of larger networks will be shown later in the dissertation. 
The sets Ek, Ep and EL can also be defined from the adjacency matrices and interlayer 
matrix as follows: 
 ( ){ }1, == jik cijE  (4.10) 
 ( ){ }2, == jip cijE  (4.11) 
 { }
ll nnlL
AlE ×≠= 0  (4.12) 
As a conclusion, the interdependent multi-layer network N can be uniquely defined as 




This chapter discussed the concept of survivability, from its origin in the military context 
to its expansion to engineering systems. Building o the works published in the literature, 
this thesis introduced a framework for the study of the survivability of engineering 
systems in general, and applied to space systems in this dissertation. The chapter then 
discussed the state of the academic study of network analysis and its practical use for 
understanding real-world network. However, it was highlighted that the classic network 
representation failed to capture an essential aspect of space-based networks, namely, the 
potential heterogeneity in their respective functionalities. To enable the modeling of such 
architectures, a new concept was introduced and this approach describes the space-based 
networks as “interdependent multi-layer networks”. A formal definition of the IMLN 
representation was then introduced. However, one qustion was not addressed in 
conjunction with the survivability considerations discussed earlier in the chapter: how 
can this new representation be used for survivability analyses? This topic is the subject of 
the following chapter dedicated to the study and modeling of the failure propagation 




CHAPTER 5  
FAILURE PROPAGATION IN INTERDEPENDENT MULTI-LAYER 
NETWORKS: FORMAL ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPME NT 
 
Modeling the space-based networks through interdependent multi-layer network has been 
presented in the previous chapter. However, assessing the survivability features of such 
networks requires estimating an objective function related to the failure times of the 
network nodes. Due to the interdependencies in the model, this estimation is not trivial 
and requires understanding the propagation of failures through the network.  Part of the 
failure propagation is due to the kill and precursor effects introduced earlier. The 
following sections are dedicated to study these effcts, but note that other cascading 
mechanisms such as the ones described in the literatur  review can be easily added and 
implemented. How does the failure of one node propagate in the interdependent 
multi-layer network through the kill and precursor effect? 
The proposed method comprises three steps: 
1. Generate the times to failures TF for each vertex and edge5. 
2. Propagate failures through the kill effect 
3. Propagate failures through the precursor effect 
                                                 
5 In the following, the following convention is adopted: TF, vertex i refers to the time to failure of vertex i in 
the overall numbering scheme. Also, TF represents the random variable time to failure, while tF represents 
an instantiation of the random variable TF.
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Let characterize mathematically the last two steps. Suppose that the interdependent multi-
layer network of interest has been defined as ( )fCAAN L ,,,,1 K . 
The remainder of this chapter is split in two sections: the first section investigates the 
propagation across the network of catastrophic failures only; the second section builds 
onto this propagation scheme and expands the established algorithm for the more 
complex treatment of multi-state failures (minor and major anomalies). 
5.1. Complete Failure Simulation 
5.1.1. Time to Failure Generation 
To propagate failures through the network, one must first generate times to failures for 
the different objects in the space-based network: the vertices and the edges. Using the 
cumulative distribution functions representing the failure behavior of each vertex, 
random times to failure for the vertices TF,vertex i (
*
ni N∈ ) can be generated
6. Note that it is 
not necessary for each node in a common layer to share t e same failure behavior. 
Two steps are needed to generate the times to failure for the edges TF,edge j→i: the link 
between two spacecraft is established through a wireless unit embedded in each 
spacecraft. For the link to function, both units need to be operational, the failure of one 
leading to the failure of the link. 
                                                 
6 In the case of a virtual node, its failure time is considered as null. 
88 
 
• Generate the times to failure of the wireless units on each spacecraft using 
predetermined cumulative distribution functions; 
• Generate the times to failures for each edge TF,edge j→i by taking the minimum of 
the time to failures of the two associated wireless units (unit i and unit j). 
5.1.2. Failure Propagation Through the “Kill Effect” 
The information about the kill effect is contained in the interlayer matrix C, and the first 
step consists in extracting from C the pairs of “killer” and “victim” vertices. As shown in 
the previous chapter, Ek can be defined from C as follows: 
 ( ){ }1, == jik cijE  (5.1) 
Define the “killer” vector k1 and the “victim” vector v1 such that: 
 
( )






























The last step consists in computing time to unavailbil ty FkUT
,  of the “victim” vertex 







*  , qF
Fk
qUE TTq k 11 kvN =∈∀  (5.3) 
In the case that a victim vertex has several killers, FkUT
, is equal to the minimum of the 
times to failure of the killer vertices. 
5.1.3. Failure Propagation Through the “Precursor Effect” 
As for the killer effect, the information about the precursor effect is contained in the 
interlayer matrix C, and C is used to extract the pairs of “killer” and “victim” vertices. As 
defined in the previous chapter, Ep is defined as follows: 
 ( ){ }2, == jip cijE  (5.4) 
The “killer” vector k2 and the “victim” vector v2 are defined as: 
 
( )






























Computing the time to unavailability due to the precursor effect is not as straightforward 
as for the kill effect. Indeed, the failure of a vertex that has a functional redundancy will 
not necessarily propagate immediately to the vertics belonging to the same entity (here, 
spacecraft). The time at which the function represented by the vertex will become 
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unavailable depends on the time to failure of the vertex itself, but also on the times to 
failure of the other vertices and edges part of the same layer. For example, in the case 
study SBN, the failure of node 1 will propagate to nodes 2 and 3 if node 1 is not able to 
tap into the resources of node 4, i.e., if either the link between node 4 and 1, or node 4 
has failed. Hence it is necessary to compare the tim o failure of the node, to the ones of 
the pairs link/node it is connected to. Several steps are needed and are described below. 
1. To know when a vertex becomes unavailable after the kill ffect, the “minimum 
time to unavailability” FmUT




              
else                       
































2. To compare the time to failure of the vertex i and the ones of the pairs             
edge (j→i)/vertex j it is connected to (i.e., edges towards that vertex i) , a useful 






,  defined as follows for LEl ∈ : 
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This matrix H is helpful as it presents in line the time to failure of the vertex, and 
the ones of the pairs edge/vertex it is connected to. 
3. The time to unavailability considering the functional redundancy FrUT
, of the 
vertex of interest can be found as the maximum time to failure in the associated 








,, max , =∈∀  (5.8) 
4. FrUT












1 ,, =∈∀∈∀ −N  (5.9) 
5. The same process than for the kill effect can be now applied, that is, the 
propagation of the “failure” of a node across layers to nodes belonging to the 
same entity. This step consists in computing time to unavailability FpUT
,  of the 
“victim” vertex using the time to failure of the “killer” vertex. Mathematically, 















N =∈∀  (5.10) 
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In the case that a victim vertex has several killers, FpUT
, is equal to the minimum of 
the times FrUT
, of the killer vertices. 
6. Due to the fact that several layers of redundancy can be considered concurrently, 
the interdependence of the precursor effect between vertices belonging to the 
same spacecraft but in different layers can require an iterative scheme for 
unavailability times to converge to their correct values. The following condition 






 vertex , ≤ , the failure 
propagation due to the precursor effect is complete (skip step 7). If not, continue 
to next step. 
 














 vertex , = and repeat steps 2–5. 
5.1.4. Combination of All Effects 
Finally, for each vertex in the interdependent multi-layer network, the time to 
unavailability is obtained as: 
 ( )[ ]Fp qUFk qUFr qUqFF qUn TTTTTq , vertex ,, vertex ,, vertex , vertex , vertex ,* ,,,maxmin , =∈∀ N  (5.11) 
where Fr qUT
,








vertex ,  are included in if they exist 
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5.1.5. Summary of the Failure Propagation Algorithm 
Below is a summary of the algorithmic process used to propagate catastrophic failures 
across the network. The following inputs are required: the adjacency matrices and 
interlayer matrix, the mapping function (these three lements defining a network 
architecture), and the c.d.f.s for the failure distribution of the vertices and edges. 
1. Generate for each vertex i TF,vertex i (section 5.1.1) 
2. Generate for each edge TF,edge j→i (section 5.1.1) 
3. Compute Ek using Eq. (5.1) 
4. Compute k1 and v1 using Eq. (5.2)  
5. Compute FkUT
,  for each victim vertex using Eq. (5.3) 
6. Compute Ep using Eq. (5.4) 
7. Compute k2 and v2 using Eq. (5.5) 
8. Compute FmUT
,  for each vertex using Eq. (5.6) 
9. For all LEl ∈ , compute 
F
lH  using Eq. (5.7) 
10. For all LEl ∈ , compute 
F
lm using Eq. (5.8) 
11. Compute FrUT
,  for each vertex for all layers LEl ∈  using Eq. (5.9) 
12. Compute FpUT
,  for each victim vertex using Eq. (5.10) 






 vertex , ≤  for all victim vertices q in the 
precursor effect  
14. Compute FUT  for each vertex using Eq. (5.11) 
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5.1.6. Failure Propagation Examples 
The first example uses the TTC functional redundancy case study, and the IMLN under 
consideration is shown in Figure 4.8. To illustrate how the algorithm is working, 
deterministic times to failures for the nodes and li ks will be used in this example. These 
times to failures are given in Table 5.1, and shown in Figure 5.1 for clarity purposes. 
Table 5.1. Times to failure of the nodes and link in the case study example 
 Time to failure 
years 
Spacecraft #1  
 TTC 2 
 Supporting subsystems 6 
 Payload 7 
Spacecraft #2  
 TTC 9 
 Supporting subsystems 8 
Link between spacecraft 12 
 
 


















tF ,5 = 8
tF ,1↔4 = 12
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If spacecraft #1 was to be by itself, it would have failed at 2 years, when the TTC failed. 
However, in this network configuration, the second spacecraft can help maintaining the 
functionality up to 6 years on-orbit. How this number was obtained is explained below 
using the 14 steps given in section 5.1.5. Steps 1 and 2 are already completed as the times 
to failure for the nodes and link are given in this example. 
3. According to section 4.5.1, 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }4,5,3,2,1,2=kE  (5.12) 
4. Then, 
  ( )522=1k  and ( )431=1v  (5.13) 





































6. According to section 4.5.1, 




  ( )4112 =k  and ( )5322 =v  (5.16) 
8. The minimum time to unavailability after the kill eff ct is given as: 
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9. The only functionally redundant layer in this IMLN is the TTC layer. The 



















































H  (5.18) 





















Fm  (5.19) 








































































13. The convergence condition is met in this particular example, so the algorithm 
continues to the final step. 
14. Combining all the effect, the final times to unavailab lity for the nodes are: 
 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
( )[ ] ( )[ ]



































































5.2. Multi-State Failure Simulation 
In the case of a multi-state failure approach, some additions must be made to the 
algorithm presented in the previous section. Let’s consider two degraded states for each 
vertex and edge: a minor degradation state and a major degradation state. The respective 
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time to event random variable is noted Tm and TM.  It is shown below that modeling 
directly the probability distributions of these two random variables is not practical, and 
two related random variables are used instead in the modeling process: TMF and TmMF. 
The former represents the time at which a vertex or edge is in either the major 
degradation state or the complete failure state; the latter represents the time at which the 
vertex or edge experience any degradation event (mior, major or catastrophic). 
5.2.1. Generation of the Times to Failure and Degradation 
Instantiations to the time to failure TF and the two times to degradation TMF and TmMF 
cannot be generated independently. Knowing TF, how can instantiations to TMF be 
generated? And knowing TF and TMF, how can instantiations to TmMF be generated? This 
subsection is presenting a possible solution to generate these times concurrently. 
A event leads to the major-failed state (MF) either if this event is a major degradation or 
a complete failure of the (sub)system under consideration. As such, there is a competition 
between these two types of severity for which will occur first. A transition diagram of 
this failure and degradation behavior is shown in Figure 5.2a. Both the probabilities of 
being in the failed state (F) and the major-failed state (MF) can be modeled using 
cumulative distribution functions as they are absoring states. However, the probability 
of being in a major state cannot be modeled similarly: as time goes to infinity, the 
probability of being in that state goes to zero. To get around this problem, an equivalent 
representation for the failed state and the major-failed state is shown in Figure 5.2b. The 
major state (M) has been replaced by a virtual state (Sv1) where the probability of being in 
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that state is represented by a c.d.f. The major-failed state can now be thought as the failed 
state and the virtual state in series from a block diagram point of view. As a consequence, 
the probability of being in the major-failed state can be expressed as: 




PPP −−−=  (5.23) 














Then, the random variables for the time to complete failure (TF), major degradation or 





TTT =  (5.25) 
 












Let us examine the expression of 
1vS
P for different types of distribution for TF and TMF.  
• Exponential distributions: 
Consider that both TF and TMF are modeled as exponential distributions and their c.d.f.s 
are expressed as: 
 ( )tP FF ⋅−−= λexp1  (5.26) 
 ( )tP MFMF ⋅−−= λexp1  (5.27) 
















Simplifying Eq. (5.28) leads to 
 ( )[ ]tP FMFSv λλ −−−= exp11  (5.29) 
Note that the resulting probability is also exponential with a parameter equal to 

















• Weibull distributions with the same shape parameter: 
Consider that both TF and TMF are modeled as Weibull distributions sharing the same 










































P exp1  (5.32) 
































As shown in Volovoi and Vega (2012), Eq. (5.33) can be reduced to a single Weibull 

































Also in this case, generating random times to the virtual state is straightforward: 




Pt  (5.35) 
• General Weibull distributions: 
















































exp1  (5.37) 
the resulting expression for 
1vS
P given in Eq. (5.38) cannot be reduced to an equivalent 




































As a consequence, there is no closed-form solution for the time to the virtual state (as 
seen above, a closed-form solution exists if MFF ββ = ). Generating random times requires 
solving for t in Eq. (5.38). In this thesis, a root-finding algorithm (MATLAB fzero 
function) was used and the initial guess was determined by fitting 
1vS
P with a single 
Weibull distribution using a non-linear least-square regression. 
Algorithm for TF and TMF. In this thesis, the times to failure and severe degradation TF 
and TMF for each vertex and edge are modeled as Weibull distributions that might or 
might not have the same Weibull shape parameter (Eqs 5.36) and (5.37)). Consequently, 
instantiations to TF and TMF are generated concurrently as follows: 
1. Using Eq. (5.36), generate randomly an instantiation to TF, namely, tF; 
2. If MFF ββ = , generate randomly an instantiation to 1vST , namely, 1vSt using the 
straightforward Eq. (5.35). If MFF ββ ≠ , then numerically solve Eq. (5.38) for 1vSt  
as described above; 





ttt =  (5.39) 




After the Monte Carlo simulation, the c.d.f.s for TF and TMF (PF and PMF) can be 
recreated and PM can be obtained as follows: 
 FMFM PPP −=  (5.40) 
Generation of instantiations of TmMF. Knowing TMF, the same process can be applied to 
generate an instantiation of TmMF. A similar equivalent representation involving the MF 
state and another virtual state (Sv2) leads to modify Eq. (5.23) as follows: 




PPP −−−=  (5.41) 














In addition, the random variables for the time to major degradation or complete failure 






TTT =  (5.43) 
Similarly, assuming that TMF and TmMF are modeled using Weibull distributions, 2vSP can 






































t  must be solved numerically. If βββ == mMFMF , 2vSP has a closed-form 
solution given by:  




Pt  (5.45) 
where: 
 



























 General algorithm for TF, TMF and TmMF. Assuming Weibull distribution for these 
random variables, instantiations for TF, TMF and TmMF are obtained as follows: 
1. Using Eq. (5.36), generate randomly an instantiation to TF, namely, tF; 
2. If MFF ββ = , generate randomly an instantiation to 1vST , namely, 1vSt using the 
straightforward Eq. (5.35). If MFF ββ ≠ , then numerically solve Eq. (5.38) for 1vSt  
as described above; 
3. From Eq. (5.25), calculate MF as follows: 
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4. If mMFMF ββ = , generate randomly an instantiation to 2vST , namely, 2vSt using the 
straightforward Eq. (5.45). If mMFMF ββ ≠ , then numerically solve Eq. (5.44) for 
2vS
t  as described above; 
5.  From Eq. (5.43), calculate mMF as follows: 
6. To obtain a representative sample, repeat nMC times steps 1–5 in a Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
5.2.2. Algorithm Modification for Failure Propagation in the Multi-State Case 
Both propagations through the kill effect and through the precursor effect need to be 
expanded to take into account the multi-state failures occurring at the vertices and edges. 
Once TF, TMF and TmMF have been generated for each vertex and edge as described in the 
previous subsection, the kill effect and the precursor effect are derived as follows. 
Kill effect. Ek, k1 and v1 are derived as previously using Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2). The time to 


















*  , qF
Fk
qUE TTq k 11 kvN =∈∀  (5.49) 
 Similarly, the time to unavailability for the major degradation or complete failure case 





*  , qMF
MFk





*  , qmMF
mMFk
qUE TTq k 11 kvN =∈∀  (5.51) 
In the case that a victim vertex has several killers, MFkUT
, and mMFkUT
,  are equal to the 
minimum of the times of the killer vertices. 
Precursor effect. Ep, k2 and v2 are derived as previously using Eqs. (5.4) and (5.5). After 
the kill effect, a victim node becomes unavailable for the failed case as given by Eq. (5.6) 
and rewritten below: 
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However, in the case of the MF and mMF states of the victim vertices, the functionality is 
truly lost only due to the complete failure of the killer vertex (TMF and TmMF have no 
impact on the functionality of the victim vertex). As a consequence, the equivalent 
expression for MFmUT
, and mMFmUT
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are defined for LEl ∈  in the same 
fashion than FlH  
in Eq. (5.7): 
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In the same fashion, [ ] 1, ×= lnMFliMFl mm  and [ ] 1, ×= lnmMFlimMFl mm  for LEl ∈  are defined as 
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,, max , =∈∀
 
(5.58) 
The times of unavailability due to the functional redundancy in the MF and mMF cases 
( MFrUT
,  and mMFrUT
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1 ,, =∈∀∈∀ −N  (5.60) 



























N =∈∀  (5.62) 
Once again, in the case that a victim vertex has several killers, MFpUT
, and mMFpUT
,  are equal 
to the minimum of the times of the killer vertices. 
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 vertex , ≤  for all victim vertices q in the precursor effect. 














 vertex , =
(precursor times for the failed case for similar reasons with mUT in Eqs. (5.53) and (5.54)) 
and repeat the precursor effect process outlined above. 
Combination of all effects. The final times to unavailability in the MF and mMF cases 
are derived in a similar way than Eq. (5.11): 
 ( )[ ]MFp qUMFk qUMFr qUqMFMF qUn TTTTTq , vertex ,, vertex ,, vertex , vertex , vertex ,* ,,,maxmin , =∈∀ N  (5.63) 
 ( )[ ]mMFp qUmMFk qUmMFr qUqmMFmMF qUn TTTTTq , vertex ,, vertex ,, vertex , vertex , vertex ,* ,,,maxmin , =∈∀ N  (5.64) 
where MFr qUT
,




















vertex , are included in if 
they exist. 
5.2.3. Summary of the Anomaly and Failure Propagation Algorithm 
Below is a summary of the algorithmic process used to propagate multi-state failures 
across the network. The following inputs are required: the adjacency matrices and 
interlayer matrix, the mapping function (these three lements defining a network 




1. Generate for each vertex i TF,vertex i, TMF,vertex i, and TmMF,vertex i (section 5.2.1) 
2. Generate for each edge TF,edge j→i, TMF,edge j→i, and TmMF,edge j→i (section 5.2.1) 
3. Compute Ek using Eq. (5.1) 




, for each victim vertex using Eqs. (5.3), (5.50) and 
(5.51) 
6. Compute Ep using Eq. (5.4) 




, for each vertex using Eqs. (5.6), (5.53) and (5.54) 






lH  using Eqs. (5.7), (5.55) and (5.56) 










, for each vertex for all layers LEl ∈  using Eqs. 




, for each victim vertex using Eqs. (5.10), (5.61) 
and (5.62) 
























 vertex , ≤  




UT for each vertex using Eqs. (5.11), (5.63) and (5.64) 
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5.2.4. Failure Propagation Example in the Multi-State Case 
Let us revisit the first example presented in section 5.1.6 by considering the MF case 
additionally (the mMF case can be applied in a similar fashion). The tims to failures (TF) 
and to MF state (TMF) are given in Table 5.2, and shown in Figure 5.3 for clarity purposes. 
Table 5.2. Times to failure and degradation of the nodes and link in the case study example 
 Time to failure TF TMF 
years years 
Spacecraft #1   
 TTC 2 1 
 Supporting subsystems 6 6 
 Payload 7 5 
Spacecraft #2   
 TTC 9 4 
 Supporting subsystems 8 0.5 
Link between spacecraft 12 11 
 
 














tF ,1 = 2
tMF ,1 = 1 
tF ,2 = 6
tMF ,2 = 6 
tF ,3 = 7
tMF ,3 = 5 
tF ,4 = 9
tMF ,4 = 4 
tF,5 = 8
tMF ,5 = 0.5
tF,1↔4 = 12
tMF ,1↔4 = 11
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If spacecraft #1 was to be by itself, it would have failed at 2 years and been in a MF state 
at 1 year, when the TTC failed and degraded. However, in this network configuration, the 
second spacecraft can help maintaining the functionality up to 6 years on-orbit for a non-
failed state, and 4 years for a non-MF state. How these numbers were obtained is 
explained below using the 14 steps given in section 5.2.2. Steps 1 and 2 are already 
completed as the times to failure for the nodes and link are given in this example. 
3. According to section 4.5.1, 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }4,5,3,2,1,2=kE  (5.65) 
4. Then, 
  ( )522=1k  and ( )431=1v  (5.66) 












































































       
 (5.68) 
6. According to section 4.5.1, 
  ( ) ( ) ( ){ }5,4,3,1,2,1=pE  (5.69) 
7. Then, 
  ( )4112 =k  and ( )5322 =v  (5.70) 
8. The minimum time to unavailability after the kill eff ct is given as: 
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9. The only functionally redundant layer in this IMLN is the TTC layer. The 























































































































































MFm  (5.76) 













































































































































13. The convergence condition is met in this particular example, so the algorithm 
continues to the final step. 
14. Combining all the effect, the final times to unavailab lity for the nodes are: 
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This chapter was entirely dedicated to the study of the anomaly and failure propagation 
across interdependent multi-layer networks. This chapter developed several contributions: 
• The formal description of the mechanisms that enable the propagation of failures 
and anomalies across the network, supporting a complete survivability analysis of 
the network under consideration; 
• The establishments of several algorithms for: 
o the propagation of complete failures of nodes and links across the network; 
o the concurrent generation of times to failure and degradation in the context 
of multi-state failures; 
o the concurrent propagation of multi-state failures across the network. 
• The illustration of the failure propagation process through case-study examples.  
The following chapter aims to validate the modeling and simulation tool presented in this 
chapter, quantify its precision and its scalability.  
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CHAPTER 6  




The previous chapters have introduced the need of the interdependent multi-layer 
approach and developed the necessary tools to tackle survivability analyses for space-
based networks. This chapter aims to test that the proposed tool correctly perform what it 
is designed for, as well as quantify the simulation output precision and evaluate the 
scalability of the model.  
The first objective will be tackled using an alternative modeling scheme, namely the 
stochastic Petri nets, as well as analytical solutins that can exceptionally be derived for 
simple forms of networks: the output probabilities of the IMLN approach will be 
compared to the output of these two alternative ways of obtaining them, and it will be 
shown that the IMLN results are in excellent agreemnt with the other two set of results 
as shown in sections 6.2 and 6.3. Consequently, the IMLN output can be trusted for 
further analysis in the following chapter (Chapter 7). 
The second objective arises from the fact that the results from the IMLN approach are 
obtained by running Monte Carlo simulations. As a consequence, there is an inherent 
variability in the probabilities outputted by the simulation associated with the number of 
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runs selected for the Monte Carlo. Section 6.4 investigates the spread of the confidence 
intervals and ways to maintain the precision of theIMLN results. This discussion is 
continued in section 6.5. 
Finally, section 6.5 also addresses questions relativ  to the scalability of the IMLN 
approach, such as: how does precision requirements affect the simulation time? How 
flexible is the IMLN representation in handling large network size? How does this 
network size affect the simulation time?  
6.2. Stochastic Petri Nets 
6.2.1. Overview of Stochastic Petri Nets 
Petri nets were introduced in 1962 by the German computer scientist, Carl Adam Petri 
(1926–2010). A Petri net is a bipartite directed graph used to model discrete-event 
systems that can display concurrent or asynchronous processes (Peterson, 1977). The 
Petri net graph has 2 disjoint sets of vertices (or nodes): places and transitions. Directed 
arcs are drawn between a place and a transition (called input arc) or conversely between a 
transition and a place (called output arc). Places connected to a transition by input arcs 
are called input places of that transition, and conversely places connected to a transition 
by output arcs are called output places of that transition. In addition to places, transitions, 




 As explained by Peterson (1977), a Petri net has “static” and “dynamic” properties: the 
Petri net graph describes its “static properties”, and its “dynamic properties [...] result 
from its execution”. The evolution of the Petri net is marked by the movement of the 
tokens from places to places, through the “firing” of transitions. However, the firing of a 
transition occurs only if this transition has been “ abled” beforehand, i.e., if tokens are 
present in all the input places of the transition. The firing rules of the transitions define 
the dynamic behavior of the system, and the combinatio  of the locations of the tokens, 
called the marking, characterizes the current state of the system. Thus, places model 
particular “conditions” of the system (e.g., subsystem X experienced a major anomaly), 
while transitions model “events” affecting the system (e.g., failure of subsystem X). The 
condition associated with a place is realized when one (or several) token(s) are in that 
place. Formal mathematical definitions of Petri nets can be found in Peterson (1977; 1981) 
or Haas (2002). 
Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) are a subfamily of Petri nets, and they add a stochastic 
behavior to the modeling scheme by introducing randomness in the firing of transitions, 
modeled for example with exponential, Weibull, or lgnormal distributions. Details about 
stochastic Petri nets, or other Petri net subfamilies (e.g., colored or hierarchical Petri nets) 
can be found in Haas (2002),  or Ajmone Marsan (1989). 
Two additional types of arcs exist in Petri net modeling, the inhibitor and the enabler arcs. 
The inhibitor arc prevents a transition from firing when a token is present in the place 
linking the transition and the place. Its usefulness will be shown in an example shortly. 
Conversely, the enabler arc is a “negative inhibitor” (Volovoi, 2006) that enables or 
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forces the transition to occur. In essence, the inhib tor and enabler arcs “override” the 
stochastic nature of a transition in an SPN model (or a deterministic temporal delay in a 
regular Petri Net). 
To better understand the construction and evolution of a Petri net, consider the following 
example. A system is composed of two subsystems, and e ch can be in two states: 
operational or failed. After a failure, each subsystem can be repaired and brought back to 
the operational state, but only one subsystem at a time. In other words, only one 
subsystem can be repaired at a time. This system is shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1. Two-subsystem system with repair queue 
(initial configuration with subsystem 1 (S1) and subsystem 2 (S2) both operational) 
All the elements previously mentioned can be seen in Figure 6.1:  
• six places (shown as circles) representing the possible “states” the subsystems can 
evolve towards;  
S1 operational S2 operational

















token 1 token 2
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• two tokens initially in the operational places for the subsystems, indicating that 
initially the systems is in this configuration/state;  
• the failure and repair transitions are displayed as large black rectangles and 
represent the stochastic or deterministic laws governing the failure and the repair 
time of the subsystems; the immediate transitions are represented differently here 
(with thin black rectangles) to ensure the clarity of the model.  
• These immediate transitions can be overridden by the in ibitor arcs to ensure than 
only one subsystem get repaired at a time: if subsystem 1 (S1) fails first for 
example, the token 1 initially in the place labeled “S1 operational” transitions to 
the place labeled “S1 failed”, and as the subsystem 2 is still operational, the 
immediate transition is enabled and the token 1 immediately transitions to the 
place labeled “S1 ready for repair”. Since now a token is present in that place, the 
inhibitor arc overrides the immediate transition 2. As a consequence, if the 
subsystem 2 fails while the immediate transition 2 is still inhibited, the token 2 
will stay in the place labeled “S2 failed” until the token 1 transitions back to the 
place labeled “S1 operational.”
7 
6.2.2. Stochastic Petri Nets for Multi-State Failure and Survivability Modeling 
In multi-state failure or survivability analyses, the finer resolution into the degradation 
and failure behavior of systems introduces additional complexity compared with the 
traditional reliability analysis, and requires as a consequence more advanced analytical 
                                                 
7 As a side note, enabler arcs could have been used in tead of inhibitor arcs in this example: an enabler arc 
between “S1 operational” and the immediate transition 2, and aother one between “S2 operational” and the 
immediate transition 1 would have modeled the same behavior. 
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techniques for modeling and analysis, such as the IMLN framework proposed in this 
thesis, Markov chains or more broadly stochastic timed automata. 
SPNs have several advantages over Markov chains for modeling and analyzing multi-
state systems. One argument in support of this statement is the following: consider a 
simple example, where a system is composed of k subsystems and each subsystem can be 
in m different states. In the case of a Petri net modelization, “only” km places are 
necessary to model the state evolution of this system (the presence of tokens in places 
will reflect which state the system is in). However, with a Markovian approach, mk states 
are necessary. The ratio of the number of states necessary for a Markovian approach to 
the number of places required in a Petri net approach is plotted in Figure 6.2. The figure 
shows this ratio with respect to the number of subsystems k, and for 4 different values of 
the number of states per subsystem, m, (m = 2 for the lowest curve to m = 5 for the uppest 
curve). The figure is plotted with a logscale y-axis due to the explosion of this ratio for 
higher values of k and m.  
Figure 6.2 reads as follows: for example, for k = 5 and m = 5 (the upper-most curve), a 
Marvokian model requires 125 more states than places in a Petri net model. The 
proliferation of states or places when k or m increases is rightfully described as the 
“dimension damnation” of multi-state failure analysis by Lisnianski and Levitin (2003), 
but is significantly more acute in the case of the Markovian approach. Figure 6.2 also 
shows for example that for systems with 7 or more components, even in the case of the 
traditional binary reliability analysis, Markov Chains require at least an order of 
magnitude more states to model the system than places in an equivalent Petri net. More 
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broadly, this feature of Markov chains—their (acute) dimension damnation—results from 
the fact that Markovian modeling requires “global states” and a “global clock” for the 
system to run the state evolution against. That is, the system can be in only one state at a 
time, and this state describes the status of all the subsystems evolving in time with respect 
to the unique “global” clock. In contrast, Petri nets allow local modeling (places per 
subsystem) and local clocks, where each subsystem evolves with its own token(s) and the 
system state is given by the marking of the Petri nt. 
 
Figure 6.2. Numbers of states in Markov Chains versus Petri nets 
(the lower curve represents subsystems with 2 states, nd the upper curve represents subsystems with 5 
states) 
Another advantage of SPNs is their intrinsic ability to handle any distribution for the time 
to transition, for example non-exponential transitions such as the Weibull or the 
lognormal, as opposed to the Markovian approach which would require more complex 
and involved operations to manage time-varying failure rate (e.g., systems exhibiting 
infant mortality or wear-out behavior). 


























































Although initially used for the modeling and analysis of manufacturing systems and 
computer networks, stochastic Petri Nets are slowly but increasingly being adopted for 
reliability studies, as well as for maintenance and risk analysis, because of the many 
advantages they provide over Markov chains for example (Volovoi, 2004). The adoption 
of SPN is still hampered however by the limited availability of Petri net software, 
especially when compared with the widespread availability of software tools for other 
modeling approaches. In this thesis, the software SPN@ (Volovoi, 2006) was used. 
In the space application developed in this work, we consider 12 subsystems on-board 
spacecraft, and each of these subsystems can be in 4 different states of functionality. Thus 
48 places are necessary in the case of a Petri net to capture the overall state of only one 
spacecraft, whereas more than 16 million states are nec ssary in a Markovian approach. 
The state space for a Markov chain (or a semi-Markov model) would make it 
unmanageable and impossible to visualize. Also, the number of transition laws to 
calculate and populate in the model would be unmanageable. 
6.2.3. Stochastic Petri Net Representation of a Spacecraft and of the Case Study 
Space-Based Network 
The traditional monolith and the case study SBN archite tures were introduced in 
previous chapters but are recalled here for readability purposes. The monolith 
architecture consists of a single spacecraft with the 11 subsystems introduced in Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3, plus the unknown category:  
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1. Gyro / Sensor / Reaction Wheel (hereafter referred to as Gyro) 
2. Thruster / Fuel (Thruster) 
3. Beam / Antenna Operation / Deployment (Beam) 
4. Control Processor (CP) 
5. Mechanisms / Structures / Thermal (Mechanisms) 
6. Payload Instrument / Amplifier / On-board Data / Computer / Transponder 
(Payload) 
7. Battery / Cell (Battery) 
8. Electrical Distribution (ED) 
9. Solar Array Deployment (SAD) 
10. Solar Array Operating (SAO) 
11. Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TTC) 
The Gyro and Thruster subsystems can be lumped together into a macro-subsystem called 
Attitude and Orbit Control Subsystem (AOCS), and the Battery, ED, SAD and SAO 
subsystems are part of the macro-subsystem named Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS). 
The traditional monolith architecture is presented in the upper part of Figure 6.3. The 
case study space-based network consists of two spacecraft (S/C #1 and S/C#2): S/C #1 is 
similar to the spacecraft in the monolith architecture, while S/C #2 possesses all the 
subsystems but the payload. The two spacecraft are networked wirelessly together to 





Figure 6.3. Architecture of the monolith spacecraft (top) and the case study SBN (bottom) 
 
As developed in Chapter 3, four classes of failure ev nts were recognized and analyzed 
for each subsystem:  
• Subsystem state 4 (SubS4): fully operational 
• Subsystem state 3 (SubS3): minor anomaly/degradation 
• Subsystem state 2 (SubS2): major anomaly/degradation 
• Subsystem state 1 (SubS1): total failure 
Each subsystem can transition to a more severe statof degradation or failure and the 




To evaluate the survivability of these two architectures, four states were considered by 
the author at the system level: 
• System state 4 (SysS4): fully operational:  0 – 5% performance loss 
• System state 3 (SysS3): minor degradation:  5 – 35%performance loss 
• System state 2 (SysS2): major degradation:  35 – 85% performance loss 
• System state 1 (SysS1): total failure:   85 – 100% performance loss 
These states determine the level of precision for the survivability analysis of the models. 
Additional precision can be obtained by defining additional states, which comes at the 
cost of increased analytical and computational complexity, as discussed previously. The 
probabilities of being in these four states are the output of the SPN model. Comparisons 
between the probabilities obtained provide the comparative survivability analysis of these 
two architectures, as will be shown shortly.  
In the case of the monolith spacecraft, the following rules are used to link the subsystem 
and system levels of degradations and failures: 
• The system is in the operational state (SysS4) if all the subsystems are in their 
operational states (SubS4); 
• The system is in the failed state (SysS1) if one subsystem is in its failed state 
(SubS1); 
• SubS3 state of the subsystems does not have a direct eff t on the system level; 
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• The SubS2 state can lead to minor, major degradation or failed system states  
(SysS3, SysS2 and SysS1 respectively) according to conditional probabilities 
peculiar to each subsystem, as given in Table 6.1 (actual on-orbit data derived 
from the database). The probabilities given in Table 6.1 are “conditional” since 
they represent the probability that the system willtransition to a degraded state 
given that a particular subsystem is in SubS2 state. For example, for the Gyro / 
Sensor / Reaction wheel subsystem, given that this sub ystem is in SubS2 (major 
anomaly), there is 25.7% chance that the system transi ions to a minor 
degradation state (SysS3), 54.3% chance to a major degradation state (SysS2) and 
20% chance to a failed state (SysS1). 
 
Table 6.1. Impact on the system level of subsystem ajor degradation (conditional probabilities) 
Subsystem 
Conditional probability that a SubS2 state  
leads to system: 
minor degradation major degradation total failure 
Gyro / Sensor / Reaction wheel 25.7% 54.3% 20% 
Thruster / Fuel 50.9% 47.3% 1.8% 
Beam / Antenna operation / deployment 70.6% 23.5% 5.9% 
Control processor 0% 0% 100% 
Mechanisms / Structures / Thermal 100% 0% 0% 
Payload instrument / Amplifier / On-
board data / Computer / Transponder 
33.4% 59.1% 7.5% 
Battery / Cell 56.2% 18.8% 25% 
Electrical distribution 40% 40% 20% 
Solar array deployment 40% 60% 0% 
Solar array operating 61% 31.2% 7.8% 
Telemetry Tracking and Command 43.5% 34.8% 21.7% 




A summary of the subsystem and system states, and the links between is provided in 
Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Summary of subsystem and system state and transitions 




For each subsystem, four states 




SubS3: minor anomaly 
SubS2: major anomaly 
SubS1: total failure 
 
derived from the classes of events 
present in the database (see 
Chapter 3) 
 
Weibull distributions derived from  
statistical data analysis 
(see Chapter 3) 
System 
level 
Four states based on the 




SysS3: minor degradation 
SysS2: major degradation 
SysS1: total system failure 
 
defined in this dissertation  
 
Transitions between system states depend on 
subsystems states: 
 























then the system transitions 
to… 
 
no transition (no impact on 
system states) 
 
    SysS3 





Given the stochastic transition laws between the diff rent states summarized in Table 6.2, 
the SPN model of a monolith spacecraft facing on-orbit failures and anomalies was 
developed (using SPN@ (Volovoi, 2006)) and is shown in Figure 6.4. To clarify this 
model and enable an easy identification of its different parts, Figure 6.5 is provided 
showing the overall SPN model, the spacecraft archite ture, the various subsystem 
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models, and the system transition diagram. In addition, a zoom-in or enlargement of two 
subsystems SPN models is shown in Figure 6.5, those of the Gyro, and the TTC 
subsystems. The system level states are clearly identified and illustrated by a schematic 
transition diagram. The remaining states are labeled “intermediary states” and are used to 
link the subsystem level to the system level according to the empirical data and the 
previously stated rules. 
A similar SPN model has been developed for the casestudy SBN, and is provided in the 
appendix of this chapter instead of the main body for readability purposes. Its derivation 
is presented in detail in Castet and Saleh (2012) and Saleh and Castet (2011). Also 
explained in these references is the extensive testing done to validate these SPN models. 
 
 










Results. Running the Monte Carlo simulation of the SPN model in the case of the 
monolith spacecraft provides the evolution in time of the probabilities of the system 
being in operational or different failed states (i.e., operational, minor and major 
degradation, failed). Figure 6.6 presents these results, shown in two different plots for 
readability purposes given their different ranges on the y-axis. 
 
Figure 6.6. State probability results of the monolith spacecraft SPN model 
 
Figure 6.6 reads as follows: for example after six years on-orbit, a monolith spacecraft 
has a 75.6% likelihood of being fully operational, 8.4% of being in minor degradation, 
8.1% of being in major degradation state, and 7.9% of being in a failed state. Similarly, 
after 10 years for example, a spacecraft has only a 70% likelihood of being fully 
operational, that is, of not experiencing some form f anomaly or degradation. This result 
offers a significant opportunity, can be thought of as a call to arms, to improve spacecraft 
design and testing. 
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For the space-based network, running the simulation of its SPN model leads to the same 
kind of plots. This in turns allows the comparison of the probability of residency in each 
state for both architectures. Figure 6.7 for example displays the probability of residency 
in the operational and failed states for the monolith spacecraft and the space-based 
network. 
 
Figure 6.7. Comparison between the monolith spacecraft and the SBN for the fully operational (a) 
and failed (b) states 
 
Figure 6.7a is confined to the operational state and clearly shows that the space-based 
network is more likely to be in an operational state than the traditional monolith 
spacecraft at any point in time, given stochastic on-orbit anomalies and failures. For 
example, after 15 years, there is a 65.9% likelihood that the space-based network will still 
be in the operational state, compared with 63.9% for the monolith spacecraft. This two-
percentage point increment is provided by the networked nature of this architecture and 
the ability of one spacecraft to tap into a resource, in this case the TTC, of the second 
spacecraft. Similarly, Figure 6.7b shows that the space-based network is less likely to be 
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in a failed state than the traditional monolith at any point in time. For example, after 15 
years, there is 11.2% likelihood that the space-based network will be in the failed state, 
compared with 13.1% for the monolith spacecraft. 
A detailed analysis of the implications for design a d architectural choice of the results 
presented above is conducted in Chapter 7. As a side note, other space-based network 
architectures were modeled with stochastic Petri nets, as presented in Castet and Saleh 
(2011). As seen above, the SPN modeling allow the generation of probabilities of 
degradation and failure of the space-based network. One might wonder why SPNs were 
not chosen as the principal modeling tool for survivab lity analysis, in place of the 
proposed IMLN representation. A Petri net is by nature a graphical representation of 
processes, and the generation of even the monolith spacecraft model was complex, as 
attested by Figure 6.5. The simple case study space-b s d network also required a 
complex SPN model, created manually.  In comparison, the IMLN approach only 
requires the creation of three sets of input: the adjacency matrices, the interlayer matrix 
and the mapping function. As explained in section 6.5.3, their determination can be quite 
simple and the algorithm presented to propagate failures is not specific to any type of 
network. Consequently, the survivability exploration f several architectures is conducted 
by varying inputs in the case of the IMLN framework, while a graph must be specifically 
created for each architecture in the case of the SPN approach. As a conclusion, the IMLN 
approach is superior in terms of generalization, complexity and practicality. The actual 
introduction and use of SPN in the context of the IMLN modeling is presented next. 
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6.2.4. Use of SPN Model to Partially Create and Validate th IMLN Model 
The monolith and space-based network SPN were used to create inputs for the IMLN, as 
well as using SPN results to (partially) validate IMLN models. 
IMLN input creation. Remember that the required inputs for the IMLN models are based 
on design and architectural choices of the network (adjacency matrices A1, …, AL, the 
interlayer matrix C and the mapping function f) as well as on the failure behaviors of the 
vertices and edges of the network. The formers are immediately defined from an arbitrary 
architecture, while the latters are not trivial in their derivation. In this dissertation, it was 
chosen to represent the failure behavior of the vertices and the edges using cumulative 
distributions functions of the random variables TF, TMF and TmMF (all three of them for a 
complete multi-state failure simulation, or a subset for other simulations (e.g., a complete 
failure simulation requires only the c.d.f.s for TF)). These c.d.f.s are represented 
parametrically here using single Weibull distributions characterized by two Weibull 
parameters each: βF, θF, βMF, θMF, βmMF and θmMF. 
In this dissertation, deriving βF, θF, βMF, θMF, βmMF and θmMF is not trivial as the severity 
levels at the subsystem level do not match the severity of the impact at the system level. 
Indeed, as summarized in Table 6.2, a subsystem in a minor degradation state (SubS3) 
does not translate in the overall spacecraft transitio ing to the system minor degradation 
state (SysS3) for example. However, the IMLN inputs characterize the impact of failure 
behavior of the vertices and nodes at the system level. Hence, for example in the case 
study, the Weibull c.d.f. for the total failure (PF) of TTC vertex is not defined by the 
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results derived in Chapter 3 (that correspond to probability of the TTC being in SubS1), 
as Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 clearly show that the spacecraft will experience a total failure 
(SysS1) due to the TTC if the TTC experiences a totl failure (SubS1) or a major 
degradation event (SubS2) that leads to a system total failure in 21.7% of the occurrences 
of such event. 
The SPN model of the monolith spacecraft becomes extremely helpful in determining the 
Weibull parameters of the c.d.f.s for TF, TMF and TmMF of the vertices in the IMLN 
models. For example, in the case of the case study IMLN, the required c.d.f.s are the ones 
of the TTC vertex, the supporting subsystems vertex and the payload vertex. These 
probabilities can be obtained by running subsets of the SPN monolith model with the 
subsystems of interest and tracking the resulting system state probability output of the 
Monte Carlo simulation. For example, in the case of the supporting subsystems vertex, 
the subset of subsystem under consideration consists of the AOCS, EPS, Beam, 
Mechanisms and CP subsystems; the arcs in the SPN model for the remaining subsystems 
modeling their impact on the system level being disconnected. To obtain the Weibull 
parameters βF, θF, βMF, θMF, βmMF and θmMF, a non-linear least-square regression is used to 
fit single Weibull distributions to the output of the SPN simulation. In this space 
application, these Weibull models are very precise: for example, in the case of the TTC 
vertex, the average errors of the Weibull models with respect to the probability output of 
the SPN simulation are 0.003, 0.02 and 0.04 percentag  points for TF, TMF and TmMF 




Table 6.3. Weibull parameters for TF, TMF and TmMF of vertices in the IMLN case study model 
Vertex PF PMF PmMF 
TTC 
βF = 0.4650 
θF = 47700 years 
βMF = 0.4680 
θMF = 28040 years 
βmMF = 0.4402 
θmMF = 28210 years 
Supporting subsystems 
βF = 0.5529 
θF = 918.5 years 
βMF = 0.5052 
θMF = 435.0 years 
βmMF = 0.4638 
θmMF = 203.6 years 
Payload8 
βF = 0.5921 
θF = 30150 years 
βMF = 0.5561 
θMF = 1731 years 
βmMF = 0.5599 
θmMF = 813.3 years 
 
Partial validation of the IMLN model. Now that a subset of the SPN model has been 
used to create inputs for the IMLN model, it is possible to use the complete SPN model 
and its results to partially validate the IMLN simulation results.  
A Monte Carlo simulation of the SPN model of the case study space-based network was 
run (5 million runs, as justified in Castet and Saleh (2012)), and the results are provided 
in Table 6.4. For example, according to the SPN model, after 5 years on-orbit, the 
probability that the space-based network has completely failed (PF) is 6.0 percentage 
points, that it is in a major degradation state (PM) is 7.3 percentage points, and that it is in 
a minor degradation state (Pm) is 7.7 percentage points. 
The IMLN model using the Weibull distributions given in Table 6.3 and assuming a 
perfect link between spacecraft was run 100,000 times (see section 6.4 for more details 
about the number of runs). The results are also present d in Table 6.4. Similarly, 
according to the IMLN model, after 5 years on-orbit, the probability that the space-based 
                                                 
8 In this particular example, the “payload” vertex consists of the payload instrument, as well as data 
handling components. These components will be analyzed separately later in the dissertation. 
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network has completely failed (PF) is 6.1 percentage points, that it is in a major 
degradation state (PM) is 7.4 percentage points, and that it is in a minor degradation state 
(Pm) is 7.7 percentage points. 
Table 6.4 gives the full results for all degradation and failure states at four times in the 
lifetime of a spacecraft (1, 5, 10 and 15 years) for b th models. Table 6.4 also provides 
the absolute difference (in percentage points) betwe n the results of the two models. It 
can be seen that these results are similar, as the maximum error is 0.29 percentage point 
and the average error over all the results is 0.1 percentage point, a significantly small 
difference. A detailed analysis of the results is presented in Chapter 7. 




SPN IMLN Absolute difference 
PF PM Pm PF PM Pm F M m 
1 year 2.78 3.70 4.36 2.53 3.50 4.34 0.24 0.19 0.02 
5 years 5.96 7.32 7.66 6.09 7.38 7.69 0.12 0.07 0.03 
10 years 8.78 9.89 9.71 8.79 9.88 9.74 0.01 0.04 0.03 
15 years 11.22 11.78 11.04 10.93 11.66 11.00 0.29 0.13 0.04 
 
The small, but existing differences can be explained from two sources: 
• The IMLN model was simulated with 100,000 runs. Increasing the number of 
runs will increase the precision of the results, but at the cost of computing time. 
This source of error is investigated in the following section. Also the Monte Carlo 
simulation can introduce some variability in the SPN results, even if 5 million 
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runs were chosen to reduce it as much as possible wth a reasonable simulation 
time.  
• The Weibull laws derived in Table 6.3 are close approximations of subsets of the 
SPN model, hence the fitting errors mentioned above are introduced in the IMLN 
simulation. 
6.3. Comparison with Limited Analytical Solutions 
In the case of the simple space-based network from the case study, a closed-form solution 
for the probabilities of being in a total failure state, a major degradation state or a minor 
degradation state can be derived analytically. Note that the existence of a closed-form 
solution is not generalizable to all space-based networks, justifying the need of the 
general interdependent multi-layer approach presentd i  this dissertation. 
Assuming that the link is perfectly reliable, they can be expressed as: 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ){ }FFFFFF PPPPPP TTCsub. supp.TTCpayloadsub. supp. 1111111 −−−−−−−=  (6.1) 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ){ }MFFMFMFMFMF PPPPPP TTCsub. supp.TTCpayloadsub. supp. 1111111 −−−−−−−=  (6.2) 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ){ }mMFFmMFmMFmMFmMF PPPPPP TTCsub. supp.TTCpayloadsub. supp. 1111111 −−−−−−−=  (6.3) 
Plugging in the Weibull models shown in Table 6.3, it is then possible to investigate the 
precision of the IMLN results from 100,000 runs. The numerical results from the 
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equations are presented in Table 6.5. Note that these values differ from the SPN results 
presented in Table 6.4 as the Psupp. sub., Ppayload and PTTC are modeled using the same 
Weibull distributions than the IMLN model. As a side node, the SPN results can be found 
by plugging instead the SPN simulated values.  




Analytical solution IMLN Absolute difference 
PF PM Pm PF PM Pm F M m 
1 year 2.51 3.55 4.25 2.53 3.50 4.34 0.02 0.05 0.09 
5 years 6.08 7.39 7.76 6.09 7.38 7.69 0.01 0.01 0.07 
10 years 8.86 9.93 9.72 8.79 9.88 9.74 0.06 0.04 0.02 
15 years 11.01 11.69 10.93 10.93 11.66 11.00 0.08 0.03 0.07 
 
The IMLN simulation results are in good agreement with the analytical results: the 
maximum error for all degradation and failure states and for all time is 0.1 percentage 
point and the average error is 0.05 percentage point. 
It results that the comparison of the IMLN results with the SPN and analytical results 
yields very good agreement, partially validating the IMLN approach and establishing 
trust for the IMLN outputs. 
6.4. IMLN Model Precision 
The IMLN results presented in Table 6.5 were obtained by using a Monte Carlo 
simulation with 100,000 runs. However, due to the variability associated with Monte 
Carlo simulations, these results are not fully representative of the precision of the IMLN 
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model. This precision was investigated on the case study by running 10 times the same 
Monte Carlo simulation with 100,000 runs. Then confidence intervals can be built to 
characterize the variability associated with the IMLN simulation. For each on-orbit time 
(1, 5, 10 and 15 years) and for each degradation or failure state, a sample of 10 
probabilities P is gathered: the sample mean is defined as P nd the sample standard 
deviation is s. Then, using the Student’s t-distribution with 9 degrees of freedom, the 
















P  (6.4) 
where 262.29,025.0 =t as ( ) 95.09,025.09,025.0 =≤≤− tTtP for 9 degrees of freedom 
The sample averages and the confidence interval spreads are provided in Table 6.6. The 
spread of the confidence interval is relatively small: the maximum spread is 0.15 
percentage point and the average spread is 0.10 percentage point, with most of the 
analytical results falling between the confidence int rval bounds. 
Table 6.6. Confidence intervals for 100,000 runs results 
Time 
on-orbit 
Sample average Confidence interval spread 
PF PM Pm F M m 
1 year 2.48 3.54 4.21 0.08 0.10 0.08 
5 years 6.03 7.40 7.76 0.11 0.13 0.07 
10 years 8.79 9.91 9.77 0.11 0.13 0.08 




Improving the accuracy of the results can be obtained by increasing the number of runs in 
the simulation, hence increasing the computational burden. This is discussed in more 
details in the following section. 
6.5. Model Scalability 
6.5.1. Confidence Interval and Simulation Time 
For the case study IMLN (2-spacecraft network represented with 5 nodes), four series of 
Monte Carlo simulations were conducted to determine the accuracy improvement of the 
IMLN model results with the increase in the number of uns by tracking the spread of the 
confidence intervals, as well as the impact of thisincrease on the computational time. 
Each series of Monte Carlo consists in running 10 times the total failure simulation (no 
degradation states considered) in order to build confidence interval with that sample. The 
number of runs for each series is increasing from 10,000 runs for the first series to 
100,000 runs for the second series, 500,000 runs for the third series and 1,000,000 runs 
for the fourth series. The resulting variation in confidence interval spread (average and 
maximum over four on-orbit dates: 1, 5, 10 and 15 years) is presented in Figure 6.8. Also 
shown on the secondary y-axis in Figure 6.8 is the time required for propagating the 
failures across the IMLN depending on the number of uns. The configuration used in 
this thesis consists of the MATLAB software running on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.66 GHz 




Figure 6.8. Confidence interval spread and simulation time variations with the number of runs for 
the case study IMLN 
 
Figure 6.8 shows an exponential decrease in the spread of the confidence interval (both 
for the average and the maximum values) by increasing the number of runs, trend that can 
be translated in an increase in accuracy for the IMLN model. For example, the average 
confidence interval spread is 0.4 percentage point f r 10,000 runs and 0.04 percentage 
point for 500,000 runs. Figure 6.8 suggests that choosing a too high number of runs will 
not translate in a significantly higher accuracy (plateau effect after 500,000 runs in this 
particular example). This is all the more significant as Figure 6.8 shows that the 
simulation time linearly increases with the number of runs, from 0.2 second for 10,000 
runs to 24 seconds for 1 million runs. Consequently, a medium number of runs associated 
with most of the precision improvement and an acceptable computational time can be 
selected as a trade-off. The simulation times shown here remain low, but the IMLN under 
consideration consists of a small number of nodes. The next paragraph investigates how 







































































6.5.2. Network Size and Simulation Time 
Four different space-based network architectures ar considered here, each with four 
layers: two layers of functional redundancy (layers 1 and 2), one layer of supporting 
subsystems (layer 3) and one layer for the payload (layer 4). The first network consists of 
3 networked spacecraft (3-IMLN), the second of 4 spacecraft (4-IMLN), the third of 5 
spacecraft (5-IMLN) and the fourth of 10 spacecraft (10-IMLN). These IMLNs are not 
intended to be realistic space architectures: they w re chosen to increase the complexity 
of the failure propagation and observe its impact on the simulation time. The IMLN 
models (graph representation, adjacency matrices, interlayer matrix and mapping 
function) of these four architectures are shown in the Appendix of this chapter, instead of 
the main body for readability purposes. The number of vertices increases from 8 in the 3-
IMLN, to 11 in the 4-IMLN, 14 in the 5-IMLN and 29 in the 10-IMLN. The simulation 
times necessary to propagate total failures (these are not multi-state failure simulations) 
across the networks during Monte Carlo simulations with 100,000 runs are given in Table 
6.7. Even in the most complex IMLN (10 spacecraft), the simulation time for 100,000 
runs remain low with a value of about 13 seconds. A shorter simulation time or the 
possibility of considering a higher number of runs could be obtained by using a more 
efficient programming language or a more powerful computer configuration. 
Table 6.7. Simulation time variation with number of vertices 
Network type Number of vertices 
Simulation time 
seconds 
3-IMLN 8 4.8 
4-IMLN 11 5.8 
5-IMLN 14 6.9 
10-IMLN 29 12.8 
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In addition to the results for the architectures considered above, the failure propagation 
took about 2.3 seconds for 100,000 runs in the caseof the 2-IMLN case study as shown 
in Figure 6.8. The previous calculations were obtained for total failure simulations. In the 
case of a full multi-state analysis (here including the MF and mMF degraded states), the 
degradation and failure propagation takes about 5.4 seconds, short of three times the time 
necessary for the total failure simulation. As a consequence, the computational burden 
remains low even for the multi-state simulation. 
However, an additional computational time exists for the generation of TF, TMF and TmMF 
for the vertices (and edges). In the case of the total failure simulation, only TF is required 
to be generated from Weibull distributions, and only a fraction of second (0.2 second) is 
added to the 2.3 seconds required for the failure propagation across the network in the 2-
IMLN case. This is not the case for the multi-state pproach, as TF, TMF and TmMF need to 
be generated concurrently using the algorithm present d in section 5.2.1. In the case of 
the 100,000-run Monte Carlo simulation for the case study IMLN, 585 seconds are 
necessary to generate TF, TMF and TmMF for the vertices (the link between spacecraft is 
assumed to be perfectly reliable). This generation is significantly time consuming for 
vertices with Weibull distributions for TF, TMF and TmMF that do not share the same shape 
parameter and thus require the use of a potentially slow root-solving algorithm9 . 
Increasing the number of runs to high levels with a igh number of such vertices in the 
network might lead to a significantly high simulation time that might become prohibitive. 
To balance this problem, it was shown in Figure 6.8 that considering a too high number 
                                                 
9 The vertices with Weibull distributions sharing the same shape parameters induce a low computational 
burden as TF, TMF and TmMF can be generated using straightforward equations presented in 5.2.1. 
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of runs might not significantly improve the accuracy of the results. To help improve the 
time necessary for the generation of TF, TMF and TmMF, several paths can be considered: 
using a more efficient programming language, using a more efficient root-finding 
algorithm, approximating the failure behavior models with Weibull with the same shape 
parameters as much as possible or using a more powerful hardware configuration. Also, 
one might consider creating in parallel a library of times to degraded states for pre-
determined node and link anomaly and failure behaviors, so that the changes in the 
architecture and reruns of the simulations can be done within the order of times presented 
in Table 6.7 (i.e., uncoupling the generation of TF, TMF and TmMF and the failure 
propagation algorithm). 
6.5.3. Network Size and Scalability of Adjacency and Interlayer Matrices 
Another consequence of scaling up the network size lies with the increasing size of the 
adjacency and interlayer matrices. This increase can pose significant issues for creating 
and stocking matrices as well as performing efficient matrix operations. However, it is 
shown below that most interlayer matrices can be considered as sparse matrices, as well 
as some adjacency matrices. A sparse matrix is a matrix mainly populated with zeros, and 
it is extremely useful for lowering the computational burden associated with large 
matrices, as only the non-zero elements need to be c nsidered. 
The maximum number of elements in an adjacency matrix grows as the square of the 
number of spacecraft nS in the network: for example, in the case of the IMLN with nS = 4 





=×=An elements (maximum possible size), while the A2 matrix has 4222 =×=An  
elements. The actual size of the adjacency matrix depends on the number of nodes nl in 
the associated layer l (bounded by the number of spacecraft), and the number of non-zero 
elements in it depends on the number of edges in that layer ( lE En l =  with El defined in 
Eq. (4.1)). For undirected edges with no self-edges, the maximum number of edges is 
given by ( ) 21max, −= llE nnn l  (Newman, 2010). As a consequence, the associated 
adjacency matrix is symmetric, its diagonal only consists of zero, and there are 
( ) 21−ll nn  remaining elements to fully define Al. In the case of a low connectance (or 
density) of the layer (i.e., a low number of edges), Al can be considered as a sparse matrix. 
For example in the case of the 10-IMLN presented in the appendix, the adjacency matrix 
A1 has 100 elements, but only 5 elements are necessary to fully characterized it. 
The number of elements nC in the interlayer matrix C scales with the square of the 
number of vertices n in the network. For example, in the case of the 5-IMLN presented in 
the appendix, 1961414 =×=Cn elements. This number can grow very quickly and 
determining, entering and stocking the interlayer matrix elements can pose significant 
practical and computational issues. However, the number of non-zero elements (*Cn ) in 
the interlayer matrix is generally relatively low. Table 6.8 shows for each of the 
architectures considered in the appendix the total number of elements in C, the total 
number of non-zero elements in C and the ratio of these two numbers. For example, in 
the case of the 10-spacecraft network, the interlay matrix has 841 elements, but only 55 
of them are non-zero: in other words, 7% of the elem nts in that specific matrix are non-
zero. For all four of the architectures, this ratio stays below 20 %. As a consequence, the 
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interlayer matrix C can be considered as a sparse matrix to improve the computational 
treatment of this matrix. 
Also, as mentioned in section 4.5.1, a particular scheme of numbering the vertices in the 
network can help determining more easily elements of the interlayer matrix: if the 
vertices belonging to a same spacecraft are numbered in sequential order, the interlayer 
matrix can be written with a block diagonal form. It can be seen in the appendix that the 
interlayer matrix for the 10-IMLN architecture is simply written, despite its 29×29 size. 
Note that the seven 3×3 non-zero blocks are similar, as the two 2×2 blocks. To 
summarize, the fact that the interlayer matrix can be considered as a sparse matrix, and 
that an informed numbering scheme can significantly reduce the issues of scaling up the 
network size. 





Total number of 
elements in the C 
matrix ( nC) 
Number of non-zero 
elements in the C 
matrix ( *Cn ) 
Ratio C
*
C nn  
3-IMLN 8 64 13 20% 
4-IMLN 11 121 19 16% 
5-IMLN 14 196 25 13% 
10-IMLN 29 841 55 7% 
 
6.6. Summary 
This chapter explored technical considerations related to the IMLN representation and 
simulation tool: (partial) validation of the IMLN outputs, relationship between precision 
and number of runs in the Monte Carlo simulation, and its impact on scalability through 
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the simulation time and matrix size. It was demonstrated that the IMLN concept 
introduced in this thesis is able to handle properly the exploration of the design space of 
space-based networks. Indeed, the results from the IMLN simulation were shown to be in 
good agreement with results derived from an equivalent stochastic Petri net model, as 
well as analytical solutions, for a reasonable number of runs and simulation time. It was 
also shown that the precision of the results, through the proxy of the spread of confidence 
interval, is increasing (smaller confidence intervals) with the number of runs in the Monte 
Carlo simulation. However, the incremental benefits in precision are also decreasing with 
an increase in the number of runs, while the simulation time increases. A resulting 
compromise between precision and simulation time is necessary, but it was demonstrated 
that the failure propagation algorithm is sufficiently efficient so that the simulation time 
remains acceptable. Finally, through an informed way of numbering nodes in the network 
and the fact that most matrices considered are sparse, it was shown that the determination 
of the elements of the adjacency matrices and the interlayer matrix could be significantly 




6.A.1. Stochastic Petri Net of the Case Study Space-B s d Network 
 




Figure 6.B. Construction clarification of the space-based network SPN model 
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6.A.2. IMLN Models of the Four Architectures in 6.5.3 3-IMLN architecture 
3-IMLN architecture 
 
Figure 6.C. IMLN representation for the selected 3-IMLN architecture 


















2A , 333 0 ×=A  and 114 0 ×=A  
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Figure 6.D. IMLN representation for the selected 4-IMLN architecture 



























2A , 443 0 ×=A  and 114 0 ×=A  


































































































Figure 6.E. IMLN representation for the selected 5-IMLN architecture 




































2A , 553 0 ×=A , 114 0 ×=A  
























































































































Figure 6.F. IMLN representation for the selected 10-IMLN architecture 
 







































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 7  
RESULTS, ANALYSES AND INSIGHTS ON DESIGN AND ARCHIT ECTURAL 
CHOICES FOR SPACE-BASED NETWORKS 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 introduced a new concept to enable the modeling of space-based networks and 
Chapter 5 described a framework to assess the survivability of such architectures. 
Chapter 6 investigated the ability of this framework to properly capture subsystem 
anomaly and failure propagation across the network (a validation process) and its 
scalability. The objectives of this chapter are twofold: the first is to provide examples of 
application of the survivability framework and tools introduced in this dissertation 
through the evaluation of specific space-based networks as a proof of concept; the second 
is related to the purpose behind the introduction of this framework, that is, exploring the 
survivability features of a new concept for space systems, namely space-based networks, 
and their implications for conceptual design. Through the use of the survivability 
framework and the interdependent multi-layer network approach developed in this thesis, 
what insights can be gathered for the design and the architecture selection of space 
systems for which survivability is a metric of interest?  
Before providing more details about the two objectives of this chapter, a caveat is in 
order to clarify the use of the tool introduced in this thesis, as well as the interpretation of 
the results provided in this chapter. This thesis does not advocate for or against the 
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development of space-based networks by the space industry. This thesis introduces and 
develops a framework and tools to explore the survivability of space-based networks, in 
the case that space-based networks are under consideration by the designer due to 
particular drivers. This thesis enables the analysis of survivability implications of 
networks for design, and helps inform the design and rchitectural choices of space 
systems. The survivability tools and results presented here are not the only elements that 
will determine the design decision of the retained architecture: other considerations, such 
as cost, complexity, technology maturity, delivery schedule, customer requirements or 
shareholder risk tolerance, will also influence thedesigner’s decision. In summary, this 
thesis provides the means to explore the survivability aspect and implications of space-
based networks, if networks are one option amongst others on the design table, as part of 
a decision support process.  
The first objective is tackled in section 7.2 where two particular cases of functional 
redundancy are explored, leveraging the subsystem probabilities of experiencing 
anomalies and failures derived earlier in this dissertation from a 1584-Earth orbiting 
spacecraft sample. The first case of functional redundancy is devoted to the Telemetry, 
Tracking and Command (TTC) subsystem: the role of the TTC is critical in the proper 
operation of a spacecraft as it links the spacecraft to the ground station and operators, 
enabling the proper tracking of the spacecraft, the monitoring of its subsystems and the 
upload of commands from the operators. The TTC functio  is a good candidate for 
fractionation, as the communication link with the ground can be distributed among 
neighboring spacecraft: through the network, the spacecraft could either pool their 
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computing and communication capabilities or step up to support a networked spacecraft 
that lost its ability to communicate with the control center.  
The second case builds on the TTC and adds two moresubsystems for consideration of 
functional redundancy: the Control Processor subsystem (the computer “brain” of the 
spacecraft) and the Data Handling subsystem (the “hard-drive” of the spacecraft that 
stores and handles data). This aggregation of subsytems is termed the “Command and 
Data Handling subsystem” (C&DH) and Berget summarizes its function as the subsystem 
that “receives, validates, decodes, and distributes commands to other spacecraft systems 
and gathers, processes, and formats spacecraft housekeeping and mission data for 
downlink” (Berget, 1999). Consequently, the C&DH sub ystem appears also as a good 
candidate for networking and sharing on-orbit resources among a constellation of co-
located spacecraft. The TTC and C&DH examples are explored by considering specific 
types of networks, with two or three spacecraft, and serve as a proof of concept of the 
survivability evaluation process designed in this dissertation. 
The second objective extends the survivability analysis of the TTC and C&DH in a more 
general direction in section 7.3, by considering a eneral non-descriptive networkable 
subsystem or technology and the parameterization of its anomaly and failure behavior to 
explore broader and more general survivability characteristics of space-based networks 
and insights gleaned for design and architectural choices of future space systems. Section 
7.3 also demonstrates advanced capabilities of the modeling setup and simulation and 
introduces useful tools to the conceptual design analysis. 
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Before pursuing the stated objectives, the survivability framework and its application in 
four steps introduced in Chapter 4 is briefly recalled below: 
• Step 1: definition of the classes of threats or types of disruptions for the 
survivability analysis; 
• Step 2: functional characterization of the architecture of the system under 
consideration; 
• Step 3: transformation of the functional characterization into an analytical or 
computational model of the system to assess its survivability with respect to the 
classes of threats or types of disruptions of interest; 
• Step 4: assessment of the system’s performance degradation—its survivability 
assessment—following disruptions, using the system model previously developed 
and the characterization of the classes of threats or types of disruptions of interest. 
7.2. C&DH Survivability Analysis 
7.2.1. Telemetry, Tracking and Command Functional Redundancy 
The first space-based network considered in this first subsection is simple and is the case 
study model used in previous chapters (for example shown in Figure 6.3), which consists 
of a network of two spacecraft that can share their TTC resource. As seen in previous 
chapters, the TTC subsystem is a major driver of spacecraft unreliability. The wireless 
connectivity in the SBN enables a type of redundancy in the TTC between the two 
spacecraft in the network.  This space-based network has already been discussed at 
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length in previous chapters, but it was used in a specific fashion to illustrate the definition 
and construction of the IMLN modeling, its (partial) validation with stochastic Petri nets 
and analytical solutions, the IMLN modeling precision and its scalability. In this 
subsection, the focus is on showing the complete survivability analysis process, the 
results themselves, and their implications for design and architectural choices. 
The four steps in the survivability analysis are prsented below. 
Step 1. The focus of this section is on endogenous failures, enabling the leverage of the 
studies conducted in earlier chapters on the anomaly and failure behavior of spacecraft 
subsystems. The models used to represent these behaviors re presented in step 3. As a 
consequence, the survivability results are limited o this particular class of threat, and 
they should not be extrapolated to other classes of on-orbit shocks. 
Step 2. A compact representation of the SBN architecture is provided in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1. Simplified representation of the space-based network architecture 
 
Step 3. The anomaly and failure behavior of the subsystem was derived in Chapter 6 




Table 7.1. Weibull parameters for TF, TMF and TmMF for the case study space-based network 







and Command (TTC) 
total failure 0.4650 47,770 
severe degradation 0.4680 28,040 
any degradation 0.4402 28,210 
Supporting subsystems 
total failure 0.5529 918.5 
severe degradation 0.5052 435.0 
any degradation 0.4638 203.6 
Payload11 
total failure 0.5921 30,150 
severe degradation 0.5561 1731 
any degradation 0.5599 813.3 
 
The IMLN representation of this space-base network is shown in Figure 7.2, and the 
different elements necessary to define the IMLN are list d below: 









1A , 222 0 ×=A and 113 0 ×=A ; 










































                                                 
11 In this particular example, the “payload” vertex consists of the payload instrument, as well as data 




Figure 7.2. IMLN representation of the case study space-based network 
 
Step 4. The survivability analysis here consists of investigating the utility generation 
capability of the space system, that is, the probability that the payload node (node 3) 
remains fully operational for full performance, or the probability that this node degrades 
or fails and results in performance degradation. As a consequence, the metrics of interest 
are ( )tTP FU <3, , ( )tTP MU <3,  and ( )tTP mU <3,  (or the equivalent combination ( )tTP FU <3, , 
( )tTP MFU <3,  and ( )tTP mMFU <3, ). Also here, the survivability results are limited to these 
specific metrics and should not be generalized to any other performance metrics. 
After running a 500,000-run simulation, the resulting output is shown in Figure 7.3 for TF, 
TMF and TmMF. The probabilities for being in the minor degradation state (Tm) and the 
major degradation state (TM) are obtained by linear combinations of the previous results, 















Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 share the same formatting. For example, Figure 7.4 reads as 
follows: after 5 years on orbit, the probability tha  the space-based network will have 
ceased to generate utility (failed state) is 6.08%, the probability that it will have a major 
degradation in performance is 7.38% and a minor degadation 7.69%. As a consequence, 
the complementary probability that the space system will be fully operational is 78.85% 
after 5 years on-orbit. 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Output probabilities for TF, TMF and TmMF of the payload node with TTC redundancy 
 






























Figure 7.4. Processed probabilities for TF, TM and Tm of the payload node with TTC redundancy 
 
The equivalent survivability analysis of the monolith architecture was conducted in the 
previous chapter and the results are recalled in Figure 7.5.  
 
Figure 7.5. Survivability characteristics of the monolith architecture 
























































At the same on-orbit time, the probability of the monolith space system will have ceased 
to generate utility (failed state) is 7.31%, the probability that it will have a major 
degradation in performance is 7.57% and a minor degadation 7.97%. As a consequence, 
the complementary probability that the space system will be fully operational is 77.15% 
after 5 years on-orbit. 
The difference between the probability of residency in each state between the two 
architectures (PSBN – Pmonolith) and it can be computed to conduct a comparative 
survivability analysis. This is shown in Figure 7.6. 
 
Figure 7.6. Survivability superiority of the space-based network with TTC redundancy over the 
monolith spacecraft 
 
The important results than can be seen in Figure 7.6 are the following: 













































































































• The probability that, in this specific case (TTC functional redundancy and 
endogenous failures), the space-based network will be able to generate utility 
at full capacity is higher at any point in time than the one of the monolith 
architecture (the difference between the two is positive on Figure 7.6). After 15 
years, the incremental likelihood is about 2 percentage points. A careful cost-
benefit analysis should be conducted to assess whether this incremental 
probability of remaining fully operational is worth e cost of obtaining it. While 
such studies are beyond the scope of this dissertation, i  is worth pointing out in 
this regard that communication satellites for example can generate in excess of 
$50 million per year and these increments in lowering the probability of failure 
can represent the equivalent of several months’ worth f revenues. Similarly, it 
can be of significant importance for defense or intelligence space assets. 
• Regarding the distribution of this incremental gain mong the reduction in the 
probability of entering degraded states, the major improvement was related to a 
decrease in the probability of total failure of the architecture by about 1.9 
percentage points. This decrease represents a 14% variation compared to the 
probability of total failure of the monolith architecture, which could be regarded 
as a significant improvement over the current design paradigm. 
• A significant share of the difference occurs early in the life of the space-based 
network, consistent with the fact that most spacecraft subsystems suffer from 
infant mortality. This shows that the networking has a high efficiency as soon as 




As a consequence, adding a networked spacecraft to the traditional monolithic 
spacecraft will increase the survivability aspect the space system with respect to 
endogenous failures in the case of the TTC functional redundancy. 
The previous analysis was conducted with a network of 2 spacecraft (2-IMLN). The 
following explores the addition of a third spacecraft to the network (3-IMLN) in order to 
root out the anomaly and failure behavior of the TTC subsystem, as illustrated in Figure 
7.7. Note that the S/C #2 and #3 do not communicate with each other. The associated 
IMLN representation is given in Figure 7.8. 
 






















The different elements necessary to define the IMLN model are listed below: 















1A , 332 0 ×=A and 113 0 ×=A ; 



















































After running the IMLN simulation, the probabilities PF, PMF and PmMF are obtained for 
the survivability features of the 3-IMLN, that is, features related to the performance 
degradation of the utility generation (Figure 7.9).  
The probabilities shown in Figure 7.9 can be processed to obtain PF, PM and Pm for the 









Figure 7.10. Processed probabilities for TF, TM and Tm of the payload node with TTC redundancy (3-
IMLN case) 
























































After 5 years on-orbit for example, the probability of the 3-IMLN space system will have 
ceased to generate utility (failed state) is 5.92%, the probability that it will have a major 
degradation in performance is 7.43% and a minor degadation 7.79%. As a consequence, 
the complementary probability that the space system will be fully operational is 78.86% 
after 5 years on-orbit. How does this 3-spacecraft network compare with the 2-spacecraft 
network? Figure 7.11 presents the probability of a tot l failure (total loss of utility due to 
the complete unavailability of the payload node) for the monolith architecture, the 2-
IMLN and the 3-IMLN space systems. This probability is chosen as it is the one that 
presents the greatest difference with the monolith spacecraft. 
 
Figure 7.11. Comparison of the probability of unavailability of the payload for the monolith, 2-IMLN 
and 3-IMLN architectures 
 
The greatest gap between the curves occurs at 15 years: after that duration on-orbit, the 
monolith spacecraft would have totally failed with 12.84% chance, the 2-IMLN with 







































10.98% chance and the 3-IMLN with a 10.74% chance. It is clear that the incremental 
benefit of adding a spacecraft to the 2-IMLN architecture decreases sharply compared to 
the benefit of networking a monolith spacecraft (2-IMLN): adding one spacecraft to the 
traditional monolith spacecraft for TTC functional redundancy improves by 1.86 
percentage points the probability of payload unavail bil ty, but adding two spacecraft to 
the monolith for the same purpose improves it only by an additional 0.24 percentage 
point. This indicates that, if networks are an optin considered by the designer, a three-
spacecraft network for mitigating the TTC anomaly and failure behavior might not 
be worth it compared to the cheaper and slightly less survivable two-spacecraft 
network. Note that this comment holds in the case of a perfectly reliable wireless link 
between spacecraft in the network. The impact of the link failures is treated later in the 
dissertation.  
7.2.2. C&DH Functional Redundancy 
Other spacecraft subsystems can be selected for sharing on-orbit resources: for example, 
the Control Processor (main computer of the spacecrft) can be a good candidate as 
spacecraft could pool their processing power, or one spacecraft could run processes and 
command another spacecraft if the Control Processor (CP) subsystem of that spacecraft 
failed, given that sufficient processing power margin is built into the supporting 
spacecraft. An additional fractionable subsystem could be the Data Handling subsystem 
(DH) (responsible for storing and exchanging data): for example, one spacecraft could be 
envisioned as the “hard drive” of the constellation,  which networked modules upload 
their data, data then sent to the ground station by the collector spacecraft. 
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The macro subsystem combining the TTC, the CP and DH is also referred to as the 
Command and Data Handling (C&DH) subsystem. The associated Weibull models are 
presented in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2. Weibull parameters for TF, TMF and TmMF for the space-based network with C&DH 
redundancy 






Control Processor (CP)12 
total failure 1.251 691.2 
severe degradation – – 
any degradation – – 
Data Handling (DH) 
total failure 0.6266 350,000 
severe degradation 0.5603 119,900 
any degradation 0.5571 67,940 
Telemetry, Tracking, 
and Command (TTC) 
total failure 0.4650 47,770 
severe degradation 0.4680 28,040 
any degradation 0.4402 28,210 
Supporting subsystems 
total failure 0.5181 1405 
severe degradation 0.4856 543.5 
any degradation 0.4523 230.2 
Payload13 
total failure 0.5767 49,990 
severe degradation 0.5529 2117 
any degradation 0.5568 981.4 
 
The IMLN model needs to account for these new separate functionalities: there are now 
five functionalities to represent: the CP, DH, TTC, supporting subsystems and payload. 
As a consequence, the IMLN representation will consist of five layers, one for each of the 
aforementioned functionalities. Two spacecraft are part of the network: the first 
spacecraft has all the subsystems, while the second has all the subsystems but the payload 
and acts as a functional redundancy for the first spacecraft for the CP, DHS and TTC. 
The associated IMLN representation is then shown in Figure 7.12. 
                                                 
12 The CP subsystem only impacts the complete failure of the spacecraft: as such, TF = TMF = TmMF. 
13 In this particular example, the “payload” vertex consists only of the payload instrument. Data handling 




Figure 7.12. IMLN representation of the space-based network with C&DH redundancy 
 
The different elements necessary to define the IMLN model are listed below: 



























3A , 224 0 ×=A and 115 0 ×=A ; 






















































































Running a 500,000-run IMLN simulation yield the following results presented in Figure 
7.13 for the probabilities PF, PMF and PmMF for the payload node. The processed 
probabilities of residency in each degraded state (PF, PM and Pm) are shown in the 
following figure, Figure 7.14.  
The difference in the probability of residency with the monolith spacecraft                 
(PSBN – Pmonolith) can be computed and Figure 7.15 demonstrates the survivability 
improvements brought by the “networkness” introduced in the C&DH subsystems. 
 
Figure 7.13. Output probabilities for TF, TMF and TmMF of the payload node with C&DH redundancy 


































Figure 7.15. Survivability superiority of the space-based network with C&DH redundancy over the 
monolith spacecraft 









































































































































For example, it can be seen in Figure 7.15 that after 15 years, the space-based network 
under consideration here has 3.1 percentage points more chance to be fully operational 
and generate utility at full performance than the monolith architecture. Regarding the 
total failure of the architectures, the network decreases the risk of payload unavailability 
by 2.6 percentage points. This represents a 20.5% decrease compared to the monolith 
risk of losing payload utility (with respect to C&DH endogenous failures), and could 
be one of the elements justifying the consideration of space-based networks into the 
conceptual design process of the acquisition of a new space system. The fractionation of 
the three subsystems in the C&DH subsystem might be realized in upcoming space 
systems, but extending this paradigm shift to other subsystems such as the Electrical 
Power Subsystem or the Attitude and Orbit Control Subsystem might require 
technological breakthroughs. However, the results pre ented with the C&DH demonstrate 
certain survivability advantages of such architectures over the traditional monolithic 
design, but they should not be generalized to all designs of space-based networks or 
monolith architectures and they should not be extrapolated to other classes of on-orbit 
shocks. Also, survivability is one design aspect among others under consideration by the 
designers, and survivability advantages alone will not determine the final design decision. 
Complementary analyses on the cost and utility comparisons between space-based 
networks and monoliths can be found in Dubos and Saleh (2011). 
7.3. General Subsystem/Technology Survivability Analysis 
The previous section explored the survivability characteristics of specific subsystems 
associated with specific failure behavior derived from a 1584-Earth orbiting spacecraft 
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sample. However, spacecraft designers might be interest d in the impact of various 
subsystem or technology failure behaviors and links on design choices for the selection of 
networked architectures. To capture this variation, the anomaly and failure behavior of a 
general subsystem/technology, and further of the wir less link, is parameterized in this 
section, and the survivability characteristics of two architectures are explored. These two 
space-based networks are termed “2-IMLN” and “3-IMLN” in the remainder of this 
section and their complete representation is given b low. The 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN 
architectures are similar to the ones used studied pr viously in the dissertation, and 
consist of two or three spacecraft networked to provide functional redundancy for the 
general subsystem/technology. Their representations are recalled in Figure 7.16 and 
Figure 7.17, and their adjacency matrices, interlayr matrices and mapping functions are 
given in section 7.2.1.  
 



















Figure 7.17. IMLN representation of the 3-IMLN 
 
These specific architectures are simple but are extremely useful to explore the 
survivability trends of space-based networks in general as they illustrate the basic 
building blocks of a more complex network. The failure behavior of the supporting 
subsystems and payload functionality remain similar to the ones used previously and the 
Weibull distributions for their respective TF, TMF and TmMF are recalled below in Table 
7.3. Note that the sensitivity of the results obtained for the general subsystem/technology 
case will be investigated in this section. 
Table 7.3. Weibull parameters for TF, TMF and TmMF for the supporting subsystems and payload 







total failure 0.5181 1405 
severe degradation 0.4856 543.5 
any degradation 0.4523 230.2 
Payload14 
total failure 0.5767 49,990 
severe degradation 0.5529 2117 
any degradation 0.5568 981.4 
                                                 




















As previously done, the survivability of each architecture is benchmarked by the 
traditional monolithic architecture, and the survivability metric is defined as the 
probability of being in a degraded state (PF, PM and Pm) for the payload node. As a 
consequence, the results and design implications provided next are limited to these 
choices. 
7.3.1. Parameterization of Probability of Total Failure 
The parameterization of the probability of failure of the networked subsystem/technology 
is conducted as follows. Let assume that the probability of failure is given by )(tFα . Five 
different failure behaviors are modeled in this dissertation, from a subsystem/technology 
that experiences few anomalies and failures to a subsystem/technology that is plagued by 
anomalies and failures. Let us first look into total failures. To characterize the different 
levels of severity of the failure behavior, the probability of total failure of the networked 
subsystem/technology after 15 years is used: 15)years 15( FF t αα == . Five values of  
15
Fα  
are chosen here, from a low severity level to a high one: 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and 0.20. 
In this dissertation, )(tFα  is modeled using a single Weibull distribution, with a fixed 
shape parameter βF = 0.5, and a varying scale parameter θF to match the different 
15
Fα  
values. The choice of a single Weibull distribution is justified as this distribution type 
was shown in the previous chapters to be appropriate to model spacecraft subsystems. 
The shape parameter is chosen to be common to all distributions so that only one 
parameter in the Weibull distribution varies at a time, and its value is set at 0.5 as it is in 
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the range of the shape parameters derived for most of the spacecraft subsystems in 
previous chapters. θF can be calculated using the expression of the Weibull c.d.f. as 
follows: 
 























The different values of θF are given in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4. Weibull scale parameter values for the networked subsystem/technology’s failure behavior 
15
Fα  








The choice of a Weibull distribution affects the numerical results, but the IMLN models 
are general enough so that the reader can use and directly plug in different distributions to 
compute his own results. 
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7.3.2. IMLN Probability of Total Failure 
The probabilities of catastrophic failure of the space-based networks under consideration 
are obtained by running the IMLN models, as well as using analytical expressions. 
Analytical expressions are possible in some cases here, but are already significantly 
complex for the relatively simple IMLN models presented in this section. Analytical 
expressions generally do not exist for interdependent multi-layer networks15, and in the 
case they exit, they can be difficult to derive and use. Analytical expressions are used 
when possible in this section, as they provide insight  complementary to the IMLN 
simulation on the survivability features of the space-based networks. 
 The probability of catastrophic failure of the traditional monolith architecture is given by: 
 ( )( ) FFPFSF PPP α−−−= 111monolith  (7.3) 
where: FSP is the probability of total failure of the supporting subsystems and 
F
PP is the 
probability of total failure of the payload. 
Similarly, the probabilities of catastrophic failure for the 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN 
architectures are given by: 
                                                 
15 For example, in the case of the IMLN presented in Figure 7.12, no closed-form solution exists. 
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 ( )( ) ( )( )( ){ }FFSFFPFSF PPPP αα −−−−−−−= 1111111IMLN-2  (7.4) 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ){ }FFSFFPFSF PPPP αα 2IMLN-3 1111111 −−−−−−−=  (7.5) 
Eqs. (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5) can be calculated for any time t spent on-orbit as shown in 
Figure 7.18. Also, for readability purposes here, four on-orbit times have been selected to 
compare architectures: 1 year, 5 years, 10 years and 15 years on-orbit. The probabilities 
of catastrophic failure (in percentage points) for the three architectures at these times are 
shown in Table 7.5. Note that no results are provided for the monolith architecture using 
the IMLN simulation as the interdependent multi-layer approach was proposed in this 
thesis for networked architectures (it is however possible to build a trivial model for the 
monolith case). The IMLN simulation results and theanalytical results are in very good 
agreement, as the average error is 0.008 percentage point, a significantly low difference. 




PF – IMLN simulation PF – Analytical results 
Time spent on-orbit (years) Time spent on-orbit (years) 
1 5 10 15 1 5 10 15 
0.01 
Monolith – – – – 2.76 6.26 8.85 10.82 
2-IMLN 2.51 5.73 8.16 10.00 2.51 5.74 8.16 10.01 
3-IMLN 2.50 5.71 8.11 9.93 2.50 5.71 8.11 9.93 
0.05 
Monolith – – – – 3.79 8.46 11.87 14.42 
2-IMLN 2.54 5.93 8.53 10.54 2.55 5.93 8.53 10.53 
3-IMLN 2.50 5.73 8.16 10.02 2.50 5.73 8.15 10.00 
0.10 
Monolith – – – – 5.12 11.28 15.68 18.93 
2-IMLN 2.63 6.30 9.23 11.54 2.63 6.31 9.24 11.56 
3-IMLN 2.51 5.77 8.27 10.21 2.51 5.78 8.27 10.22 
0.15 
Monolith – – – – 6.51 14.15 19.52 23.43 
2-IMLN 2.77 6.88 10.28 13.00 2.76 6.87 10.26 12.99 
3-IMLN 2.52 5.86 8.49 10.60 2.52 5.87 8.51 10.62 
0.20 
Monolith – – – – 7.96 17.11 23.42 27.94 
2-IMLN 2.94 7.63 11.61 14.84 2.93 7.62 11.60 14.83 





Figure 7.18. Probabilities of failure for monolith and networked architectures for 0.0515 =Fα  
 
Figure 7.19 provides a visual representation of Table 7.5 for the case 05.015 =Fα .  
 
 
Figure 7.19. Snapshot of Figure 7.18 at four on-orbit times: 1, 5, 10 and 15 years 


































































Time after successful orbit insertion
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Figure 7.18 and Figure 7.19 read as follows: for example, after 5 years on-orbit, the 
probability of catastrophic failure is 0.085 for the monolith spacecraft (i.e., 8.5% chance 
of experiencing a catastrophic failure during the first 5 years on-orbit), 0.059 for the 2-
IMLN architecture and 0.057 for the 3-IMLN architecure. In this particular example, the 
2-IMLN architecture allows reducing the probability of a catastrophic failure during the 
first 5 years on-orbit by 2.53 percentage points and the 3-IMLN by 2.73 percentage 
points over the monolith architecture. These differences between the networked 
architectures and the monolith one is referred in th s dissertation as the net gain and is 
labeled as ∆. The net gain is an interesting indicator to the designer as it represents 
the absolute improvement or decline in survivability of one architecture with 
respect to another (with respect to the chosen performance metric and the class of 
threat of interest). It is mathematically defined as follows in the IMLN approach: 
 FFF PP IMLN-2monolithIMLN-2 −=∆  (7.6) 
 FFF PP IMLN-3monolithIMLN-3 −=∆  (7.7) 
Developing the terms in Eqs. (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5) yields for the analytical solutions: 
 ( )( ) ( )( )FPFSFPFSFF PPPPP −−−+−−= 11111monolith α  (7.8) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )FPFSFPFSFSFFPFSFF PPPPPPPP −−−+−−+−−= 1111111 22IMLN-2 αα  (7.9) 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
























Substituting in Eqs. (7.6) and (7.7) results in: 
 ( ) ( )( ) FFFPFSF PP αα−−−=∆ 111 2IMLN-2  (7.11) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] FFSFSFFSFFPFSF PPPPP ααα ++−−−−−=∆ 12111 22IMLN-3  (7.12) 
Figure 7.20 shows that for that particular setting a d for this range of on-orbit time shown 
in Figure 7.19, the net gain increases in time. This suggests that the longer the space 
architecture is planned to operate, the greater the benefit of the space-based 
architecture for survivability  in the case studied here. Indeed, if the architectur  is 
designed to operate 1 year, then a networked architecture does not significantly improve 
over the traditional architecture (about 1 percentage point improvement), while an 
architecture designed to operate 15 years might benefit from the space-based network 
option (about 4 percentage points, to balance with the cost of adding spacecraft). Note 
that this trend is not valid for all times, as when time goes to infinity, ∆ goes to zero. Also 
in this particular example, the difference between ∆2-IMLN and ∆3-IMLN is relatively small 
(0.53 percentage point after 15 years), suggesting that adding a third spacecraft to the 




Figure 7.20. Net gain for the 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN compared to the monolith spacecraft for 
0.0515 =Fα  
 
Another way to look at the data presented in Table 7.5 is to observe the impact of the 
failure behavior of the networked subsystem/technology on the probability of 
catastrophic failure of the monolith and networked architectures, i.e., its variation with 
15
Fα . Figure 7.21 shows this variation after 5 years on-orbit.  
Figure 7.21 reads as follows: for example, after 5 years on-orbit, and for 05.015 =Fα , the 
monolith architecture has 11.3% chance of experiencing a catastrophic failure, while the 
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Figure 7.21. Variation of the probability of failure of architectures with 15Fα  
 
As expected, the probability of a catastrophic failure at the system level increases with 
15
Fα . However, each architecture responds differently to the variation of 
15
Fα . The 
monolith architecture is significantly affected by its variation, while the networked 
architectures tend to be less affected: the probability of a catastrophic failure for the 
monolith architecture varies from 6.26% ( 01.015 =Fα ) to 17.11% ( 20.0
15 =Fα ); on the other 
hand, the probability of a catastrophic failure varies from 5.74% ( 01.015 =Fα ) to 7.62% 
( 20.015 =Fα ) for the 2-IMLN, and from 5.71% ( 01.0
15 =Fα ) to 6.03% ( 20.0
15 =Fα ) for the 
3-IMLN. To quantify this variation, let define the relative failure growth of the 



















































Fγ  (7.13) 
where: )(0 tP
F is the probability of a catastrophic failure for the architecture with a 
perfectly reliable networkable subsystem/technology (αF = 0)
16. 
γF represents the relative error between a system with a perfectly reliable networkable 
subsystem/technology and the system under consideration with a networkable 
subsystem/technology prone to failures. In the present case, 0.0571years) 5(0 ==tP
F , and 
using the values at 5 years presented in Table 7.5, the values for γF can be computed and 
are presented in Table 7.6. The results from Table 7.6 are also presented graphically in 
Figure 7.22. Table 7.6 results and Figure 7.22 confirm that the monolith architecture is 
severely affected by the failure behavior of the networkable subsystem/technology, with 
its probability of failure varying by 9.6% for a subsystem/technology failing little to 
almost 200% with a severely degrading subsystem/technology. On the other hand, the 
networked architectures handle better the failure of the networked subsystem/technology, 
as in the worst case considered here ( 20.015 =Fα ), the 2-IMLN architecture has a relative 
failure growth of 33.6% after 5 years, an order of magnitude lower than the one of the 
monolith spacecraft, and the 3-IMLN probability of catastrophic failure varies only by 
5.7%, one additional order of magnitude lower.  
                                                 
16 FP0 is common to the three architectures 
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As a conclusion, the networked architectures have a “shielding effect” (in the sense 
that they shield the system from the failures of the networked subsystem/technology), 
and this effect grows stronger with the addition of spacecraft to the network. 
Consequently, this positive behavior of the network can allow the design of a system with 
unproven subsystems or technologies, for example for technology testing, as it limits the 
sensitivity of the network to (potentially) problematic subsystems/technologies. Also, the 
relative failure growth can help informing the decision about the relevance of a 
networked architecture (and its number of spacecraft) according to shareholder risk 
tolerance. 





Fα : 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
Monolith  9.6% 48.2% 97.5% 147.9% 199.7% 
2-IMLN  0.4% 3.8% 10.3% 20.5% 33.6% 




































, networked subsystem probability of failure after 15 years15Fα
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7.3.3. Network Efficiency Relative To Failure 
Another way to look at the shielding effect of the networked architecture is to investigate 
how efficiently they capture and eliminate catastrophic failures. The network efficiency 
is an interesting indicator to the designer as it represents how much of the potential 
improvement (or decline) in survivability available is actually realized by the 
architecture (with respect to the chosen performance metric andclass of threat of 
interest). The maximum net gain a monolith can capture is limited to the complete 
elimination of the networkable subsystem/technology failures: 
 )()()( 0monolith0 tPtPt
FFF −=∆  (7.14) 
On the other hand, the net gain of a networked architecture over the monolith architecture 
is defined using Eqs. (7.11) and (7.12). The efficien y of the networked architecture 


























=η  (7.15) 


































= −−η  (7.17) 
As analytical expressions exist in this particular c se of space-based networks, Eqs. 
(7.14), (7.16) and (7.17) can be expended using Eqs. (7.9), (7.11), (7.12) and the 
following: 
 ( )( )FPFSF PPtP −−−= 111)(0  (7.18) 
Then: 
 ( )( )FPFSFF PPt −−=∆ 11)(0 α  (7.19) 
And: 
 ( ) ( )( )

































IMLN2  (7.20) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
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These last two equations can be further manipulated to highlight the dependence on αF: 
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 ( ) FSFSFF PP −+−−=− 11IMLN2 αη  (7.22) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )222IMLN3 1121 FSFSFSFFSFF PPPP −+−−−−=− ααη  (7.23) 
The IMLN simulation was run to determine the efficiencies of the two space-based 
networks, and the results at 4 points in time (as previously, 1, 5, 10 and 15 years) were 
selected for readability purposes. 100,000 runs were r peated 10 times to obtain average 
efficiencies and confidence intervals on the simulation results. In addition, plugging in 
the equations above the distributions for αF and PS, the efficiency of the 2-IMLN and 3-
IMLN architectures is also obtained for all times up to 15 years in orbit, for comparison 
with the IMLN results. Figure 7.23 shows the efficiency of the 2-IMLN architecture and 
Figure 7.24 for the 3-IMLN, with the solid line showing the analytical results, and the x-
mark showing the simulation results. The numerical values for the simulation are given in 
Table 7.7, along with their equivalents from the analytical formulas. Also Table 7.8 
presents the confidence interval spread for the simulation results. The simulation and 
analytical results are well in agreement, with an aver ge difference of 0.003 for the 2-
IMLN and 0.001 for the 3-IMLN. Note that on Figure 7.23 the simulation results are 
following closely the solid lines for 15Fα from 0.05 to 0.20 (for the 0.01 case, the 
simulation results are less precise); similarly forthe 3-IMLN in Figure 7.24, the 
simulation and analytical results are close for 15Fα from 0.10 to 0.20 (the cases 0.05 and 
0.01 are less precise). The less precise results correspond to the simulation results with 
larger confidence intervals, and their precision could be largely improved by running 
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simulations with higher numbers of runs (at the expense of time and hardware power, not 
done here as the absolute precision of the results i  nevertheless high).  
 





F – IMLN simulation ηF – Analytical results 
Time spent on-orbit (years) Time spent on-orbit (years) 
1 5 10 15 1 5 10 15 
0.01 
2-IMLN 0.981 0.956 0.921 0.907 0.974 0.942 0.918 0.90  
3-IMLN 1.000 0.996 0.988 0.987 0.999 0.997 0.993 0.99  
0.05 
2-IMLN 0.969 0.922 0.888 0.862 0.964 0.920 0.888 0.864 
3-IMLN 0.999 0.992 0.984 0.979 0.999 0.994 0.987 0.981 
0.10 
2-IMLN 0.952 0.894 0.852 0.820 0.951 0.892 0.849 0.818 
3-IMLN 0.997 0.989 0.978 0.967 0.998 0.988 0.977 0.967 
0.15 
2-IMLN 0.934 0.861 0.809 0.772 0.937 0.863 0.811 0.773 
3-IMLN 0.996 0.982 0.966 0.949 0.996 0.981 0.964 0.948 
0.20 
2-IMLN 0.920 0.832 0.771 0.727 0.922 0.833 0.772 0.727 
3-IMLN 0.994 0.971 0.947 0.925 0.994 0.972 0.948 0.926 
 




Confidence interval spread on ηF 
IMLN simulation 
Time spent on-orbit (years) 
1 5 10 15 
0.01 
2-IMLN 0.058 0.036 0.046 0.048 
3-IMLN 0.025 0.040 0.034 0.029 
0.05 
2-IMLN 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.006 
3-IMLN 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.010 
0.10 
2-IMLN 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.004 
3-IMLN 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.004 
0.15 
2-IMLN 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.004 
3-IMLN 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 
0.20 
2-IMLN 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 





Figure 7.23. Efficiency of the 2-IMLN architecture 
 
 
Figure 7.24. Efficiency of the 3-IMLN architecture 
 


























































































Figure 7.23 reads as follows: for example, after 10 years on-orbit and for 10.015 =Fα , the 
efficiency of the 2-IMLN architecture is about 0.85, i.e., the network was successful in 
capturing 85% of F0∆ . Similarly on Figure 7.24, for the same conditions, the efficiency of 
the 3-IMLN architecture is about 0.98. It can immediately be seen that in all the 
conditions explored here, the architecture with a higher number of spacecraft has a 
higher efficiency. Nevertheless here, as seen on Figure 7.23, the efficiency of the 2-
IMLN remains relatively high for all times, even for the worse-case 
subsystem/technology failure under consideration here: the lowest efficiency recorded is 
about 0.73. This shows that the addition of a networked spacecraft to the traditional 
monolith spacecraft allows capturing at least 73% of the failure probability share of the 
networked subsystem/technology, which is quite significant. The 3-IMLN architecture 
performs even better, as the lowest efficiency recorded here is about 0.93. This could 
suggest that adding a fourth or more spacecraft to ne work would not be the best option in 
this case as the 3-IMLN almost capture all the failures that can be. However, a 
networkable subsystem/technology with a worse failure behavior than studied here could 
warrant more spacecraft for a more efficient network. As a consequence, the efficiency 
can be a useful tool to the designer to select networked architectures depending on 
performance requirements. 
Several trends can be seen in both figures. First, the efficiency decreases with time: it 
means that the networks are more successful in shielding the system of failures early in 
the orbital life rather than later. Second, the efficiency also decreases with 15Fα  increasing: 
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the networks are more efficient in shielding the system from a subsystem/technology 
failing little than from a heavily degrading subsystem/technology.  
These two observations means that, if an efficiency lower bound is fixed, then a time 
horizon exists for the network, and this horizon will occur earlier with major 
contributors to failure than with minor ones. For example, considering two systems in 
a 2-IMLN configuration with 10.015 =Fα  and 20.0
15 =Fα  respectively, if a 85% efficiency 
threshold is required, then the first architecture meets this requirement for about 10 years 
on-orbit, while the second meets it only for the first 4 years. This time horizon will also 
occur later for architectures with more spacecraft. For example, considering 
20.015 =Fα , if a 95% efficiency threshold is required, then the 2-IMLN architecture will 
meet this requirement for only half a year, while th 3-IMLN will meet it for 9.5 years. 
It is mentioned above that the 3-IMLN architecture has a higher efficiency for the same 
15
Fα –level than the 2-IMLN architecture. Compares these two efficiencies after 15 years 
on orbit when varying 15Fα . This figure is obtained by a direct application of Eqs. (7.22) 
and (7.23): indeed, when t is fixed (here at 15 years), then FSP  is also fixed, and the 
efficiency becomes only a function of 15Fα  (linear effect for the 2-IMLN and quadratic for 
the 3-IMLN). Figure 7.25 clearly shows that the efficiency decreases with 15Fα , but more 
sharply for the 2-IMLN than the 3-IMLN in the 0–0.2 range (due to the quadratic effect, 




Figure 7.25. 2-IMLN versus 3-IMLN efficiency as a function of 15Fα  
 
7.3.4. Efficiency Versus Net Gain 
While it can be tempting to choose architectures with the highest efficiency, the net gain 
should also be considered in the decision process, a  an architecture with a high 
efficiency but a very small net gain might not be th best candidate from a cost-benefit 
point of view. To combine both pieces of information, a new graph is introduced in this 
thesis and presents the network efficiency on the x-axis and the net gain from the network 
on the y-axis. Four notional areas can be envisioned on the η–∆ graph as shown in Figure 
7.26, and some characteristics of the architectures can be deduced from their location on 
this graph (all the following survivability implications are considered with respect to the 
chosen performance metric and class of threat of interest):  






































• the area marked with a number 1 encircled corresponds to a network that has a 
high efficiency and a high net gain: it means that t e monolith architecture failure 
behavior is such that a significant potential improvement exists and is fully 
captured by the space-based network under consideration. As a consequence, the 
architecture can be considered as insensitive to the failure of the networked 
subsystem/technology and is potentially a better choice than the monolith 
architecture for survivability considerations; 
• the area marked with a number 2 encircled corresponds to a network that has a 
low efficiency and a high net gain: it means that the monolith architecture failure 
behavior is such that a significant potential improvement exists but the space-
based network under consideration failed to capture a significant share of it. 
Contrary to the case in the previous point, the archite ture is significantly affected 
by the failure of the networked subsystem/technology. Despite its low efficiency, 
the space-based network remains worth considering as it f res significantly better 
than the monolith architecture (high net gain) from a survivability point of view; 
• the area marked with a number 3 encircled corresponds to a network that has a 
high efficiency and a low net gain: it means that the monolith architecture failure 
behavior is such that not much of a potential improvement exists in terms of 
reducing the probability of failure of the system; but however small is this 
improvement, it is fully captured by the space-based n twork under consideration. 
The failure behavior of the networked subsystem/technology is eradicated, but it 
was not affecting the monolith architecture in the first place; 
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• the area marked with a number 4 encircled corresponds to a network that has a 
low efficiency and a low net gain. Two possible cases arise: the potential 
improvement over the monolith architecture in terms of reducing the probability 
of failure of the system can be either low or high, but in both cases, the space-
based network under consideration failed to capture i . In the first case, the space-
based network might not be worth considering as the cost of adding a spacecraft 
does not buy a significantly better probability of failure. In the second case, the 
space-based network might be worth considering given some modifications to the 
network as explained in the following.  
 
Figure 7.26. η–∆ graph with four types of architecture performance 
 
The practical implications of the η–∆ graph are given below, and visually represented in 
















• In the case of high efficiencies, the practical implication consists of not 
adding more spacecraft to the network for mitigating the failure of the 
networked subsystem(s)/technology(ies) as the current architecture fully capture 
the shortcomings of the monolith architecture (areas 1 and 3 in the η–∆ graph). 
Removing some functionally redundant modules might also be an option to be 
considered according to the performance of that updated architecture. 
• The fact that a space-based network has a low efficiency should translate in 
considering the addition of functionally redundant modules for the 
networked subsystem(s)/technology(ies): as seen earlier, networks with a higher 
number of networked spacecraft have a higher efficincy (areas 2 and 4). 
• The previous two points should be adapted in function of the net gain. A 
space-based network with high efficiency gains and high gain efficiency (area 1 in 
the η–∆ graph) does not require any improvement and can be considered as is: as 
a consequence, it should follow the “do not add spacecraft” implication. A space-
based network high efficiency but with low gain (are  3) might not be cost-
effective as is, and consequently no more spacecraft should be added to the 
network for the benefit of the networked subsystem/chnology failure behavior 
(other modules such as payloads for example might be considered). The case of a 
space-based network with low efficiency but high gain (area 2) implies that a 
significant share of a high potential improvement is not captured by the current 
version of the network. More spacecraft should then b  considered being added to 
the network. Finally, actions on space-based networks with low efficiencies but 
high gains (area 4) are not straightforward, as the pot ntial improvement over a 
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monolith architecture is not readily observable due to the low efficiency of the 
network. If the potential improvement is high, then adding spacecraft to the 
network might result in significant gains; however if it is low, then the space-
based network might not be a worthwhile alternative o the monolith spacecraft 
from a survivability point of view. 
 
Figure 7.27. Practical implications of the η–∆ graph for survivability considerations  
 
7.3.5. η–∆ Graphs for 2- and 3-IMLN Architectures 
Let us build the η–∆ graph for the 2-IMLN architecture defined earlier n this section. 
Recall that the efficiency and the net gain both vary with time and with 15Fα . The 
resulting graph for 05.015 =Fα  is presented in Figure 7.28, and the different lines and 
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Figure 7.28. η–∆ graph for the 2-IMLN architecture as a function of time for 0.0515 =Fα  
(the black solid line corresponds to the evolution in time of the efficiency and net gain of the 2-IMLN 
architecture, and the grey dashed lines correspond t  instant in the orbital life of the system: 1, 5, 10 and 
15 years from bottom to top. The square markers at the intersections of the solid line and dashed lines give 
(η,∆) for the specified time (ageing from lighter to darker colors). The diamond-shaped markers represent 
the time-associated maximum net gains ∆0 (also referred to as potential improvements from monoliths) 
 
Figure 7.28 reads as follows: after 5 years on orbit (light-grey square), the efficiency of 
the 2-IMLN is 0.92 and the associated net gain is 2.53 percentage points. The maximum 
net gain possible at the same time is 2.75 (light-grey diamond). Note that the numbers are 
consistent as 53.292.075.2 =× . As observed previously, it can be seen that high gains 
come at the expense of efficiency and time. The η–∆ graph for the 3-IMLN for 05.015 =Fα  
can be compiled in the same fashion, and is added to the 2-IMLN curve in Figure 7.29. 


















































Figure 7.29. η–∆ graph for the 2-IMLN (square) and 3-IMLN (triangle ) architectures as a function of 
time for 0.0515 =Fα  
(Same formatting than the previous figure) 
 
Figure 7.29 shows that the 3-IMLN architecture has igher gains and higher efficiencies 
than the 2-IMLN for the same time. Also, the 3-IMLN curve stays closer to the “ideal” 
vertical curve at η = 1. A two-point comparison yields the following: 
• After 5 years on-orbit, having added one spacecraft to the 2-IMLN architecture 
improves efficiency from 0.920 to 0.994, but the relative net gain associated is 
limited to 0.20 percentage point (from 2.53 to 2.73 percentage points). 
• After 15 years on-orbit, the same operation yields an improved efficiency of 
0.981 from 0.864, and the relative associated gain is 0.53 percentage point (from 
3.89 to 4.42 percentage points). 

















































A careful cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to assess whether these incremental 
improvements (from a monolith architecture to a 2-IMLN, and from a 2-IMLN to a 3-
IMLN) are worth the cost of obtaining them.  
Impact of 15Fα . Let us now vary 
15
Fα , that is, modify the failure behavior of the networked 
subsystem/technology (an increase in 15Fα  translates in a networked subsystem/ 
technology more prone to failure). As previously, 15Fα  varies from 0.01 to 0.20 and the 
resulting η–∆ graph is shown in Figure 7.30 for the 2-IMLN and Figure 7.31 for the 3-




Figure 7.30. Variations of the 2-IMLN network efficiency and net gain with 15Fα  
(As previously, the color of the square markers corresponds to the on-orbit times, 1, 5, 10 and 15 years, 
from lighter to darker colors. The different curves correspond to the variation of 15Fα , from 0.01 in the 
bottom curve to 0.20 in the top curve) 






















































Figure 7.31. Variations of the 3-IMLN network efficiency and net gain with 15Fα  
(Same formatting than the previous figure) 
 
Several interesting trends can be seen on Figure 7.30 and Figure 7.31: increasing 15Fα  
results in increasing net gains at all times. For example, increasing 15Fα  from 0.05 to 0.15 
increases the net gain from 2.53 to 7.28 at 5 years for the 2-IMLN architecture, and from 
2.73 to 8.28 for the same time for the 3-IMLN architecture. This trend comes from the 
fact that increasing 15Fα  means that the probability of failure of the networked 
subsystem/technology increases and it results in higher potential net gains. Note that the 
3-IMLN net gains are higher than the 2-IMLN as seen previously, and also that the 
relative net gain increase is higher in proportion f r the 3-IMLN than for the 2-IMLN. 
Finally, in the case of a problematic subsystem/technology (such as 20.015 =Fα ), the net 
























































gain reaches 13 percentage points after 15 years for the 2-IMLN and almost 17 points for 
the 3-IMLN, a significant improvement over the monolith architecture. 
In parallel, increasing 15Fα  results in decreasing efficiency at all times. Continuing the 
same example than above, the efficiency of the 2-IMLN architecture at 5 years decreases 
from 0.920 to 0.863, and from 0.994 to 0.981 for the 3-IMLN architecture by increasing 
15
Fα  from 0.05 to 0.15. The 2-IMLN experienced a 6.2% loss in efficiency relative to the 
05.015 =Fα  value, while the 3-IMLN limited its loss to 1.3%. This results is consistent 
with the fact the 3-IMLN architecture is more insenitive to the networked 
subsystem/technology failures than the 2-IMLN: in the worst case considered here, the 
efficiency lower bound for the 3-IMLN is a relatively high 0.926, when it is 0.727 for the 
2-IMLN. Figure 7.32 presents a compact version of the trends discussed above. 
Figure 7.32 clearly shows the impact of the networked subsystem/technology’s 
probability of failure and the difference between the networks with 2 or 3 spacecraft here 
under consideration. Figure 7.32 highlights the potential interest in adding a spacecraft 
for networkable subsystems/technologies with a high probability of failure. For the range 
of times and 15Fα  considered here, networks with more than 3 spacecrft for the same 
functionality are difficult to justify, as the 3-IMLN performance is significantly high in 




Figure 7.32. 2- and 3-IMLN comparison for 0.0515 =Fα  and 0.20
15 =Fα  
(The grey curves correspond to 0.05F =
15α and the black curves correspond to 0.20F =
15α .  The square 
markers represent the 2-IMLN, and the triangle markers represent the 3-IMLN. As previously, the color f 
the markers represents the on-orbit times, 1, 5, 10 and 15 years from lighter to darker colors) 
 
By fixing the time (called here time horizon), the variations of the network efficiency and 
net gain are solely function of αF as seen in Eqs (7.11), (7.12), (7.22) and (7.23). In the 
previous paragraph, only the 0.01–0.20 range was exmined. The full range from 0 to 1 is 
examined in Figure 7.33 for the 2- and 3-IMLN architectures with a time horizon of 15 
years (αF becoming 
15
Fα  in the equations mentioned above
17). 
                                                 
17 Generating Figure 7.33 for times other than 15 years here is more delicate, but feasible: the values of αF 
at other times used in the equations need to be consiste t with the Weibull distributions for αF. 



























































Figure 7.33. Variations of network efficiency versus net gain for a time horizon of 15 years 
 
Figure 7.33 reads as follows: the black curve represents the 2-IMLN architecture, while 
the grey curve represents the 3-IMLN one. The dashed lin s represent different values for 
15
Fα , the upper one being represented with a different type of dashed line as it is the 
limiting case. Indeed, a pair of network efficiency and net gain in the space above that 
line is not physically possible. Looking at the 0.50 dashed line, the values for the network 
efficiency and net gain for the 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN can be read: (0.455, 20.5) for the 2-
IMLN and (0.703, 31.6) for the 3-IMLN.  
If the probability of failure of the networkable subsystem/technology is known and 
fixed, then adding more spacecraft to the network make the pair (network efficiency, 
net gain) moves up and right along the associated dashed line for a specified time 
horizon.  




























































Another effect can be noted on Figure 7.33: for each ar hitecture, a unique maximum for 
the net gain exists for a specific value of 15Fα : 0.50 for the 2-IMLN maximum net gain of 
20.5 percentage points (with an associated efficiency of 0.455) and 0.58 for the 3-IMLN 
maximum net gain of 32.3 percentage points (with an associated efficiency of 0.629). 
This means that for a specific time horizon, space-based networks have a limiting 
capability to handle the failure of the networkable subsystem/technology (this 
limited capability increasing with the size of the network), over which the 
advantages of the network fade. For example here, a probability of failure at 15 years 
superior to 0.50 for the networked subsystem/technology results in a net gain for the 2-
IMLN smaller than the maximum value and on a decreasing trend (higher 15Fα  will result 
in decreasing net gain values). 
Families of curves for different types of network can be generated in the same fashion on 
Figure 7.33 and are of great help to inform the selection of a space architecture, by 
providing network efficiency and net gain trends and values. Indeed, these trends and 
values can be mapped to the risk tolerance of the shareholders and complementary cost 
studies can bring the last piece to choose an “optimal” solution. 
7.3.6. Impact of Variations in the Probability of Failure of the Supporting 
Subsystems 
In the subsections above, the probabilities of failure for the supporting subsystems and 
the payload were assumed to be equal to the ones derive  from our sample of the 
SpaceTrak database (hereafter referred to as “nominal” case). However, these 
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probabilities might be different for some specialized space platforms and this section 
investigates the impact on the efficiency of the network if these probabilities are changed. 
It can be seen in Eqs. (7.22) and (7.23) that the efficiency of the networks under 
consideration actually depends only on the probability of failure of the supporting 
subsystems, and not on the one of the payload. Assuming that the probability of failure of 
the supporting subsystems at 15 years varies by ±20% from the nominal case, while 
keeping the same shape parameter (βS = 0.5181), the new values for the scale parameter 
are: 969=+FSθ  years and 2202=
−F
Sθ  years. Generating again the network efficiencies for 
the 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN architectures for 05.015 =Fα  and 20.0
15 =Fα  yields the following 
results, shown in Figure 7.34 and Figure 7.35.  
 
Figure 7.34. Effect of a ±20% variation in FSP on the 2-IMLN efficiency 
(The “nominal” case is represented with solid lines and the “perturbed” cases are represented with 
dashed lines. The family of grey curves represents the 0.05F =
15α and the family of black curves 
corresponds to 0.20F =
15α ) 


































Figure 7.35. Effect of a ±20% variation in FSP on the 3-IMLN efficiency 
(Same formatting than the previous figure) 
 
The maximum deviation from the nominal case occurs at 15 years and is equal to 2% for 
the 2-IMLN and 0.4% for the 3-IMLN at 05.015 =Fα , 2% for the 2-IMLN and 0.8% for 
the 3-IMLN at 20.015 =Fα . As a consequence, the efficiency results change but remains 
close to the nominal case. Thus, the results present d i  the previous section give a good 
approximation for the trends of the network efficiency. 
7.3.7. Impact of the Probability of Failure of the Wireless Link Between 
Spacecraft 
Another assumption made in the previous sections was rel ted to the perfect reliability of 
the wireless link between spacecraft. In reality, this may not be the case, and, as a result, 




































the survivability advantages of the space-based network over the monolith spacecraft 
may not be fully realizable. This section investigates the impact of an imperfect wireless 
link on the network efficiencies and net gains. Letassume that the wireless link between 
spacecraft is generated by two units in each spacecr ft: the link works only if both units 
work (no link attenuation from distance for example is considered). The probability of 
failure of the link is labeled as υF(t), and the probability of failure of the unit i is labeled 
F
iPU . The two probabilities are related as follows: 
 ( )( )FFF PPt U2U1 111)( −−−=υ  (7.24) 
Two types of distributions are considered for FiPU : exponential and single Weibull. For the 



















































As was done with αF, υF is parameterized according to its values at 15 years, l beled 
15
Fυ : 
0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50, 0.90. The associated values for µF are given in Table 7.9. 
Table 7.9. Exponential parameter values for the wireless link’s failure behavior 
15
Fυ  








The probability of failure given in Eq. (7.4) for the 2-IMLN can be modified to include 
the probability of failure of the link between the spacecraft as follows: 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( )( ){ }FFFSFFPFSF PPPP αυαυ −−−−−−−−= 11111111IMLN,-2  (7.27) 
This equation can be reduced to (as done for Eq. (7.9)): 























2-IMLN architecture’s probability of complete failure – exponential case. Let us look at 
an example: assuming 05.015 =Fα , and 50.0
15 =Fυ  (the link has a 50% chance to be 
operational after 15 years), Figure 7.36 gives the probabilities of failure of the monolith 
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architecture, of the 2-IMLN architecture with a perfect link ( 015 =Fυ ), and of the 2-IMLN 
with a 50% reliability link after 15 years ( 50.015 =Fυ ). 
 
Figure 7.36. Impact of an imperfect link (exponential case) 
 
Figure 7.36 clearly show that the probability of a complete failure is significantly 
impacted by the unreliability of the link: the two curves for the 2-IMLN architecture 
depart from each other from year 2 approximately. The gap continuously increases in 
time as the imperfect link curve tends towards the monolith curve. At 15 years, the 
probability of failure of the 2-IMLN with a 50% unreliable link is 0.125, compared to the 
perfect link case at 0.105. The monolith probability of total failure at 15 years is 0.144: as 
a consequence, of the 3.9 percentage point improvement by considering an ideal 2-IMLN, 
only 1.9 percentage points are effectively realized with a 50% reliable link. 










































2-IMLN architecture’s net gain and efficiency – exponential case. Equations for the net 
gain and network efficiency can also be derived in th s particular case as done previously: 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) FFFFPFSF PP ααυυ −−−−=∆ 1111 2IMLN,-2  (7.29) 
 ( )( )( ) FFFFSF P ααυη υ −−−= 111IMLN,-2  (7.30) 
Figure 7.37 shows the impact of an imperfect link on the network efficiency of the 2-
IMLN architecture in the case 05.015 =Fα . For low values of 
15
Fυ , the efficiency remains 
close to its ideal value: for a link reliability around the same order of reliability of 
spacecraft subsystems, the efficiency slightly dropped to 0.821 for 05.015 =Fυ  from its 
ideal value of 0.864, or to 0.777 for 10.015 =Fυ . However, the efficiency dramatically 
drops with an significant increase in 15Fυ : with a 50% chance of link failure at 15 years 
( 50.015 =Fυ ), the efficiency dropped to 0.432 from its ideal vlue of 0.864; in a more 
extreme case, with a 10% of still working after 15 years ( 90.015 =Fυ ), the efficiency is 
down to 0.086. As a consequence, the reliability of the link is critical in capturing th e 
survivability advantages of the space-based networks. 
The information about the net gain is also of interest to assess the interest of an 
architecture. Combing the results about the efficien y above with net gain calculations, 








Figure 7.38. Variation of the probability of failure of the link (exponential, 0.0515 =Fα ) 











































































































Figure 7.38 shows a family of curves for the 05.015 =Fα  case with the dashed lines 
representing four on-orbit times: 1, 5, 10 and 15 years from the lower line to the upper 
one. Increasing 15Fυ  results in a decrease in efficiency as seen in the previous figure. An 
additional piece of information yields with the net gain: the higher the probability of 
failure of the link, the smaller the net gain of the architecture. For the 0.10 and 0.20 cases, 
the maximum gain is obtained at 15 years, while the 0.50 maximum gain is reached at 
about 9 years and the 0.90 maximum gain at about 3 years. In the last two cases, the 
maximum gain is not reached at the end of the observation period, indicating a time 
horizon for an “effective performance” of the network. For example, in the case of 
90.015 =Fυ , the network becomes less attractive past 3 years and the net gain captured 
continuously decline past that point. 
2-IMLN architecture’s probability of complete failure – Weibull case. The failure of the 
link was assumed to be exponential above. A more flexib e distribution to model the link 
failure is the Weibull distribution. Two types of failure behavior are investigated in the 
following: an infant mortality behavior with a shape arameter equal to 0.5 (less than 1), 
and a wear-out behavior with a shape parameter of 3 (more than 1). In the case of the 














































































υ  (7.32) 

















































exp1)(  (7.33) 
An illustrative case is explored around 50.015 =Fυ : the values of the shape and scale 
parameter for the Weibull distribution are given in Table 7.10. 
Table 7.10. Weibull parameters values for the wirelss link’s failure behavior 
15
Fυ  
Weibull shape parameter β 











Figure 7.39. Impact of an imperfect link (Weibull case) 
 
As it was the case above with the exponential failure distribution, the probability of 
failure for the 2-IMLN architecture with an imperfect link diverges from its ideal case, 
for both failure behavior (infant mortality and wear-out). The divergence however does 
not occur at the same time for the two failure behaviors: in the case of the infant mortality, 
the gap between the curves become noticeable before 1 year on-orbit, while in the case of 
a wear-out behavior, the divergence occurs between year 5 and 6. Thus it is clearly 
shown that an infant mortality behavior for the link will be significantly more 
problematic than the wear-out behavior. Despite the fact that at 15 years, both failure 
behaviors result in the same probability of failure, the wear-out case allowed to fully 
capture the survivability advantage of the space-based network for the first 5 years on 
orbit. As a consequence, infant mortality failures in the link should be rooted out for 
the space-based network option to be of interest.  







































15 = 0.50, β = 0.5
2-IMLN - υF
15 = 0.50, β = 3
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2-IMLN architecture’s net gain and efficiency – Weibull case. The trend mentioned 
above can also be shown with the evolution of network efficiency in time shown in 
Figure 7.40. Figure 7.40 presents the ideal 2-IMLN efficiency (link with a perfect 
reliability), the exponential link failure case (β = 1 makes the Weibull distribution 
equivalent to the exponential distribution), the infant mortality case (β = 0.5) and the 
wear-out failure case (β = 3). It can be seen on the figure that increasing the shape 
parameter β from 1 results in shifting the efficiency curve towards the right (hence 
retaining higher efficiency value at the same on-orbit time), while decreasing the shape 
parameter from 1 results in shifting the efficiency curve towards the left (and hence 
worsening the efficiency at a comparable on-orbit time). 
 
 
Figure 7.40. Impact of the link unreliability on the 2-IMLN efficiency ( 0.0515 =Fα  and 0.50
15 =Fυ ) 







































Including the information about the net gain, the associated η–∆ graph can be generated 
as shown in Figure 7.41. Again, the dashed lines represent four on-orbit times: 1, 5, 10 
and 15 years from the lower line to the upper one. An additional figure is given, Figure 
7.42, to give a comparative case with a less problematic link ( 10.015 =Fυ ) relative to the 
case studied above ( 50.015 =Fυ ). 
 
 
Figure 7.41. η–∆ graph for the 2-IMLN with an imperfect link, 0.5015 =Fυ  
(exponential and Weibull cases) 
 
























































Figure 7.42. η–∆ graph for the 2-IMLN with an imperfect link, 0.1015 =Fυ  
 
Figure 7.41  and Figure 7.42 confirm that the infant mortality case is the worst in terms of 
network efficiency and net gain. However, in the case of a more problematic link (i.e., a 
link that fails more), the difference between the infant mortality case and the wear-out 
behavior is more pronounced (Figure 7.41 versus Figure 7.42). As a consequence, the 
more the link fails, the more critical the infant mortality failures become. In addition, 
note that in the 50.015 =Fυ  case, a maximum in the net gain appears for the wear-out and 
exponential cases around 9 years on-orbit. This could indicate that a time horizon for a 
true effective performance of the network can be defined in these cases. Finally, it can be 
seen that varying the failure behavior of the link from 50.015 =Fυ  to 0.10 results in 
shifting the end points of the efficiency–net gain curves along the 15-year dashed line, as 
seen in Figure 7.38. 























































All the figures above were generated such that the probability of failure of the networked 
subsystem/technology is equal to 0.05 after 15 years ( 05.015 =Fα ). A final examination of 
the behavior of the 2-IMLN network with respect to the link failure is to explore whether 
the sensitivity of the efficiency to the failure ofthe networked subsystem/technology is 
impacted by the failure of the link (exponential case), and this is shown in Figure 7.43. 
 
Figure 7.43. 2-IMLN efficiency variations due to the failures of the networked subsystem/technology 
and link 
 
It can be seen in Figure 7.43 that in a perfect link situation, the 2-IMLN efficiency drops 
from 0.864 to 0.727 at 15 years due to the increase in the failure behavior of the 
networked subsystem/technology (15Fα  from 0.05 to 0.20), a 16% variation. Considering 
now a link that has a 90% chance of failing by 15 years, the same variation in 15Fα  results 
in a drop from 0.086 to 0.073, a similar relative variation. However, the impact on the 
absolute numbers dramatically changed: the difference i  efficiency for a network with a 
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problematic link is smaller than for a healthy link. This is consistent with the fact that the 
more failure-prone the link is, the less networked the spacecraft are, and the less relevant 
the failure of the networked subsystem/technology is. Note that αF and υF have a similar 
role on efficiency as shown in Eq. (7.30). 
3-IMLN architecture. The previous results were generated for the 2-IMLN architecture. 
In the case of the 3-IMLN, the analytical solution is not obvious or possible, and the 
IMLN simulation is the only solution to generate the probability of failure of the network 
in presence of link failure. Indeed, the two links in the 3-IMLN do not fail independently: 
the failure of the wireless unit on board of the main spacecraft (with the payload) causes 
the failure of both links. Hence the time to failure of the links are computed by generating 
the times to failure of the 3 units, and taking theminimum of the times to failure of the 
two respective units for both links. The IMLN model handles very easily this 
computation and the probability of failure of the system, the network efficiency and the 
net gain can be simulated. In the case of 05.015 =Fα , three simulations were run, for 
15
Fυ  
equal to 0.20, 0.50 and 0.90 (exponential distributions with parameters given in Table 7.9) 
to obtain a representative sample of the impact of he link failures on the 3-IMLN 




Figure 7.44. η–∆ graph for the 3-IMLN with an imperfect link (exponential case) 
 
Figure 7.44 presents four curves: the black dotted line without “plus” markers is the 
perfect case (i.e., the links are perfectly reliable), and the curves with “plus” markers are 
the cases with links prone to failure. For readability purposes, it was chosen to output the 
results of the simulation every on-orbit year (15 markers per curve for 15 years spent on-
orbit). The black short-dash lines link the markers on a curve, but do not represent results 
from the simulation (their unique purpose is to highli ht the curve). Figure 7.44 shows 
that the 3-IMLN architecture is also affected by the failure of the links, although to a 
lesser extent than the 2-IMLN, as demonstrated in Figure 7.45 for 50.015 =Fυ .  
Finally, Weibull distributions were considered for the link failure behavior, with the 
Weibull parameters given in Table 7.10. Similar comments than for the 2-IMLN can be 
made regarding the results of Figure 7.46. 





















































Figure 7.45. Comparison of the 2- and 3-IMLN architectures with link failures (exponential case) 
 
 
Figure 7.46. η–∆ graph for the 3-IMLN with an imperfect link, 0.5015 =Fυ  
(exponential and Weibull cases) 










































































































7.3.8. Multi-State Considerations: IMLN Behavior Facing Major Degradation 
Up to this point, section 7.3 considered only the catastrophic failure of the monolith or 
space-based network architectures. However, as mention d in earlier chapters and in 
section 7.2, other types of events can occur on-board the space systems that lead to a 
degradation of its functionality, and not necessary its complete loss. In this subsection, 
another level of severity in the performance degradation is investigated, namely, the 
major degradation state. Assuming that the probability of major degradation of the 
networked subsystem/technology is given by αM(t), the impact of such an event is 
investigated in a similar fashion than for the complete failure, by parameterizing the 
value of the probability of major degradation at 15 years: 15)years 15( MM t αα == . Four 
levels are explored in this subsection, with 15Mα  equal to 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20. 
This probability αM is not directly useable in the IMLN model and simulation, as 
explained in Chapter 5. The state considered in the simulation is not the “major 
degradation” state directly, but the aggregation of the “major degradation” and “total 
failure” states into the “major–failed” state (also referred to as “severe degradation” state). 
The probability of being in a major degradation state for the space architecture is then 
calculated by taking the difference between the probability of being in the aggregated 
major–failed state, labeled αMF(t), and the probability of being in the total failure state 
(simulated in the previous subsections), as evidenced by Eq. (5.40). In similar fashion, we 
have for αF, αM and αMF: 
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  )()()( ttt FMFM ααα −=  (7.34) 
Note that the value of αMF is bounded by 1, constraining the values αF and αM can take 
concurrently ( 6.015 =Fα  and 7.0
15 =Mα  at the same time is not physically possible). 
To investigate potential changes in the probability of major degradation for the space 
architecture due to variations in the probability of t tal failure of the networkable 
subsystem/technology, two levels for 15Fα  were chosen, representative of 
subsystems/technologies with lower or higher tendency to complete failures: 0.05 and 
0.20. Table 7.11 presents a summary of the levels used in the following simulations. It is 
interesting to note that the 15MFα  value of 0.25 can be obtained by two different 
combinations of 15Fα  and 
15
Mα ((0.05, 0.20) and (0.20, 0.05) respectively). 


















As done for the probability of failure of the networkable subsystem/technology, the 
probability of being in a major–failed state of the n tworkable subsystem/technology is 
modeled using single Weibull distributions (with a constant shape parameter β = 0.5), and 
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the values of the scale parameters associated to the specified values are given in Table 
7.12. 














Using the IMLN models, simulations were run for each 15MFα  value, and generated as 
output the probability of being in a  major–failed state of the space architecture (as 
previously: monolith, 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN). Also as done previously, analytical results 
can be found as the subscripts and superscripts “F” can be replaced by “MF” (except in 
some cases of the supporting subsystems probability18) n the equations derived for the 
probability of complete failure. They are modified as follows: 
 ( )( ) MFMFPMFSMF PPP α−−−= 111monolith  (7.35) 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ){ }MFFSMFMFPMFSMF PPPP αα −−−−−−−= 1111111IMLN-2  (7.36) 
                                                 
18 In the case of the functional redundancy, special attention must be given to the supporting subsystem 
state: the functional redundancy is inhibited only if the supporting subsystems fail completely, its major 
degradation having no impact in this representation. 
233 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ){ }MFFSMFMFPMFSMF PPPP αα 2IMLN-3 1111111 −−−−−−−=  (7.37) 
For readability purposes again, four on-orbit times have been selected to compare 
architectures: 1 year, 5 years, 10 years and 15 years on-orbit. The probabilities of being in 
a major–failed state (in percentage points) for the thr e architectures at these times are 
shown in Table 7.13. 
Table 7.13. Probabilities of being in a major–failed state for monolith and networked architectures 




PMF – IMLN simulation PMF – Analytical results 
Time spent on-orbit (years) Time spent on-orbit (years) 
1 5 10 15 1 5 10 15 
0.10 
Monolith – – – – 8.49 18.02 24.53 29.18 
2-IMLN 6.08 13.42 18.75 22.72 6.09 13.44 18.77 22.75 
3-IMLN 5.97 12.95 17.91 21.58 5.97 12.94 17.91 21.58 
0.15 
Monolith – – – – 9.83 20.68 27.97 33.12 
2-IMLN 6.20 13.94 19.67 23.98 6.21 13.95 19.69 24.00 
3-IMLN 5.98 13.04 18.12 21.93 5.98 13.03 18.12 21.9 
0.20 
Monolith – – – – 11.23 23.42 31.46 37.06 
2-IMLN 6.36 14.62 20.88 25.61 6.37 14.64 20.88 25.61 
3-IMLN 5.99 13.16 18.46 22.47 5.99 13.18 18.47 22.49 
0.25 
Monolith – – – – 12.70 26.22 34.98 41.00 
2-IMLN 6.58 15.49 22.35 27.56 6.59 15.52 22.37 27.58 
3-IMLN 6.04 13.41 18.99 23.31 6.02 13.40 18.99 23.31 
0.30 
Monolith – – – – 14.23 29.10 38.53 44.92 
2-IMLN 6.87 16.59 24.17 29.92 6.86 16.59 24.16 29.90 
3-IMLN 6.06 13.72 19.73 24.43 6.06 13.73 19.73 24.44 
0.35 
Monolith – – – – 15.86 32.07 42.15 48.86 
2-IMLN 7.20 17.90 26.25 32.58 7.21 17.89 26.26 32.58 
3-IMLN 6.13 14.20 20.72 25.92 6.12 14.19 20.72 25.9 
0.40 
Monolith – – – – 17.58 35.13 45.80 52.79 
2-IMLN 7.64 19.42 28.68 35.61 7.63 19.43 28.69 35.62 
3-IMLN 6.20 14.82 22.03 27.82 6.20 14.81 22.02 27.81 
 
It can be seen in Table 7.13 that the results from the IMLN simulation and from 
analytical solutions are in strong agreement: the av rage difference is 0.01 percentage 
point and the maximum difference is 0.03 percentage point. As given by Eq. (5.40), 
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combining the results from Table 7.13 and Table 7.5 (probability of complete failure), the 
probability of being in a major degradation state for the architecture under consideration 
can be computed, and the final result is given in Table 7.14.   
Table 7.14. Probabilities of being in a major degradation state for monolith and networked 











PM – IMLN simulation  PM – Analytical results 
Time spent on-orbit (years) Time spent on-orbit (years) 
1 5 10 15 1 5 10 15 
0.05 
0.05 0.10 
Monolith – – – – 4.70 9.56 12.66 14.76 
2-IMLN 3.53 7.49 10.23 12.18 3.54 7.51 10.25 12.21 
3-IMLN 3.46 7.22 9.75 11.56 3.46 7.21 9.76 11.57 
0.10 0.15 
Monolith – – – – 6.04 12.22 16.10 18.69 
2-IMLN 3.66 8.02 11.14 13.44 3.66 8.02 11.16 13.46 
3-IMLN 3.47 7.31 9.96 11.91 3.47 7.30 9.97 11.92 
0.15 0.20 
Monolith – – – – 7.44 14.95 19.59 22.63 
2-IMLN 3.82 8.70 12.35 15.07 3.82 8.71 12.36 15.07 
3-IMLN 3.49 7.43 10.30 12.45 3.49 7.45 10.32 12.48 
0.20 0.25 
Monolith – – – – 8.91 17.76 23.11 26.57 
2-IMLN 4.04 9.56 13.82 17.02 4.04 9.59 13.85 17.05 
3-IMLN 3.53 7.68 10.83 13.29 3.51 7.67 10.84 13.31 
0.20 
0.05 0.25 
Monolith – – – – 4.73 9.11 11.57 13.06 
2-IMLN 3.64 7.86 10.74 12.71 3.66 7.90 10.77 12.74 
3-IMLN 3.50 7.38 10.08 12.04 3.48 7.37 10.09 12.05 
0.10 0.30 
Monolith – – – – 6.27 11.98 15.12 16.98 
2-IMLN 3.93 8.96 12.56 15.07 3.94 8.98 12.56 15.06 
3-IMLN 3.52 7.69 10.82 13.16 3.52 7.70 10.82 13.18 
0.15 0.35 
Monolith – – – – 7.90 14.96 18.73 20.92 
2-IMLN 4.26 10.27 14.64 17.74 4.28 10.28 14.66 17.75 
3-IMLN 3.60 8.16 11.81 14.66 3.58 8.16 11.82 14.66 
0.20 0.40 
Monolith – – – – 9.62 18.02 22.38 24.84 
2-IMLN 4.70 11.79 17.07 20.76 4.70 11.82 17.09 20.78 
3-IMLN 3.66 8.79 13.12 16.55 3.67 8.78 13.12 16.55 
 
A more practical representation of the results presented in Table 7.5, Table 7.13 and 
Table 7.14 is shown in Figure 7.47, for the case 10.015 =MFα  ( 05.0
15 =Fα  and 05.0





Figure 7.47. Probabilities of complete failure and major degradation for monolith and networked 
architectures 
 
Figure 7.47 reads as follows. For each of the four n-orbit times, three bars are 
represented:  the leftmost of the three represents the monolith architecture (“M” on the 
figure), the middle bar represents the 2-IMLN architecture (“2”) and the rightmost bar of 
the three represents the 3-IMLN architecture (“3”). The numbers associated with the 
black part of the stacked bars represent the probability of catastrophic failure of the 
associated architecture, while the grey part of the stacked bars represents the probability 
of being in a major degradation state for the associated architecture. As a consequence, 
the numbers on top of the bars resulting from the addition of the other two represent the 
probability of being in a major–failed state (or severe degradation state) for the 
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236 
 
• The monolith architecture has a probability of being  a failed state (PF) of 
8.46%, a major degradation state (PM)  of 9.56% and a total probability of being 
in a severe degradation state (PMF) of 18.02%; 
• The 2-IMLN architecture has a probability of being i  a failed state of 5.93%, a 
major degradation state of 7.51% and a total probability of being in a severe 
degradation state of 13.44%; 
• The 3-IMLN architecture has a probability of being i  a failed state of 5.73%, a 
major degradation state of 7.21% and a total probability of being in a severe 
degradation state of 12.94%. 
In this particular case, the space-based networks improve on both the failed and the major 
degradation states, but with a small difference betwe n the networks of 2 and 3 spacecraft. 
The next step consists in looking at results in Table 7.13 and Table 7.14 obtained by 
increasing 15Mα  while keeping 
15
Fα  constant, to observe the effect of increasing the 
probability of being in a major degradation state for the networkable 
subsystem/technology on the system level. The resulting change is presented in Figure 
7.48, with 25.015 =MFα  ( 20.0
15 =Fα  and 05.0
15 =Mα ): 
15
Mα  was increased from 0.05 to 0.20, 




Figure 7.48. Increase in the probability of major degradation for the networkable 
subsystem/technology 
 
As expected, the probability PM (represented in grey) has increased while PF (in black) 
remained constant: from Figure 7.47 where, at 5 years on-orbit, PM for the monolith was 
equal to 9.56%, it is now 17.76%; in the case of the 2-IMLN, it went from 7.51% to 9.59% 
and for the 3-IMLN, it increased from 7.21% to 7.67%. Note that the increase was the 
most dramatic for the monolith spacecraft, while th3-IMLN was the least affected. This 
result mirrors the behavior of the networks in the case of total failures. Also note that for 
higher 15Mα , the difference between architecture becomes more apparent: for example at 
15 years, there is now a difference of 4.27 percentage points in PMF, while it was only 
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Let investigate the complementary effect: keeping 15Mα fixed at 0.05 (as in Figure 7.47), 
let us increase 15Fα  from 0.05 to 0.20. This is shown in Figure 7.49. 
 
Figure 7.49. Increase in the probability of total failure for the networkable subsystem/technology 
 
Several interesting phenomena occur in Figure 7.49. First, as the combination of 15Fα  and 
15
Mα  were chosen to add up to 0.25, the same 
15
MFα than in Figure 7.48 (obtained with the 
reverse combination), the probabilities of being in a major–failed state (PMF, given by the 
numbers on top of the stacked bars) for the three achitectures are the same than in Figure 
7.48. The splits between the black share and the grey share changed to accommodate for 
the new degradation and failure behavior of the networked subsystem/technology: PF 
increased (in black) while PM (in grey decreased). A more interesting finding lies in 
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Fα  which increased from 0.05 to 0.20. As expected, P
F increased, but PM was also 
impacted: for example, after 15 years, the probability of major degradation for the 
monolith architecture shifted from 14.76% to 13.06%, from 12.21% to 12.74% for the 2-
IMLN and from 11.57% to 12.05% for the 3-IMLN. This mplies that for a constant 
probability of major degradation for the networkable subsystem/technology (αM), the 
probability of major degradation of the complete architecture is affected by the variation 
in the probability of total failure of the networkable subsystem/technology (αF). As a 
consequence, PM is not solely a function of αM, but depends on both αM
 and αF. 
As mentioned above, and similarly for catastrophic failures, the space-based networks 
studied here are less sensitive to the variation in the degradation and failure behavior of 
the networkable subsystem/technology. This shielding effect from major anomalies and 
failures is clearly shown in Figure 7.50 (t = 5 years).  
In the worst-case scenario here after 5 years on-orbit with ( ) ( )20.0,20.0, 1515 =MF αα , PM varies 
by 151% for the monolith (from an ideal value of 7.17% (perfect subsystem/technology, 
with no anomaly or failures, i.e., ( ) ( )0,0, 1515 =MF αα ) to 18.02%), by 65% for the 2-IMLN 
(from the ideal value of 7.17% to 11.82%) and by 22% for the 3-IMLN architecture 
(from the ideal value of 7.17% to 8.78%). Overall, the probability of severe degradation 
for the space system, PMF, varies by 173% for the monolith, 51% for the 2-IMLN and 15% 
for the 3-IMLN. As a conclusion, the networked architectures confirm their 
“shielding effect” for severe anomalies in addition to failures, and this effect grows 




Figure 7.50. Sensitivity of the architectures to the anomaly and failure behavior of the networkable 


















































(0.05, 0.05) (0.05, 0.10) (0.05, 0.15) (0.05, 0.20)
(    ,      )
Total failure
Major degradation

























































(0.20, 0.05) (0.20, 0.10) (0.20, 0.15) (0.20, 0.20)
(    ,      )
Total failure
Major degradation







Net gain and network efficiency in the case of major anomalies. Net gains for the 
major–failed state ∆MF can be defined for the IMLN approach in a similar f shion than 
for catastrophic failure as: 
 MFMFMF PP IMLN-2monolithIMLN-2 −=∆  (7.38) 
 MFMFMF PP IMLN-3monolithIMLN-3 −=∆  (7.39) 
Using Eqs. (7.35), (7.36) and (7.37), these expression  can be manipulated to obtain: 
 ( )( )( )( ) MFMFMFPMFSFSMF PPP αα−−−−=∆ 1111IMLN-2  (7.40) 
 ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] MFFSFSMFFSMFMFPMFSFSMF PPPPPP ααα ++−−−−−−=∆ 121111 2IMLN-3  (7.41) 
 
Due to the relationship between PF, PM and PMF established in Eq. (5.40), the net gain for 
the major degradation state ∆M can be computed from the knowledge of ∆F and ∆MF: 
 FMFMMM PP IMLN-2IMLN-2IMLN-2monolithIMLN-2 ∆−∆=−=∆  (7.42) 
 FMFMMM PP IMLN-3IMLN-3IMLN-3monolithIMLN-3 ∆−∆=−=∆  (7.43) 
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Note that the values of ∆M are also dependent on the choice of 15Fα . In addition, network 
efficiency for major–failed state, ηMF, can also be defined for the IMLN approach in the 


















= −−η  (7.45) 
with: 
 MFMFMF PP 0monolith0 −=∆  (7.46) 
where )(0 tP
MF is the probability of a major anomaly or catastrophic failure for the 
architecture with a networkable subsystem/technology without anomalies or failure     
(αMF = 0). As: 
 ( )( )MFPMFSMF PPP −−−= 1110  (7.47) 
Eq. (7.46) can be manipulated to obtain: 
 ( )( )MFPMFSMFMF PP −−=∆ 110 α  (7.48) 
Using Eqs. (7.40), (7.41) and (7.48), Eqs. (7.44) and (7.45) can be expressed as: 
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 ( ) FSFSMFMF PP −+−−=− 11IMLN2 αη  (7.49) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )222IMLN3 1121 FSFSFSMFFSMFMF PPPP −+−−−−=− ααη  (7.50) 
Similarly, the network efficiency with respect to major degradation, ηM, can be obtained 


















= −−η  (7.52) 
where ∆M are found in Eqs. (7.42) and (7.43) and M0∆ is simply computed as: 
 FMFM
000 ∆−∆=∆  (7.53) 
Note that the values of ηM and M0∆ are also dependent on the choice of 
15
Fα . 
Net gain and network efficiency known, η–∆ graphs can be generated to investigate the 
reaction of the architecture to anomalies and failures in the networkable 
subsystem/technology. Let us start with the global major–failed state. Figure 7.51 
presents the family of curves obtained from the variation of 15MFα  from 0.10 to 0.40 by 




Figure 7.51. Network efficiency versus net gain for the major–failed state for the 2-IMLN 
(As previously, the color of the square markers corresponds to the on-orbit times, 1, 5, 10 and 15 years, 
from lighter to darker colors. The different curves correspond to the variation of 15MFα , from 0.10 in the 
bottom curve to 0.40 in the top curve) 
 
It can be seen in Figure 7.51 that the η–∆ graph presents similar results for (ηMF, ∆MF) 
than for (ηF, ∆F): for the same on-orbit time, the efficiency decreas s, but the net gain 
increases with 15MFα  increasing. Network efficiency continuously decreas s as the 
spacecraft ages on-orbit, and the net gain initially increases, then decreases (the inflexion 
in the curve is only visible for the highest value of 15MFα ). Finally, the more severe the 
degradation is for the networkable subsystem/technology, the steeper the decrease in the 
network efficiency. 

























































The 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN can also be compared for the severe degradation state, and this 
is shown in Figure 7.52. As previously seen for ηF and ∆F, the 3-IMLN handles better the 
decrease in efficiency, as well as provides higher net gains. 
 
Figure 7.52. 2- and 3-IMLN comparison for 0.1015 =MFα  and 0.40
15 =MFα  
(The grey curves correspond to 0.10MF =
15α and the black curves correspond to 0.40MF =
15α .  The square 
markers represent the 2-IMLN, and the triangle markers represent the 3-IMLN. As previously, the color f 
the markers represents the on-orbit times, 1, 5, 10 and 15 years from lighter to darker colors) 
 
How does compare the efficiency of space-based network in rooting catastrophic failures 
with major anomalies? This question is investigated in the following by considering 
equivalent values for 15Fα  and 
15
Mα , at two levels (0.05 and 0.20). As such, the 
networkable subsystem/technology has an equal probability to be in a total failed state 
and in a major degradation state. Figure 7.53 shows the resulting network efficiencies ηF
and ηM for the 2-IMLN architecture, and Figure 7.54 for the 3-IMLN architecture.  














































Figure 7.53. Comparison of ηF and ηM for the 2-IMLN architecture 
(The grey curves correspond to15Fα  and
15
Mα equal to 0.05, while the black curves correspond to both 
parameters equal to 0.20. The triangle markers represent ηF (network efficiency for catastrophic failures), 
and the circle markers represent ηM (network efficiency for major anomalies)) 
 
Figure 7.54. Comparison of ηF and ηM for the 3-IMLN architecture 
(Same formatting than the previous figure) 
































































It can be seen on Figure 7.53 that the 2-IMLN is more efficient at rooting out catastrophic 
failures than major anomalies in the networkable subsystem/technology (at both levels, 
0.05 and 0.20): for example, after 15 years on orbit at the 0.05-level, the network 
efficiency ηF is equal to 0.864, while ηM is equal to 0.757, a value 12% lower. In the most 
problematic case considered here (15Fα  and 
15
Mα  at 0.20), η
F is equal to 0.727, while ηM is 
equal to 0.302, a value 58% lower. This suggests that in the case of more and more 
problematic subsystem/technology, the space-based network concentrate more and more 
of its efforts on catastrophic failures, to the increasing detriment of major anomalies19. 
Figure 7.54 confirms a similar phenomenon for the 3-IMLN architecture: for example, 
after 15 years on orbit at the 0.05-level, the network efficiency ηF is equal to 0.981, while 
η
M is equal to 0.948, a value 3% lower. In the most problematic case considered here 
( 15Fα  and 
15
Mα  at 0.20), η
F is equal to 0.926, while ηM is equal to 0.616, a value 33% lower. 
However, the sacrifice of the major anomalies is less pronounced in the case of the 3-
IMLN compared to the 2-IMLN architecture. 
As a conclusion, the space-based networks demonstrate an interesting quality: the 
networks attempt to eliminate anomalous events by decreasing levels of severity, 
catastrophic failures first, then major anomalies. This “sacrifice” is less pronounced 
in architectures with more networked spacecraft. 
                                                 
19 In the case of very high probability of failure of the networkable subsystem, the probability of being in a 
major degradation state for the space system can eve increase between a monolithic architecture and a 
space-based network, leading to negative efficiencies. However, the overall probability of being in a 
major–failed state remains lower for the space-based network (the network completely sacrificed major 
anomalies to the advantage of catastrophic failures). 
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To complete this analysis, two more cases are studied for the 2-IMLN architecture with 
the same value of the probability of being in a major–failed state for the networkable 
subsystem/technology ( 25.015 =MFα ): case 1 consists in a networkable subsystem/ 
technology that has a higher tendency to experience major anomalies over catastrophic 
failures ( 05.015 =Fα  and 20.0
15 =Mα ); case 2 consists in the reverse situation where the 
networkable subsystem/technology that has a higher tendency to experience catastrophic 
failures over major anomalies ( 20.015 =Fα  and 05.0
15 =Mα ). Figure 7.55 allows the 
comparison of the network efficiencies ηF and ηM resulting from cases 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 7.55. Comparison of ηF and ηM for the 2-IMLN architecture with 0.2515 =MFα  
(The grey curves correspond to case 1(15Fα  and
15
Mα equal to 0.05 and 0.20 respectively), while the black 
curves correspond to case 2 (15Fα  and
15
Mα equal to 0.20 and 0.05 respectively). The triangle markers 
represent ηF (network efficiency for catastrophic failures), and the circle markers represent ηM (network 
efficiency for major anomalies)) 





















































Figure 7.55 confirms that the behavior of the network is different for catastrophic failures 
and major anomalies. For case 1 (grey curves), ηF is consistently higher than ηM at 
comparable on-orbit times (circle markers are always to the left of the triangle markers 
with the same color on the grey curves), but the net gains are higher in the case of major 
degradation compared to catastrophic failures (consistent with the fact that the 
networkable subsystem/technology is more prone to major anomalies). For case 2 (black 
curves), ηF is also consistently higher than ηM at comparable on-orbit times, but in this 
case the net gains are higher in the case of catastrophic failures (consistent with the fact 
that the networkable subsystem/technology is more prone to major anomalies). For the 
same 15MFα –level, the network had the potential in case 1 to significantly help in terms of 
major degradation despite its associated lower effici ncy, while in case 2, the network 
almost completely focused its efforts on rooting out catastrophic failures, resulting in a 
marginal improvement for the major degradation state. 
7.3.9. Multi-State Considerations: IMLN Behavior Facing Minor Degradation 
The last part of the multi-state analysis lies with the consideration of minor anomalies in 
the networkable subsystem/technology. As it was done f r the major anomaly case, we 
assume that the probability of minor degradation of the networked subsystem/technology 
is given by αm(t), the impact of such an event is investigated in a similar fashion, by 
parameterizing the value of the probability of major degradation at 15 years: 
15)years 15( mm t αα == . Only two levels are explored to give a sense of the type of analysis 
enabled by this dissertation: 15Mα  equal to 0.05 and 0.20.  
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Again, the state considered in the simulation is not the “minor degradation” state directly, 
but the aggregation of the “minor degradation”, “major degradation” and “total failure” 
states into the “minor–major–failed” state (also simply referred to as “degraded” state). 
The probability of being in a minor degradation state for the space architecture is then 
calculated by taking the difference between the probability of being in the aggregated 
minor–major–failed state, labeled αmMF(t), and the probability of being in the major 
degradation state and the total failure state (simulated in the previous subsections). As a 
consequence, we have for αF, αM, αm, αMF and αmMF: 
  )()()()()()( tttttt mMFmMFmMF αααααα +=++=  (7.54) 
Note that the value of αmMF is bounded by 1, constraining the values αF, αM and αm can 
take concurrently. 
Three representative cases are investigated to expos  trends associated with minor 
degradation: 
• Case 1: 05.015 =Fα , 05.0
15 =Mα , 05.0
15 =mα and resulting in 10.0
15 =MFα  and 
15.015 =mMFα ; 
• Case 2: 20.015 =Fα , 05.0
15 =Mα , 05.0
15 =mα and resulting in 10.0
15 =MFα  and 
30.015 =mMFα : only αm was increased from case 1; 
• Case 3: 20.015 =Fα , 20.0
15 =Mα , 20.0
15 =mα and resulting in 40.0
15 =MFα  and 
60.015 =mMFα : only αMF was increased from case 2. 
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As done for the probability of failure and major anomaly of the networkable 
subsystem/technology, the probability of being in a minor–major–failed state of the 
networkable subsystem/technology is modeled using single Weibull distributions (with a 
constant shape parameter β = 0.5), and the values of the scale parameters associ ted to 
the specified values are given in Table 7.15. 










Using the IMLN model, simulations were run for each 15mMFα  value, and generated as 
output the probability of being in a  minor–major–failed state of the space architecture (as 
previously: monolith, 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN). Also as done previously, analytical results 
can be found as the subscripts and superscripts can be replaced by “mMF” (with the same 
exceptions than previously). The equations are modified as follows: 
 ( )( ) mMFmMFPmMFSmMF PPP α−−−= 111monolith  (7.55) 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ){ }mMFFSmMFmMFPmMFSmMF PPPP αα −−−−−−−= 1111111IMLN-2  (7.56) 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ){ }mMFFSmMFmMFPmMFSmMF PPPP αα 2IMLN-3 1111111 −−−−−−−=  (7.57) 
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For readability purposes again, four on-orbit times have been selected to compare 
architectures: 1 year, 5 years, 10 years and 15 years on-orbit. The probabilities of being in 
a major–failed state (in percentage points) for the thr e architectures at these times are 
shown in Table 7.16. 
Table 7.16. Probabilities of being in a minor–major–failed state for monolith and networked 




PmMF – IMLN simulation PmMF – Analytical results 
Time spent on-orbit (years) Time spent on-orbit (years) 
1 5 10 15 1 5 10 15 
0.15 
Monolith – – – – 13.84 27.65 36.40 42.35 
2-IMLN 10.39 21.51 29.08 34.48 10.38 21.51 29.08 34.49 
3-IMLN 10.17 20.67 27.71 32.71 10.16 20.66 27.70 32.70 
0.30 
Monolith – – – – 18.05 35.32 45.72 52.52 
2-IMLN 11.00 23.92 33.04 39.58 11.01 23.91 33.03 39.58 
3-IMLN 10.24 21.32 29.14 34.88 10.24 21.30 29.12 34.87 
0.60 
Monolith – – – – 29.08 53.18 65.63 72.87 
2-IMLN 14.49 34.95 48.87 58.06 14.48 34.95 48.87 58.07 
3-IMLN 11.15 26.92 39.45 48.65 11.14 26.90 39.45 48.65 
 
It can be seen in Table 7.16 that the results from the IMLN simulation and from 
analytical solutions are again in strong agreement: the average difference is less than 0.01 
percentage point and the maximum difference is 0.02percentage point. 
In a similar fashion than for other severity levels, the probability of being in a minor 
degradation state for the architecture is given by: 
 MFmMFm PPP −=  (7.58) 
From the results given in Table 7.13 and Table 7.16, it can be calculated and the results 
are shown in Table 7.17. 
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Table 7.17. Probabilities of being in a minor degradation state for monolith and networked 








Pm – IMLN simulation Pm – Analytical results 
Time spent on-orbit (years) Time spent on-orbit (years) 
1 5 10 15 1 5 10 15 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
Monolith – – – – 5.36 9.62 11.86 13.17 
2-IMLN 4.32 8.09 10.33 11.76 4.30 8.07 10.31 11.74 
3-IMLN 4.20 7.72 9.79 11.13 4.20 7.72 9.79 11.13 
0.05 0.05 0.20 
Monolith – – – – 9.57 17.30 21.19 23.34 
2-IMLN 4.93 10.50 14.28 16.86 4.93 10.48 14.25 16.83 
3-IMLN 4.27 8.37 11.22 13.30 4.28 8.36 11.21 13.29 
0.20 0.20 0.20 
Monolith – – – – 11.50 18.04 19.83 20.08 
2-IMLN 6.85 15.53 20.18 22.46 6.85 15.52 20.18 22.45 
3-IMLN 4.96 12.09 17.43 20.83 4.94 12.09 17.43 20.84 
 
All the results regarding the total failure, major degradation and minor degradation can be 
presented in a more practical representation, for example for the case 15.015 =mMFα  
( 05.015 =Fα , 05.0
15 =Mα  and 05.0
15 =mα ) as shown in Figure 7.56. 
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Figure 7.56 represents the probability of total failure of the architecture in black, of major 
degradation in grey and minor degradation in white. The total probability to be in a 
degraded state (i.e., not fully operational) is shown at the top of the stacked bars. Figure 
7.56 gives a complete comparative survivability analysis of the architectures under 
consideration in the case of the considered endogenous failures and performance 
metric, as all the degraded states are represented together. For example, it can be seen in 
Figure 7.56 that after 15 years on orbit, the probability of being in a degraded state has 
been reduced by 7.9 percentage points by considering a 2-IMLN architecture, and by 9.7 
percentage points with a 3-IMLN. This reduction directly translates in a gain in the 
probability of being fully operational. In the same way than for total failures and major 
anomalies, the networked architectures behave better with respect to minor anomalies in 
this particular setting, with an advantage to networks with more spacecraft related to the 
networkable subsystem/technology. 




Figure 7.57. Probability of being in degraded states for the space architectures in case 2 
 
 

























































1 year 5 years 10 years 15 years

































































1 year 5 years 10 years 15 years




M      2      3 M      2      3 M      2      3 M      2      3
256 
 
In carefully examining Figure 7.57 and Figure 7.58, a familiar phenomenon can be 
observed, as it was the case for PM: in both cases (case 2 and case 3), 20.015 =mα ; the 
variable is 15MFα  which increased from 0.10 to 0.40. As expected, P
F and PM increased, but 
Pm was also impacted: for example, after 15 years, the probability of minor degradation 
for the monolith architecture shifted from 23.34% to 20.08%, from 16.83% to 22.45% for 
the 2-IMLN and from 13.29% to 20.84% for the 3-IMLN20. This implies that for a 
constant probability of minor degradation for the networkable subsystem/technology (αm), 
the probability of minor degradation of the complete architecture is affected by the 
variation in the probability of being in a severe dgradation state of the networkable 
subsystem/technology (αMF). As a consequence, P
m is not solely a function of αm, but 
depends on αm, αM
 and αF. 
Net gain and network efficiency in the case of minor anomalies. Net gains for the 
minor–major–failed state ∆mMF can be defined for the IMLN approach in a similar 
fashion than for other severity level. 
 mMFmMFmMF PP IMLN-2monolithIMLN-2 −=∆  (7.59) 
 mMFmMFmMF PP IMLN-3monolithIMLN-3 −=∆  (7.60) 
Due to the relationship between PF, PM and Pm, the net gain for the minor degradation 
state ∆m can be computed as: 
                                                 
20 Note that the probabilities of being in a minor degradation state are higher for the space-based networks 




 MFmMFmmm PP IMLN-2IMLN-2IMLN-2monolithIMLN-2 ∆−∆=−=∆  (7.61) 
 MFmMFmmm PP IMLN-3IMLN-3IMLN-3monolithIMLN-3 ∆−∆=−=∆  (7.62) 
Note that the values of ∆m are also dependent on the choice of 15MFα . 


















= −−η  (7.64) 
with: 
 mMFmMFmMF PP 0monolith0 −=∆  (7.65) 
where )(0 tP
mMF is the probability of an anomaly or failure for the architecture with a 
networkable subsystem/technology without anomalies or failure (αmMF = 0). 




















= −−η  (7.67) 
where: 
 MFmMFm
000 ∆−∆=∆  (7.68) 
The network efficiency in the case of the minor–major–failed state (ηmMF) behaves in the 
same fashion than ηMF and ηF with their corresponding15α : it decreases with 15mMFα  
increasing. Let us concentrate instead on ηm: this efficiency represents how well the 
network tackles minor anomalies in the networkable subsystem/technology. Figure 7.59 
presents the variations of ηm according to the anomaly and failure behavior of the
networkable subsystem/technology. 
 
Figure 7.59. Network efficiency ηm for the 2-IMLN architecture 
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In Figure 7.59, the light grey curve corresponds to case 1, the dark grey curve 
corresponds to case 2 and the black curve to case 3. It can be seen that the network 
efficiency for minor degradation decreases between case 1 and case 2, where the 
probability of minor anomaly in the networkable subystem/technology increases while 
keeping constant major anomaly and total failure probabilities. A more dramatic decrease 
occurs between case 2 and case 3: minor anomalies are kept at the same level of 
occurrence, but the major anomalies and total failures are drastically increased. It results 
in a large decrease in efficiency for rooting out minor anomalies. The efficiency even 
becomes negative for longer periods on-orbit, translating the fact that the space-based 
architecture has a higher probability of being in a minor degradation state than the 
monolith architecture at these times. This phenomenon can be observed in Figure 7.58 at 
10 and 15 years on-orbit. This dependence of ηm with major anomalies and total failures 
mirrors the one for major anomalies with total failures. A similar effect is shown in 




Figure 7.60. Network efficiency ηm for the 3-IMLN architecture 
 
The variations observed in ηm are related to the fact that the networks extend their 
shielding priority rules to minor anomalies: it was seen earlier that networks shielded the 
architecture from catastrophic failures first, and then from major anomalies. Minor 
anomalies come last after major anomalies, as it can be seen in Figure 7.61 and Figure 
7.62 for the 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN architectures respectively. For the same level of 
occurrence in all anomaly and failure types (α15 is equal to 0.05 for minor, major 
anomalies and total failures in case 1), the network efficiency are ranked by decreasing 
severity level: mMF ηηη ≥≥ . As a side note, the overall network efficiency for degraded 
state (ηmMF) is given as a reference of the overall performance of the network with respect 
to any anomalous event (dashed line in the figures). 
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Figure 7.61. Comparison of network efficiencies of different severity levels for the 2-IMLN 
architecture in case 1 
 
 
Figure 7.62. Comparison of network efficiencies of different severity levels for the 3-IMLN 
architecture in case 1 














































































7.3.10. Survivability Analysis and Use of the η–∆ Graph 
All the degradation states defined in this dissertation have been investigated in the 
previous subsections, and a global evaluation of the survivability of the architectures can 
be conceived through the η–∆ graph. Indeed, for a chosen performance metric, the η–∆ 
graph visualizes the potential gains or losses of an architecture under consideration with 
respect to the reference monolith architecture. In addition, if several architectures are 
under studied concurrently, the η–∆ graph allows a quick comparative analysis of the 
survivability characteristics of these architectures. As a consequence, the η–∆ graph 
introduced in this thesis is a useful tool for the designers to explore the design space 
for survivability considerations and help inform architectural choices based on 
shareholder preferences. 
Some examples of the ways the η–∆ graph can be used are presented next by considering 
the three cases introduced in section 7.3.9. They are recalled below: 
• Case 1: 05.015 =Fα , 05.0
15 =Mα , 05.0
15 =mα and resulting in 10.0
15 =MFα  and 
15.015 =mMFα ; 
• Case 2: 20.015 =Fα , 05.0
15 =Mα , 05.0
15 =mα and resulting in 10.0
15 =MFα  and 
30.015 =mMFα : only αm was increased from case 1; 
• Case 3: 20.015 =Fα , 20.0
15 =Mα , 20.0
15 =mα and resulting in 40.0
15 =MFα  and 
60.015 =mMFα : only αMF was increased from case 2. 
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For a given time and for each architecture, the net gains ∆F, ∆M, ∆m, ∆MF and ∆mMF, as 
well as the associated network efficiencies ηF, ηM, ηm, ηMF and ηmMF. For the case 1 
and at t = 5 years, the resulting η–∆ graph is shown in Figure 7.63. 
 
Figure 7.63. Complete η–∆ graph for 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN in case 1 
 
Figure 7.63 is organized as follows: 
• Marker shape: 
o The diamond markers represent the ideal case in which t e networkable 
subsystem/technology does not experience anomalies or failures, and 
show the maximum net gain a space-based architecture can obtain. 
Referring to notations introduced earlier in the dissertation, the associated 













































o The square markers represent the 2-IMLN architectur; 
o The triangle markers represent the 3-IMLN architecture. 
• Marker color: 
o The white markers represent the network efficiencies and net gains 
associated with minor degradation, i.e., ηm and ∆m; 
o The solid grey markers represent the network efficin ies and net gains 
associated with major degradation, i.e., ηM and ∆M; 
o The black markers represent the network efficiencies and net gains 
associated with total failure, i.e., ηF and ∆F; 
o The markers with dense dots represent the network efficiencies and net 
gains associated with major degradation or total failure, i.e., ηMF and ∆MF; 
o The markers with scarce dots represent the network efficiencies and net 
gains associated with any type of degradation, i.e., ηmMF and ∆mMF. 
As an example, it can be seen on Figure 7.63 for the 2-IMLN architecture that the 
network efficiencies and net gains (in percentage points) at 5 years on-orbit are: 
• (ηm, ∆m) = (0.787, 1.55); 
• (ηM, ∆M) = (0.859, 2.05); 
• (ηF, ∆F) = (0.920, 2.53); 
• (ηMF, ∆MF) = (0.892, 4.58); 
• (ηmMF, ∆mMF) = (0.863, 6.14); 
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This shows that, for example, the space-based network ith two spacecraft improves the 
probability of experiencing a severe degradation (major degradation or total failure) of 
the on-orbit performance by 4.6 points with respect to the monolith architecture under the 
considered conditions. This architecture performs reasonably well for this level of 
severity as the associated efficiency is about 0.9. 
In addition of assessing the survivability improvements related to the consideration of a 
2-spacecraft network, Figure 7.63 allows the comparison with an additional architecture 
consisting of a 3-spacecraft network. It can be seen for example, that the 3-IMLN 
architecture provides an additional half percentage point on the net gain for the severe 
degradation state ( 08.53 =∆ −
MF
IMLN ), with a much higher efficiency (about 0.99 compared to 
the 0.9 efficiency of the 2-IMLN). In the same fashion, the 3-IMLN adds an additional 
0.8 percentage point ( 98.63 =∆ −
MF
IMLN ) with a 0.98 efficiency. These high efficiencies do 
not translate in significantly higher gains, and as a consequence, adding a third spacecraft 
(or more) to the network might not be the best option from the survivability point of view 
in this particular case. 
Let us now consider case 2: the probabilities of the networkable subsystem/technology 
experiencing a major anomaly and a total failure remain the same, but the probability of 
experiencing a minor anomaly increased significantly. The resulting η–∆ graph is shown 




Figure 7.64. Complete η–∆ graph at 5 years for 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN in case 2 
 
The formatting in Figure 7.64 is the same than for Figure 7.63. Note that the solid grey 
markers, black markers and markers with dense dots remain at the same location than in 
Figure 7.63: this is consistent with the fact that 15Fα and 
15
Mα  did not change between case 
1 and case 2. However, the locations of the white makers and the makers with scarce dots 
change, to reflect the change in 15mα . The net gains at 5 years associated with the minor 
degradation state and the degraded state are now higher, for example for the 2-IMLN 
architecture: 
• (ηm, ∆m) = (0.707, 6.82); 






































As explained before, the associated network efficiencies are lower than in case 1 due to 
the increase in 15mα . The difference between the 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN remains small for 
severe degradation states, but becomes potentially s gnificant for any type of degradation: 
the 3-IMLN adds an additional 2.6 percentage points ( 02.143 =∆ −
MF
IMLN ) with a 0.95 
efficiency, only 0.8 percentage points from the ideal case. For stakeholders with high 
requirements on spacecraft to be fully operational, the 3-IMLN architecture might be a 
good candidate to consider. Adding more spacecraft to he network might not be 
interesting as the 3-IMLN performance is very close to the ideal case. Figure 7.64 clearly 
shows that the differences between 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN architectures mainly come from 
the minor anomalies in the networkable subsystem/technology. 
The last case, case 3, is obtained from case 2 by increasing the probabilities of the 
networkable subsystem/technology experiencing major nomalies or total failures. The 




Figure 7.65. Complete η–∆ graph at 5 years for 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN in case 3 
 
Figure 7.65 clearly shows a significant jump in netgains for the major degradation state, 
the total failure state, the severe degradation state ( he sum of the previous two) and the 
degraded state. For example, the net gain at 5 years for the severe degradation state is 
15.7 percentage points for the 2-IMLN architecture, with an associated efficiency of 0.71, 
while it is 20.3 points for the 3-IMLN architecture with an associated efficiency of 0.91. 
For this type of severity, the space-based network has a clear advantage over the 
monolith spacecraft (over 18 or 26 percentage point difference with the 2-IMLN and 3-
IMLN for all types of anomalies and failures), with a significant edge for the 3-IMLN 
over the 2-IMLN. The 2-IMLN suffers from low efficiencies as it can be seen in Figure 
7.65.  Also note that the net gains and efficiencies for the minor degradation state are 
lower in case 2 than in case 3. This is consistent with previous findings that show that the 







































15α . Finally, it can be observed that the results from the 3-IMLN are significantly 
different from the ideal case, indicating that networks with more spacecraft could be 
considered for survivability improvements. 
The three η–∆ graphs shown above present interesting trends to the designer, especially 
when considered dynamically, as illustrated in Figure 7.66. This figure gathers the three 
previous figures and can be considered as the result of tweaking 15Fα ,
15
Mα  and 
15
mα . This 
could be for example integrated in a real-time simulation interface (see future work 
section for more details). Note that the scale has been altered so that it is common to all 
graphs for an easier visualization of the trends. 
 
Figure 7.66. Evolution of the η–∆ graph at 5 years for 2-IMLN and 3-IMLN with the fa ilure behavior 
of the networkable subsystem/technology 
 
Another axis to study the behavior of the network is related to the time on-orbit. In the 




































































































































time axis is shown in Figure 7.67, for case 1, and it highlights all the trends discussed in 
the previous sections. 
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7.4. Summary of selected results 
This chapter provided a significant amount of results and this conclusion summarizes a 
selected number of them. The first section investigated specific subsystems: the 
Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TTC) subsystem, and then proceeded to analyze the 
bigger Command and Data Handling (C&DH) subsystem. It was demonstrated that the 
consideration of a simple 2-spacecraft network provides a significant improvement in 
terms of survivability with respect to endogenous failures within these subsystems. 
Adding more spacecraft to the network for this purpose was shown to provide limited 
incremental benefits. 
The following section then took a more general approach by considering a general non-
descriptive networkable subsystem/technology and investigated the survivability 
characteristics of space-based networks chosen as they represent the building brick of 
more complex space-based networks. Several implications for space-based network 
design were observed, and a selected number is presented below. For example, it was 
shown that the worse degradation and failure behavior the networkable 
subsystem/technology has, the biggest benefit from a survivability point of view comes 
by adding more spacecraft to the network. It was also demonstrated that the space-based 
networks shield in priority from the worse failures, and then progress towards anomalies 
with decreasing levels of severity. A final example resides with the conclusion that the 
reliability of the wireless links in the network iscritical to ripe all the survivability 




It is important to keep in mind the settings (e.g., class of threat, architecture functional 
structure, performance metric) of the survivability analysis to interpret the domain of 
applicability of the results provided in this chapter and not over-estimate their generalities. 
The results should not be generalized without proper analysis to all designs of space-
based networks or monolith architectures and extrapolated to other classes of on-orbit 
shocks or threats to space systems. The survivability framework proposed in this thesis 
offers fruitful venue for further research and adaptation towards the survivability analysis 
of a broad range of architectural and design choices for space systems (and other 
engineering artifacts) and given different classes of hocks. Indeed, beyond survivability 
analyses pertaining to chosen architectures in this dis ertation, this chapter introduced 
useful tools and metrics for the spacecraft designer to conduct his own conceptual design 
analyses, such as the net gain, the network efficiency and the dynamically evolving η–∆ 
graph. In conclusion, beyond specific results, this d sertation introduced a general 
framework and techniques that allow precisely quantifyi g survivability features of 





CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
 
8.1. Summary 
This dissertation explored the relationship of spacecraft and space-based networks with 
time, and more particularly how they degrade and fail in time. The focus of this 
dissertation was twofold: the first part dealt with reliability and multi-state failure 
analyses based on the statistical analysis of a large sample of Earth-orbiting satellites, 
when the second part introduced a novel framework f the survivability analysis of 
space-based networks. 
Chapter 2  and Chapter 3 are the two installments of Part 1. Chapter 2 was devoted to 
spacecraft catastrophic failures and presented an extensive reliability analysis of 
spacecraft and spacecraft subsystems, through nonparametric studies, parametric model 
development and comparative analyses of subsystem contribution to spacecraft 
unreliability. Chapter 3 extended the reliability analysis beyond the binary approach of 
reliability analysis in its traditional understandig (an item being either operational or 
failed) to analyze anomalies (or partial failures that do not necessary result in the total 
loss of the spacecraft) of spacecraft subsystems. Chapter 3 presented both a theoretical 
approach to conduct multi-state analyses and its practical application to spacecraft 
subsystems. The results refined the comprehension of the progression towards complete 
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failure of the spacecraft subsystems, and help identify problematic subsystems (in 
addition to the results in Chapter 2) for spacecraft designers to hone in. 
As mentioned above, Part 2 was dedicated to the survivability analysis of space-based 
networks, a newly introduced concept in the space industry that promotes the sharing of 
on-orbit resources with neighboring orbiting spacecraft. After reviewing the survivability 
concept and the current state of network analysis, Chapter 4 introduced a survivability 
framework and proposed an approach to model space-bs d networks, namely the 
interdependent multi-layer network approach, to compensate for the perceived 
shortcomings of current tools. As survivability is the focus of this part, Chapter 5 
established the theoretical basis for anomaly and filure propagation across the network 
interdependent multi-layer model. Chapter 6 was dedicated to the technical validation and 
characteristics of the survivability analysis using the interdependent multi-layer network 
modeling, by comparing its performance to alternative modeling techniques such as 
stochastic Petri nets, or by exploring the scalability of the proposed model. As the 
validation process demonstrated that the output of the interdependent multi-layer network 
modeling can be trusted, Chapter 7 presented survivability analyses of specific and non-
descriptive subsystems/technologies, and then leveraged these results to provide insights 
into the conceptual design of future space systems, and potentially space-based networks, 
from a survivability point of view. 
8.2. Contributions 
In summary, the contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
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• Development of reliability models for spacecraft and spacecraft subsystems, in 
response of the identified need for recent and flight-based spacecraft reliability. 
This will provide a useful feedback to the space industry and help spacecraft 
manufacturers prioritize and hone in on problematic subsystems that would 
benefit most from reliability improvements;  
 
• Development of formal techniques to evaluate multi-state failure behavior and 
their application to spacecraft subsystems, to improve the understanding of the 
spacecraft subsystems failure behavior beyond the traditional binary approach of 
reliability; 
 
• Introduction of a survivability framework, as well as an interdependent multi-
layer approach to represent and analyze networks with heterogeneous nodes; 
 
• Development of theoretical foundations for the definition of interdependent multi-
layer network proposed in this dissertation, for the anomaly and failure 
propagation across the network through algorithm, and its validation of for 
survivability analyses ; 
 
• Leverage of the survivability results from the interd pendent multi-layer network 
approach to gain insights for architectural choices of pace-based networks. 
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8.3. Recommendations for future work 
8.3.1. Spacecraft Failure Data, Further Reliability Analyses and Physics of 
Failure Considerations 
As mentioned in the thesis, failure data for spacecraft is limited and the current publicly 
available databases are not complete, in particular with respect to minor or temporary 
failures. It is worth addressing a common argument, which is that competitive sensitivity 
is one reason for the lack of published data and statistical analysis of on-orbit reliability. 
Although this might be true for spacecraft manufacturers, it is not the case for spacecraft 
operators (private or government agencies) whose int rests are better served by 
transparent reliability analyses of different spacecraft buses. Furthermore, spacecraft 
manufacturers could also benefit, in the long-term, in having spacecraft reliability 
analyzed and published. For example, such studies would constitute a transparent 
benchmark against which spacecraft manufacturers can compete and hence improve their 
products. The creation of such databases would allow using the tools presented in this 
thesis to improve the reliability and multi-state failure models. It could also be interesting 
to have access to the raw telemetry data, instead of the already processed information 
shown in current databases. Another reason for the incompleteness of spacecraft failure 
databases lies with the following: Chapter 2 showed that 5% to 10% of on orbit failures 
are ascribed to an “unknown” cause and subsystem. This is indicative of the extent of 
spacecraft State Of Health (SOH) monitoring and telemetry points. Spacecraft health 




In this dissertation, it was implicitly assumed that subsystem failures are independent. In 
reality, some subsystems may have dependent anomalies and failures, for example the 
thermal and power subsystems. Unfortunately, the information available in the database, 
and sometimes in the satellite operator’s incident r port itself, does not explicitly address 
failure dependence. For example, a spacecraft Class I failure is ascribed to only one 
subsystem, and a partial failure of a subsystem has its timing and severity recorded. As 
noted previously, the statistical analysis in this work is enabled by and confined to the 
data available. As a result, common-cause and depennt anomalies and failures of 
spacecraft subsystems cannot be clearly identified an statistically analyzed. Such 
analyses however are of importance and constitute fr itful avenues for future research 
when the requisite data are collected. 
Finally, the statistical approach adopted in this work pushed the limit in the development 
of actionable results of spacecraft reliability and subsystems multi-state failures. The next 
step ought to focus on and investigate the physics of failure of spacecraft and spacecraft 
subsystems—their actual failure modes and mechanisms. 
8.3.2. Interdependent Multi-Layer Network Tool 
This dissertation presented the theoretical foundations of the interdependent multi-layer 
networks, as well as the failure propagation across space-based networks. This thesis also 
introduced metrics and tools to efficiently gauge th survivability characteristics of the 
architectures under consideration. Future work on the subject could be related to the 
creation of an integrated software with a graphical interface to allow the quick building of 
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the space-based network and dispense of the manual cre tion of the adjacency and 
interlayer matrices and the mapping function. This integrated tool could also be coded in 
a more performing language, such as C or Fortran, to compensate for the memory and 
speed shortcomings of MATLAB, used in this dissertation. The use of these languages 
could enable the use of Monte Carlo simulations with higher numbers of runs for an 
enhanced output precision, and bring the simulation me to allow quasi-real time 
network modifications. Finally, a graphic interface for the presentation of the simulation 
output, using the η–∆ graph dynamically by exploring different on-orbit time horizons, or 
subsystems failure behaviors as done in 7.3.10 could be a useful tool for the spacecraft 
designer. 
8.3.3. Generalization and Extension of Applicability 
In this thesis, non-repairable subsystems were considered: it can be seen in the multi-state 
failure diagram (Figure 3.3) as there is no arc towards less severe degradation states. This 
choice comes from the fact that maintenance is quasi-impossible on spacecraft (no easy 
physical access) and that very few actual transitions occurred in the “healing” direction in 
the spacecraft sample studied in this dissertation. In addition, the definition of some 
classes of events in the SpaceTrak database clearly specifies that the anomalies or failures 
pertaining to these classes were non-repairable.  However, the multi-state approach 
presented in this thesis could be applied to repairable systems as part of future work by 
extending the process to derive their associated probabilities of transitioning (in the same 
fashion than for the transitions presented in this dissertation). Further work could also 
capture additional aspect of different repair policies (corrective versus preventive 
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maintenance, or different types of repairs (e.g., as good as new)) by modulating the 
probability distributions. In the case of the interd pendent multi-layer approach, repairs 
could also be handled by considering an additional effect that would re-enable the node 
functionality that was rendered unavailable through the interdependency effects. 
Also in this thesis, all the nodes belonging to the same layer were assumed to share the 
same degradation and failure behavior. Dissimilar redundancy (i.e., the redundant node 
does not have the same degradation and failure behavior) can be considered in future 
work by implementing different probability distributions for the nodes of interest. 
Finally, the interdependent multi-layer approach was applied to space-based networks 
and the modeling of the nodes and links, as well as the interdependency effects were 
tailored to this type of systems. However, the interdependent multi-layer approach has a 
potential broad appeal to the modeler, as it could be extended in future work to model 
different types of networks, or even other engineering systems (not necessary networks in 
the traditional sense) where clear functionalities can be defined and are distributed across 
the architecture: the proposed approach in this theis can be adapted to these systems by 
properly defining the nodes and links, as well as introducing other interdependency 
schemes if need be. For example in the case of space systems, it is suggested that the 
interdependent multi-layer framework can be adapted to analyze redundancy within 
monolith spacecraft subsystems. 
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8.3.4. Multi-Criteria Analysis 
In this dissertation, the survivability characteristic  were studied by determining the 
probability of unavailability of the payload node. More complex architectures with 
several payloads for example, might require more advanced survivability metrics and part 
of the future work on space-based network survivability could be related to the 
investigation of appropriate metrics pertaining to these cases. 
All the analyses conducted in this dissertation were done from a survivability point of 
view by considering endogenous failures, implying that the failures arising in the network 
were generated according to failure distributions iternal to the spacecraft subsystems. 
However, recall that survivability can be defined as the “capability of a system to fulfill 
its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents” (Ellison, 
et al., 1999). As a consequence, another aspect of the survivability of space-based 
networks is their ability to withstand targeted attacks, such as collisions with orbital 
debris, or anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks from antagonist entities. Exploring the space-
based network response with respect to the modulation of the threat profile (random or 
targeted failures) might lead to interesting insights for the choice or design of 
architectures. 
Also, survivability enhancements are usually coming at a cost. In the case study, the 
survivability improvement was obtained by designing, manufacturing and launching an 
additional spacecraft. Future work would be in the form of systematically evaluating the 
cost of space-based networks in addition to its survivability metrics. 
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The consideration of survivability metrics, cost and potentially other performance metrics 
for space-based networks paves the way for multi-criteria or multi-objective analyses, 
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